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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. We first provide the motivation for this thesis, and then 
briefly introduce the research questions, as well as an integrative framework. Finally, we introduce 
the remaining six chapters in this thesis. 
1.1   Motivation 
The study of international trade is among the oldest specialities in economics. 
Changing environmental conditions and all kinds of economic or political events 
continuously introduce triggers that may give rise to new trade patterns. Such 
dynamics stimulate the theoretical and empirical study of international trade. As a 
result, the study of international trade still is a very active field in economics. The 
industrial revolution, collapse of the colonial system, regional integration, economic 
transition and globalization – these and other driving forces behind the development 
of trade have inspired this sub-discipline of economics to develop new theories and 
perform additional empirical studies. In the contemporary world of the late 20th and 
early 21th centuries, globalization has become what is probably the most talked-about 
theme, due to its forceful impact on the world economy and the heated debate 
between advocates and opponents. No country can escape from its influence, and 
not many countries intend to exclude themselves from the process of globalization 
altogether. On the contrary, many countries that adopted inward-oriented strategies 
for many decades, are now making an effort to connect their economy into the 
world network of business and trade.  
China is an extraordinary example. In 1978, China ended a long period of isolation 
by adopting an open-door policy. Since then, China has gradually increased its 
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involvement in the international production network by launching successive steps in 
the context of an overall policy of liberalization. Owing to its huge market potential, 
high growth, deepening economic reform, and outward-oriented strategy, China is 
not only influenced by the trends of globalization, but is also among the most 
forceful countries that boost the current globalization process. China is particularly 
influential as a result of the high growth of its international trade and foreign direct 
investment. No wonder, then, that China receives so much attention, both in 
academic and policy circles. Furthermore, given its unique context as a distinctive 
cultural, economic, political and social system, China seems to offer an excellent 
setting for testing and adapting the theories that were developed with reference to 
the empirical evidence as to developed market economies in the West. Therefore, 
this thesis tries to enrich the literature by examining China’s foreign trade relations 
through a series of five empirical studies. 
The reform process that started at the end of the 1970s, has gradually brought China 
in line with the economic rhythms of the world system. During this transitional 
process, China’s foreign economic relations witnessed an unprecedented history of 
changes, both in number and nature. In particular, after 1978, China became a prime 
example of a developing country that integrated into the world economy, particularly 
in the areas of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). The growth 
of China’s trade volume since 1978 has been four and a half times that of world 
trade, which changed China from a closed economy into one of the largest trading 
nations in the world. China’s share of world trade septupled from 0.67 per cent on 
the eve of reform in 1977 to 4.89 percent in 2002.1 In the post-war period, no other 
country has increased its share in international trade so rapidly. At the same time, 
China has become more open to FDI than most of the other developing countries, 
which increased China’s inward FDI from nearly zero in 1978 to a level that makes it 
2 
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3 
the largest FDI recipient in the developing world in the early 21th century. As we will 
explore below, the large FDI stock is playing an unusually influential role in the 
development of China’s international trade structure.  
The starting point of this thesis is the ‘old’ observation that the development of 
international trade is influenced by institutional and political dynamics, next to 
economic drivers. China’s institutional setting has experienced tremendous changes 
in the last five decades, first changing from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial economy 
after the Opium War into a centralized socialist economy in the 1950s, and 
subsequently shifting gradually from a highly centralized socialist system to a 
decentralized market-oriented economy in the last two decades. China’s 
contemporary history offers a natural experiment for a study into the impact of 
institutional and political changes on the evolution of trade relations. As a 
benchmark hypothesis, we expect that, during this accelerated evolutionary process, 
“traditional” economic factors (cf. the gravity model, Linder’s effect and new trade 
theories) especially started to exercise their role in driving the pattern of trade flows 
in the recent two decades of liberalization. Furthermore, after China opened its 
market to multinational companies, we hypothesize that foreign direct investment is 
likely to be an important determinant of China’s bilateral trade pattern.   
In terms of economic growth, China has been the world’s number-one country over 
the past two decades. Not very surprisingly, this attracted a substantial amount of 
attention from economists. The literature is unanimous that expanding international 
trade is an important engine for high growth, also in the case of China. This thesis 
aims to contribute to the extant literature by figuring out empirically which factors 
indeed fuel this engine. In so doing, we broadly take into account the impact of a 
wide range of cultural, economic and political factors on the development of China’s 
foreign trade relations ever since the 1950s, with an emphasis on the late 20th and 
early 21th centuries. Another objective of this thesis is to test whether – in if so: to 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
4 
what extent – established trade theories that were developed with reference to the 
evidence as to developed market economies in the West work for China, an 
emerging transition economy, as well.  In order to achieve this pair of aims, we will 
explore a rich panel data set by applying advanced econometric techniques. 
Of course, in this thesis, we stand on the shoulders of giants. Much work has already 
been done, both empirically and theoretically, also for the case of China. In the 
following chapters, we offer reviews of the relevant literatures. From such overviews, 
we learn that, although previous studies have revealed quite a few of the  important 
features of China’s international trade evolution, a number of issues still remain to be 
explored. For example, very little effort has been devoted to the estimation of the 
impact of changes in the institutional and political context on Chinese bilateral trade 
patterns with panel data that cover a long time window, the number of studies that 
address China’s bilateral structure and its determinants is quite limited, and the 
detailed investigation of how FDI and trade (reciprocally) interact is just starting to 
emerge. This thesis tries to fill these gaps by presenting a series of five empirical 
studies.  
1.2   Research Questions and Integrative Framework 
This thesis focuses on empirical studies into China’s bilateral trade relations, 
examining how and to what extent the bilateral trade relationships were and are 
influenced by cultural, economic, geographical and political factors. To fulfill this 
aim, the thesis deals with such  questions as “How have China’s trade relations 
developed over time?”, “How can bilateral trade relations be measured?”,  “How and 
to what extent do politicians influence bilateral trade relations?”, “Do the economic 
invisible hands and the political visible ones both play a role in China’s bilateral trade 
relations, and what is their relative importance?”, “What factors affect the structure 
of bilateral trade?”, “Does Linder’s effect determine China’s trade pattern, at least in 
 
 
 
 
    
 
    
 
part?”, “Does FDI influence trade?”, and “Is there a two-way causal relation 
between trade and FDI?” By answering these and other questions, we hope to 
contribute to the development of a better understanding of the drivers behind the 
changes in China’s bilateral trade relations during the last half century. Based on the 
extant literature, we can refer to the integrative research framework in Figure 1.1 to 
position our series of five empirical studies. The framework includes all the potential 
dependent and independent variables that we will examine in this thesis. 
   
Figure 1.1 Integrative framework 
 
Institutional and Political Factors
   • political system 
   • political relations 
   • institutionalized political-     
     economic cooperation 
 
 
 
 
Trade Relations
  • trade flows 
  • trade intensity 
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In the next section, we will briefly explain how our five studies relate to Figure 1.1.’s 
integrative framework. In advance, we like to emphasize that we purposefully 
decided not to eliminate all the overlap among our five studies (and, thus, our five 
empirical chapters). As a consequence of this strategy of reporting, that is, each of 
the five empirical studies can, in principle, be read without consulting any of the 
other four chapters. However, as we will explain in the next section and in Chapter 7, 
the five empirical studies produce different pieces of the overall puzzle of the 
development of China’s international trade in the post-war period. 
1.3   Chapters 
Chapter 2 reviews the historical changes of China’s foreign economic relations and 
related policies in the post WWII period. Here, the objective is to provide 
background information that sets the scene for the four empirical tests in subsequent 
chapters. China’s foreign economic relationships experienced tremendous changes 
during the last 50 years. These changes reflect important shifts in the larger world’s 
environment, such as the rise and fall of the Cold War from the 1950s to the 1980s, 
and intensifying processes of globalization in the late 20th century. However, shifts in 
China’s internal regimes and policies might take more responsibility for these trade 
relation changes. The review indicates that, in China’s pre-reform era, politicians 
were decisive in preventing or assisting trade with the rest of the world, whilst in the 
reform era open-door policies enabled – and still do so – economic factors to come 
to the fore. Subsequently, the purpose of the following four empirical studies is to 
rigorously test which determinants of bilateral trade were important when and how, 
taking this general observation into account. 
Chapter 3 aims to find an answer to the following question: does trade follow the 
flag? To answer this question, we investigate the significance of the impact on 
bilateral trade relations of political factors by using data as to 78 of China’s trade 
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partners over the 1950-2002 period. We use the so-called trade intensity index to 
measure bilateral trade relations, which explicitly reveals the relative importance of 
trade between two countries. We test the impact of five political factors on this trade 
intensity index: (1) diplomatic relationship, (2) cooperation and conflicts, (3) high-
level visit, (4) political system similarity, and (5) military alliances. To estimate the 
relative importance of these political factors vis-à-vis economic determinants, we 
explicitly take the latter on board as well. In the empirical model, we try to deal with 
issues of data censoring, temporal dynamics and heterogeneity. This study provides 
strong empirical evidence for the hypotheses that the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, cooperation, visits of heads of states and similarity of political systems are 
associated with higher intensities of trade linkages. 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on another question: does trade follow the market? For one, 
in Chapter 4, we try to reveal the impact of the Chinese trade liberalization program 
in the 1990s on changes in bilateral trade intensities. The objective here is to 
investigate whether or not trade liberalization measures have made the economic 
explanations more significant. We estimate six models for the 1993-1999 period, as 
well as for the 1993 and 1999 milestone years separately, explaining the shifts in the 
export and import intensities of trade with different trade partners in the 1993-1999 
period. The differences across our estimation results for the six models indicate, 
indeed, that factors influencing bilateral trade intensities have been changing 
significantly during the transition process. Particularly, the political determinants of 
trade intensities that were still very important in 1993, have been moved to the 
background by economic explanations in 1999. 
Next, in Chapter 5, we turn to the examination of China’s bilateral trade structure 
and its determinants. Here, we shift our focus from inter-industry trade, as explored 
in Chapters 3 and 4, to intra-industry trade (IIT). Growing importance of IIT is one 
of the major new developments in patterns of international trade in the last half 
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century. A high level of IIT can be expected only when a country’s economic 
development reaches a certain stage, implying that this country integrates well into 
the world economy. Given its character, IIT is likely to be more beneficial than inter-
industry trade, because it stimulates innovation and exploits economics of scale. 
During the last two decades, China’s intra-industry trade index has increased 
substantially, which implies that China upgraded its trade structure. The main 
objective of this chapter is to explore the determinants of bilateral IIT by using panel 
data. We estimate three models for total intra-industry trade, vertical intra-industry 
trade (VIIT) and horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT). Using factor analysis, we are 
able to extend the extant literature by including more potential determinants into the 
models. On the one hand, VIIT appears to be positively related to differences in 
consumer patterns. On the other hand, HIIT is negatively related to these 
differences. In addition, we find that FDI has played an important role in 
determining IIT, especially VIIT. Other significant intra-industry trade drivers are 
geographical distance, economic size, trade openness and trade composition. 
Subsequently, Chapter 6 deals with the FDI-trade causality issue. That is, we 
investigate long-run relationships and the causality structure between FDI, export 
and import by using cointegration and Granger-causality approaches. In Chapters 4 
and 5, FDI is set, among many other potential trade determinants, as a very 
important explanatory variable of bilateral trade intensities (Chapter 4) and bilateral 
IIT (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 goes one step further to investigate the two-way causality 
relationship between FDI and trade by estimating a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM).  In so doing, we unravel the causality and direction of FDI – trade linkages 
for the Chinese economy in the 1980 – 2003 period. The key findings indicate a 
virtuous process of the development of China’s outward-oriented economy: more 
imports lead to more FDI, more FDI leads to more exports, and more exports lead 
to more FDI. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings of the five empirical studies that 
form the core of this thesis. There, we point to a number of limitations of this thesis, 
suggesting a few  issues that deserve attention in future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Development of China’s Foreign 
Economic Relations since 1949 
In order to provide background information for following empirical studies, this chapter gives an 
historical overview of the  development of foreign trade and FDI in China since the foundation of 
socialism in 1949. China’s economic development experienced, by and large, two different periods. 
The first period, from 1949 to 1978, is the pre-reform epoch. In this period, China was a closed 
economy: foreign trade accounted for a small part of the Chinese economy only. The second period, 
since 1978, is the reform era in which China has moved towards greater participation in the world 
market. Chinese foreign trade has soared since the open-door policy was formally launched in the late 
1970s. This chapter starts with an overview of the ins and outs of China’s foreign trade regime and 
its foreign trade features in the first period. Subsequently, we present China’s foreign trade reform 
and trade development in the second period. After that, we summarize the changes in China’s 
foreign trade regime and trade policy instruments during the 50-year period. In view of the close 
relation between FDI and trade, we conclude with a description of the development of FDI in China. 
2.1   Introduction 
Contemporary history of China is dominated by Communism. In the late 1940s, a 
cival war ended with the victory of Mao’s Communist forces. Under his reign, China 
developed an inward-looking policy of independence and self-reliance. After Mao’s 
death and an interim power struggle in the second half of the 1970s, Deng Xioping’s  
Chapter 2 Development of China’s Foreign Economic Relation Since 1949 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
leadership initiated a major policy shift, with the purpose to bring prosperity to 
China by combining a monopoly of the Communist Party in the political arena with 
market capitalism in the economic sphere. The effect of this open-door policy, 
which was developed step by step in the 1980s and 1990s, has been dramatic. In this 
thesis, which covers the 1950-2002 period, we need to develop an understanding of 
the nature of these changes, and their likely impact on China’s economy in general 
and its foreign trade relations in particular. In this chapter, we provide an overview 
of just that. 
First, in Section 2.2, we focus on the Maoist period of isolation. Subsequently, in 
Section 2.3, we turn to the liberalization era of the 1980s and 1990s. Next, in Section 
2.4, we offer an intermediate conclusion and summary. As an addendum, in Section 
2.5, we zoom in on foreign direct investment (FDI), as FDI started to play such an 
influential role ever since the early 1990s. Finally, in Section 2.6, we give a brief 
summary. 
2.2   Isolated Era 
When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, its leaders’ fundamental 
long-term goal was to transform China into a modern, powerful, socialist nation. The 
basic policy for achieving this goal relied on independence and self-reliance. Mao 
emphasized the importance of self-reliance, advocating that China should rely as 
much as possible on its own resources for economic and social development to 
achieve economic and political independence. Mao feared the vulnerability that 
foreign trade and investment would engender (Roy 1998). Based on this idea, Maoist 
China was essentially a “closed economy”, which sought to operate isolated from 
outside influences for about three decades. In addition, the establishment of the new   
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People’s Republic of China in 1949 was considered by the West to give birth to a 
hostile state, dedicated to overthrowing global capitalism. This belief further 
intensified China’s isolated position. Under these circumstances, China was not a 
significant player in the world market. Foreign trade was highly controlled by central 
government, and foreign investment was highly restricted. Since foreign direct 
investment in this period was negligible, we only focus on the foreign trade system in 
this period of China’s history. 
2.2.1   China’s foreign trade system during the pre-reform period 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China, historically a semi-
feudal and semi-colonial country after the Opium War, was changed into a 
centralized socialist country. Accordingly, a highly centralized and controlled trade 
system had been set up, particularly since 1957, when the state took over all 
enterprises from private (e.g., Japanese) and public (e.g., the Kuomintang 
government) owners. As stated by Liu Chao-chin, the director of Beijng’s  foreign 
trade department: “After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949… 
we took over the control of foreign trade; reformed the customs system; abrogated 
the immediate effect of all the special rights of imperialists in China; nationalized the 
customs service; freed ourselves from the imperialist monopoly of foreign trade; … 
set up state-owned foreign trade enterprises; gradually transformed the private 
export firms; and thus put an end to old China’s dependence upon imperialism in 
foreign trade … [and] transferred semi-colonial foreign trade into a new socialist 
foreign trade.”1
 
 
 
1 See Economic Information & Agency (1978: 2).  
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The most important objective of China’s foreign trade policy in the immediate post-
1949 period was to serve the development of China’s industry, particularly heavy 
industry. The goal of industrialization was to achieve economic self-reliance. To 
guarantee the implementation of the country’s industrialization program, it was 
necessary to export in order to obtain the funds needed to import materials and 
equipment for industrial development. In the word of Ye, minister of foreign trade 
at that time, “export is for import, and import is for the country’s socialist 
industrialization.”2 Therefore, the trade system in this period was regarded as an 
extreme example of import substitution (Lardy 1992). Yet, notwithstanding the 
underlying strategy of import substitution, import of consumer products and raw 
materials were required to alleviate domestic shortages. In general, the purpose of 
imports was primarily to overcome bottlenecks due to limited domestic production 
capabilities. Exports were perceived mainly as a means of financing imports. 
In the planned economy, China’s foreign trade was conducted strictly according to 
central planning guidelines. The foreign trade plans concerned all aspects of foreign 
trade, such as the commodities composition, the trade direction, transportation, 
accounting, foreign exchange rates, labor and wages. Accordingly, China’s foreign 
trade system was composed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the national foreign 
trade companies (FTCs) and their branches in various provinces and ports, the 
commercial offices abroad, and local foreign trade bureaus at the provincial level. 
The State Planning Commission and Ministry of Foreign Trade were the key players 
 
 
 
2 Ye Jizhuan “Speech at the Second Session of First National People’s Congress”, 
People Daily, July 30, 1995.   
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in drawing up the plan for trade with the objective to fulfill the government’s overall 
plan. The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) was the executive department 
responsible for implementing the state’s foreign trade plans. FTCs were the state-
owned enterprises to deal with export and import, seeking to achieve the foreign 
trade task that the MFT allocated to them. Local foreign trade bureaus at the 
provincial level supervised the foreign trade organizations under their jurisdiction. 
They were subject to the dual-leadership of the MFT and their local so-called 
Revolutionary Committees.  
The main features of this planning foreign trade system were fivefold.3  
1) Foreign trade was handled exclusively by 12 to 16 national FTCs with numerous 
branches, which were highly specialized and monopolized. For example, the China 
National Chemicals Import and Export Corporation handled goods produced by the 
Ministry of Chemical Industry, and the China National Textiles Import and Export 
Corporation handled goods produced under supervision of the Ministry of Textile 
Industry.  
2) A centralized accounting system was run through the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and the Ministry of Finance. Under this system, the producers and foreign trade 
corporations that handled imports and exports were not responsible for the profits 
and/or losses incurred in the production and trading activities. Financial variables 
such as profits played only a secondary role, backing up the central plan’s physical 
targets. Under the pressure to fulfil their export quotas, FTCs sometimes would be 
 
 
 
3 See the descriptions in Lardy (1992),  Huang and Wong (1996), and Song (1999).  
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forced to acquire higher-cost goods, which could be sold in the international market 
only at a loss.  
3) A planned price system was employed in foreign trade.4 Domestic prices of 
commodities, therefore, were shielded from the world market. In other words, 
domestic and world market prices were completely separated. For example, the 
procurement of export goods and domestic sales of imported goods were controlled 
by the domestic planned price system, whilst the prices of exports and imports were 
based on the international market prices.  
4) Foreign exchange allocation and exchange rates were strictly controlled by the 
central government. Foreign trade corporations handed over all their foreign 
exchange earnings to the state. Demands for foreign currencies by domestic users for 
imports were met by allocating foreign currencies to these users according to the 
plan. The Yuan was highly overvalued during the whole period, which played an 
important role in balancing the foreign trade balance and subsidizing certain 
categories of imported goods. However, the overvalued Yuan resulted in financial 
losses on China’s exports. For example, by the early 1960s, the average cost of 
earning one U.S dollar was 6.65 Yuan, and the loss per dollar exports was 4.19 Yuan, 
given the official rate of 2.46 (Lardy 1992).  
5) The conventional trade policy instruments were less important. Price-based 
measures such as tariffs were obviously unimportant since the planning system was 
 
 
 
4 Chinese prices were fixed by the state, implying that they were not necessarily 
related to real economic scarcities.   
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based on quantity decisions rather than behavioral responses to prices. And quotas 
or licenses were not necessary because the import quantities were controlled through 
the monopoly trading corporations.  
Apart from economic motives, China used foreign trade as a weapon in international 
political struggles, too. Overall, in the pre-reform period, China implemented an 
import substitute strategy of industrialization. The Chinese foreign trade system was 
run as a complete state monopoly. The market mechanism was switched off. 
Consequently, foreign trade was particularly influenced by politicians rather than by 
economic agents. It can therefore be expected that political reasons were important 
drivers of or barriers for the development of foreign trade relations.  A detailed 
discussion of this political “visible hand” can be found in Chapter 3. 
2.2.2   Foreign trade development in the isolated area 
Under the influence of an excessive self-reliance principle, China’s foreign trade was 
very limited. As stated above, imports were only made up for shortages in domestic 
production, such as essential raw materials and capital goods, whilst exports were 
only a means to provide foreign currencies necessary to finance imports. In addition, 
hostile foreign relationships between China and the Western countries produced a 
trade embargo from the West against China in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, 
China’s foreign trade hardly increased at all in this period. From 1950 to 1972, 
China’s foreign trade had been languishing at about 2 to 4 billion US$, as is depicted 
in Figure 2.1. Beginning in 1972, China’s foreign trade jumped sharply, reflecting by 
the historic trip of the US’s President Richard Nixon to China, and the ending of the 
US trade embargo against China. This was China’s initial turn toward the outside 
world. Total trade tripled from 4.06 billion in 1971 to 13.6 billion in 1977. However, 
in general, during the pre-reform area, China actually failed to make full use of 
foreign trade to accelerate economic development. One of the indicators of such a 
failure was China’s decreasing share in the total world export and import from  
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0.91and 0.90 per cent in the 1950s to 0.71 and 0.66 per cent in the 1960s, and 0.80 
and 0.77 per cent in the 1970s. Table 2.1 provides detailed figures.  
Figure 2.1: China's foreign trade during 1948-1979 
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Table 2.1: The share of China in world export and import (%) 
  1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2002 
Export  0.91 0.71 0.80 1.45 2.84 4.46 
Import  0.90 0.66 0.77 1.58 2.44 3.88 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the data from IMF DOTS databank. 
In contrast to the stagnant aggregate trade value, China’s trade direction has changed 
considerably during this period. Probably, these changes reflect the policy shifts that 
occurred in the same period. In the 1950s, under the “lean-to-one-side” policy, the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were the most important trade partners. In 1955, 
69.2 per cent of Chinese foreign trade took place with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. In the early 1960s, China shifted from an alliance with the Soviet Union   
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against the United States to an anti-Soviet policy. This change led China to cultivate 
ties with Third World countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 1960s and 
1970s, and to seek rapprochement with Japan, the United States and Western 
Europe in the 1970s. Influenced by the policy shift, China’s trade partners became 
increasingly diversified. The share of industrial countries, Asia and Africa in China’s 
total trade value increased significantly, as is clear from Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2: Direction of China’s foreign trade, 1950-1979 (%) 
  1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1979 
U.S.S.R.  31.0 51.0 42.0 10.7 1.1  1.9  1.6 
Eastern  Europe  1.9 17.2  8.0 5.4 8.2 6.9 7.3 
Industrial countries  35.5  14.3 30.6 49.0 57.4 62.2 61.0 
Africa  0.9 1.0 2.4 5.0 6.3 4.7 1.8 
Asia  26.9 12.7 14.9 24.4 21.2 17.1 23.2 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on the data from IMF DOTS databank, data 
from Mah (1971), and data from Eurostat (1981).  
2.3   Trade in the Opening Era 
At the milestone Third Plenum of the National Party Congress’s Eleventh Central 
Committee in December 1978, after Mao’s death, the party leaders decided to 
undertake a program of gradual but fundamental reform of the economic system. 
They concluded that the Maoist version of the centrally planned economy had failed 
to produce efficient economic growth, and had caused China to fall far behind not 
only the industrialized nations of the West but also the new industrial powers of Asia: 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The purpose of 
the reform program was not to abandon communism, but rather to make it work  
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better by substantially increasing the role of market mechanisms in the system by 
reducing, not eliminating, government planning and direct control. The process of 
reform was incremental. New measures were first introduced experimentally in a few 
localities, and were then popularized and disseminated nationally if they proved to be 
successful. By the end of the 1980s, the program had achieved remarkable results in 
increasing supplies of food and other consumer goods, and had created a new 
climate of dynamism and opportunity in the economy. In this section, we focus on 
this incremental process of foreign trade reform and development.  
2.3.1   China’s foreign trade reform during the transition period 
The over-centralized and inflexible trade system was entirely unsuitable to facilitate 
the opening up of the Chinese economy to the outside world.  The reform of the 
trade system started with the decentralization of the foreign trade authority. This 
decentralization policy consisted of the following five aspects.  
1) De-monopolizing of the foreign trade regime. Since 1978, the de-monopolization 
of the foreign trade regime opened a window of opportunity for new entrants into 
foreign trade activity. The national ministries, provincial governments, three 
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) and a number of large state-owned 
enterprises were authorized to establish their own trading companies. Almost every 
provincial and municipal government had its own network of FTCs conducting 
foreign trade. As a result, the number of foreign trade corporations increased from   
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12 in 1978 to 5,075 in 1988, and to 10,000 in 1995.5 In addition, according to the 
Law of Foreign Investment, all foreign-invested enterprises were automatically given 
trading rights within a prescribed scope when they registered. These changes 
generated increased competition, both upstream and downstream: FTCs had not 
only to compete for foreign markets, but also for domestic supply as production 
units were progressively granted the freedom to choose their FTC. This competition 
led to selective retrenchment. For example, in mid-1988, about 2,000 FTCs were 
dissolved, or merged with rivals (Fung et al. 1998). In 1999, de-monopolization was 
extended to private firms, which could from then on apply for trade rights. In 2000, 
a notice issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC) announced that the same rules applied for state-owned, collectively-
owned and private enterprises, as well as research institutions, in granting them rights 
to engage in foreign trade business (XINHUA, December 18 2000). Since then, state 
corporations, foreign-invested firms, collectively-owned enterprises, and private 
organizations all have direct trading rights. 
2) Decentralization of decision making. The scope of mandatory planning for 
foreign trade has been reduced. The foreign trade system was transformed from 
mandatory planning to a combination of mandatory planning, guidance planning and 
a market mechanism. Gradually, mandatory planning was abolished. Before 1979, the 
mandatory export plan covered about 3,000 items, but in 1988 this number fell to a 
mere 112. By the end of the 1980s, the proportion of exports under mandatory or 
guidance plans accounted for about 34 per cent of total exports. Compared with its 
export counterpart, the import system remained relatively rigid in the 1980s. In 
 
 
 
5 China Economic News, June 24 (1996: 33).  
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addition to import licensing and high tariffs on protected products, almost all 
importers were subject to a series of administrative measures and complicated 
approval procedures. But in the process of reforming the foreign trade system, the 
general scope of mandatory planning for imports was narrowed, too. By 1991, no 
more than 40 per cent of China’s imports were subject to mandatory or guidance 
plans (Fung and Iizaka 1998). Later in the 1990s, pressured by the desire to join the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s trade regime has been moving further 
into a more deregulated and market-oriented direction. Specifically, mandatory 
export plans have been abolished, and import plans have been scaled down 
substantially. National monopoly and canalization only apply to a limited number of 
agricultural and industrial products, deemed essential for the Chinese society, calling  
for special protection, such as crude oil, rubber, automobiles, key automotive parts 
and accessories, coal, and tobacco and cigarettes.
6 Meanwhile, almost all FTCs are 
independent, being responsible for their own profits and losses.  
3) Relaxation of exchange control.  The foreign exchange rate system has been 
relaxed, step by step. In 1979, to start with, enterprises were granted the right to buy 
back a fraction of their hard currency earnings from the Bank of China. Later, they 
were allowed to retain up to 25 per cent of planned export earnings. The retention 
system came with the establishment of  foreign exchange adjustment centers across 
the country in 1986. Through the foreign exchange adjustment centers, enterprises 
 
 
 
6 See the recent announcement and provisions concerning trade management, such 
as “2003 commodities list under the import licensing control” (2002, jointly issued 
by MOFTEC and the Customs of People’s Republic of China).   
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short of foreign exchange could purchase foreign currencies at a significant discount 
relative to the official rate. China thus had a dual exchange rate system. One the one 
hand, there was the administered official exchange rate, which used for transactions 
under the foreign trade plan and for most capital account transactions; on the other 
hand, there were the swap market exchange rates as determined in the foreign 
exchange adjustment centers, which were applicable to foreign exchange transactions 
outside the foreign trade plan. In 1994, the two rates were unified and the foreign 
exchange adjustment centers were replaced by a national foreign exchange market 
operating through designated banks. All enterprises must now buy and sell foreign 
currencies at this national market. This new exchange system has strengthened the 
Central Bank’s ability to stabilize the exchange rate, thereby achieving more flexibility 
in responding to movements in the balance of payments and global market 
conditions. The united system provides a more efficient trading and settlement 
mechanism, as well as a unified regulatory framework.  
4) Devaluation. For a long time, the losses on exports caused by the overvalued 
Yuan increasingly deterred China’s trade development. Devaluation was an 
important measure to alleviate the disincentive effects of currency overvaluation on 
exports. The first round of devaluation took place in January 1981 with the 
introduction of an internal settlement rate of 2.8 Yuan per US dollar. From 1981 to 
1993, there were six major devaluations in China, ranging from 9.6 to 44.9 per cent: 
the official exchange rate went from 2.8 to 5.32 Yuan per US dollar. On January 1, 
1994, China unified the two-tier exchange rates by devaluing the official rate to the 
prevailing swap rate of 8.7 Yuan per US dollar. By the end of May 1998, the foreign 
exchange reserve of China had reached US$140.91 billion. Due to the increase in 
foreign exchange supply, the official exchange rate has continued to appreciate 
slightly. Since the end of May 1998, the official exchange rate has stayed at 8.28 Yuan 
per US dollar. Table 2.3 provides the 1980-2003 time series. Studies found evidence 
to support the idea that the current Chinese exchange rate is more realistic,  
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compared to the one in the pre-reform period. For example, Zhang (1999) indicated 
that the actual real exchange rate in China moved closer in line with its equilibrium 
value after 1981. 
Table 2.3: Exchange rate of Renminbi (Yuan/$) 
Year Exchange  Rate Year  Exchange Rate   Year Exchange Rate  
1980 1.5  1988 3.72  1996 8.31 
1981 1.7  1989 3.77  1997 8.29 
1982 1.89  1990 4.78  1998 8.28 
1983 1.98  1991 5.32  1999 8.28 
1984 2.32  1992 5.51  2000 8.28 
1985 2.94  1993 5.76    20018.28 
1986 3.45  1994 8.62  2002 8.28 
1987 3.72  1995 8.35  2003 8.28 
Source: IMF. 
5) Trade liberalization. As stated above, before the reform, all imports and exports 
were handled by the special national import and export companies under the 
jurisdiction of the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and its branch companies. 
Common trade policy instruments were not important. During the 1980s, the 
government restored the import and export license system to control foreign trade. 
The share of trade regulated by licenses rose sharply. By 1989, the share of imports 
under licenses was 46 per cent, and the share of export under licenses was 55 per  
cent (Lardy 1992). Since 1992, China has made substantial progress in reducing the 
number of non-tariff barriers in its trade regime. In 1992, the government lowered 
the number of export goods subject to quota license regulation from 212 to 183, and 
fully eliminated import-quota license requirements for 16 categories of goods. In 
December 1993, China canceled import license requirements for 9 categories of   
 
 
 
 
 
25 
                                                     
goods that comprise 283 products, including steel products, pesticides, civil airplanes, 
and black-and-white television tubes. In May 1994, China eliminated import license 
requirements for another 195 goods, including 30 goods that were to be relieved of 
requirements by the end of 1994 in accordance with a Sino-US memorandum of 
understanding. In 1995, another 120 goods were relieved of import license regulation. 
In April 1996, 30 per cent of the remaining quotas were dropped. By the end of 1997, 
the import commodities subject to licensing controls were reduced to 374 products 
(http://www.tdctrade.com/sme/ir/chinair.htm). In fulfilling China’s WTO 
commitment, China has removed the import license requirements for more products 
in recent years; by 1 January 2003, only 8 categories and 143 products were subject to 
licensing control.7
Moreover, the Chinese government has lowered trade tariff rates more broadly and 
more significantly. In January and again in December 1992, China reduced import 
tariffs for 3,596 duty codes, reflecting different product categories, by an average of 
7.3 per cent. In the same year, China eliminated an adjustment tax that had been 
levied since 1985 on the import of 16 categories of goods. In December 1993, China 
further cut back on import tariff rates for 2,898 duty codes by an average of 8.8 per 
cent. In January 1994, import tariff rates for sedans were reduced from 220 per cent 
and 180 per cent (depending on the model) to 150 per cent and 110 per cent, 
respectively. In April 1996, import tariffs for 4,971 items were lowered by an average 
of 35 per cent, reducing the country’s average tariff rate from 35 to 23 per cent for 
all goods. The average rate was further decreased to 17.8 per cent on October 1 1997 
(Customs of the People’s Republic of China). In 2001, China cut import tariff rates 
 
 
 
7 MOFTEC 2002, “2003 commodities list under the import licensing control”.   
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on 3,462 items by an average of 6.6 per cent, bringing the country’s average tariff 
rate down to 15.3 per cent (China Daily of May 1 2001). In all, the trade liberalization 
program during the post-1992 period is associated with a drop of the arithmetic 
average of tariff rates from 43.2 per cent in 1992 to 15.3 per cent in 2001. In order to 
fulfill the promise for the entry of WTO, in 2002, China cut back on import tariff 
rates for 5000 duty codes, which bring average tariff rate to 12%. In 2003 this rate 
was further cut down to 11.1%, with more than 3,000 tariff items involved. Table 2.4 
provides details. 
Table 2.4: The average tariff rates in China: 1992-2003 (%) 
 All  products  Primary  products  Manufactures 
 Simple*  Weighted**  Simple  Weighted Simple  Weighted 
1992 42.9  40.6  36.2  22.3  44.9  46.5 
1993 39.9  38.4  33.3  20.9  41.8  44.0 
1994 36.3  35.5  32.1  19.6  37.6  40.6 
1996 23.6  22.6  25.4  20.0  23.1  23.2 
1997 17.6  18.2  17.9  20.0  17.5  17.8 
1998 17.5  18.7  17.9  20.0  17.4  18.5 
1999 16.7           
2000 16.3  14.7  16.5  18.8  16.2  13.7 
2001 15.3  14.3  18.8  18.6  14.7  12.9 
2002 12    18.1    11.4   
2003 11    16.8    10.3   
  * Simple average tariff rate; ** Weighted average tariff rate. 
Source: Data during 1992-1998 and for 2000 come from the World Bank (1999: 340; 
and 2001: 348). For the other years, the sources are Xinhua News Agency, 
MOFTEC, and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council.   
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2.3.2   China’s foreign trade development since 1978 
2.3.2.1   The role in the world 
In the period after the launch of the trade system reform, China’s foreign trade 
expanded dramatically, as is immediately clear from Figure 2.2. The growth of 
China’s trade since 1978 has been four and half times that of world trade. As a result, 
China’s share in world export increased from 0.8 per cent in the 1970s to 4.46 per 
cent in the 2000s (see Table 2.1). China has increased its penetration into both 
developed and developing markets. The role of China’s products in Western 
countries and in Asian regional trade has become increasingly important, as the data 
in Table 2.5 reveal. For example, in 2002, China’s exports accounted for 11 per cent 
of US imports and 18.3 per cent of Japan’s imports. Similarly, China has become a 
more important export destination, especially for regional economies. In effect, 
China is now among the most important export destinations for other Asian 
countries, as is reflected in Table 2.6’s evidence. For example, a 14.7 per cent of 
Korea’s exports flowed into China in 2002, up from zero per cent in 1990. While 
most of the dramatic increases in exports to China have occurred from within the 
Asian region, the share of exports from the United States and the European Union 
to China has also increased, from 1.2 and 1.5 per cent, respectively, in 1990 to 3.2 
and 3.4 per cent in 2002.  
Figure 2.2: China's foreign trade during 1949-2002
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Source: IMF DOTS databank.  
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Table 2.5: China’s market share in selected trade partners 
(the share of China’s products in their total imports) 
 United 
States 
European 
Union 
Japan Korea  Australia Africa 
1980 0.5% 0.8%  3.1% 0.0% 1.2% 0.8% 
1981 0.8% 0.8%  3.7% 0.0% 1.4% 1.3% 
1982 1.0% 0.8%  4.1% 0.0% 1.3% 1.1% 
1983 0.9% 0.9%  4.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.0% 
1984 1.0% 0.9%  4.4% 0.0% 1.3% 1.0% 
1985 1.2% 1.0%  5.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.9% 
1986 1.4% 1.4%  4.5% 0.0% 1.4% 1.2% 
1987 1.6% 1.7%  5.0% 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 
1988 2.0% 1.9%  5.3% 0.0% 2.1% 1.0% 
1989 2.6% 2.1%  5.3% 0.0% 2.4% 0.9% 
1990 3.2% 2.3%  5.1% 0.0% 2.7% 1.1% 
1991 4.0% 3.1%  6.0% 4.2% 3.5% 1.2% 
1992 5.0% 3.5%  7.3% 4.5% 4.2% 1.7% 
1993 5.6% 4.2%  8.5% 4.5% 4.7% 1.8% 
1994 6.0% 4.4%  10.1%  5.3% 4.9% 1.8% 
1995 6.3% 4.3%  10.7%  5.5% 5.0% 1.9% 
1996 6.7% 4.6%  11.6%  5.7% 5.2% 2.0% 
1997 7.3% 4.9%  12.4%  6.9% 5.7% 2.4% 
1998 8.0% 5.3%  13.2%  6.9% 6.0% 3.0% 
1999 8.2% 5.7%  13.9%  7.4% 6.5% 3.0% 
2000 8.6% 6.2%  14.5%  8.0% 7.8% 3.8% 
2001 9.3% 6.7%  16.6%  9.4% 8.8% 4.3% 
2002  11.1% 7.5%  18.3% 11.4% 10.1% 5.0% 
Source: IMF DOTS databank. 
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Table 2.6: The share of China in selected countries’ exports  
(exports to China divided by their total exports) 
 
United 
States 
European 
Union  Japan Korea ASEAN Australia Africa 
1980 1.7%  0.9%  3.9%  0.0%  1.0%  3.6%  0.3% 
1981 1.5%  0.8%  3.4%  0.0%  0.8%  2.9%  0.3% 
1982 1.4%  0.8%  2.5%  0.0%  1.2%  3.8%  0.3% 
1983 1.1%  1.0%  3.3%  0.0%  0.8%  1.9%  0.3% 
1984 1.4%  1.2%  4.2%  0.0%  0.9%  3.1%  0.4% 
1985 1.8%  2.1%  7.1%  0.0%  1.4%  3.8%  0.4% 
1986 1.4%  2.1%  4.7%  0.0%  1.9%  4.7%  0.4% 
1987 1.4%  1.8%  3.6%  0.0%  2.3%  4.0%  0.2% 
1988 1.6%  1.8%  3.6%  0.0%  2.6%  2.6%  0.3% 
1989 1.6%  1.7%  3.1%  0.0%  2.3%  2.5%  0.4% 
1990 1.2%  1.5%  2.1%  0.0%  1.9%  2.5%  0.4% 
1991 1.5%  1.6%  2.7%  1.4%  2.0%  2.8%  0.3% 
1992 1.7%  1.8%  3.5%  3.4%  2.1%  3.2%  0.5% 
1993 1.9%  2.6%  4.8%  6.0%  2.4%  3.6%  0.7% 
1994 1.8%  2.6%  4.7%  6.1%  2.5%  4.3%  0.6% 
1995 2.0%  2.5%  5.0%  7.0%  2.6%  4.3%  1.0% 
1996 1.9%  2.3%  5.3%  8.3%  2.9%  5.0%  0.8% 
1997 1.9%  2.2%  5.2%  9.4%  3.0%  4.6%  1.5% 
1998 2.1%  2.3%  5.2%  9.0%  3.2%  4.2%  0.9% 
1999 1.9%  2.5%  5.6%  9.5%  3.1%  4.7%  1.6% 
2000 2.1%  2.7%  6.3%  10.7% 3.6%  5.7%  3.5% 
2001 2.6%  3.0%  7.7%  12.1% 4.1%  6.2%  3.1% 
2002 3.2%  3.4%  9.6%  14.7% 5.2%  6.9%  3.8% 
Source: IMF DOTS databank. 
2.3.2.2   Changes in trade direction 
Ever since the trade liberalization program is in effect, an important feature of 
Chinese trade patterns is the increased diversity of trade partners. The number of 
trade partners (with trade value more than 10,000 US$) increased from 62 in 1980 to 
198 in 2002. The share of trade partners like Hong Kong and Japan decreased, but  
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the share of other trade partner such as the United States, the European Union and 
Korea increased. In Figure 2.3, a few key statistics are depicted. Hong Kong had for 
long been China’s largest trade partner, counting for more than one third of Chinese 
exports during 1987-1992, but Hong Kong’s share dropped to an interim low of 18 
per cent in 2002 (IMF), becoming China’s second largest export destination behind 
the United States. Trade between the European union and China has increased very 
fast since 1992 (Ebbers and Zhang 2003). In 2004, the European Union has 
surpassed the United States to become China's largest trade partner. 
 
Figure 2.3: Share of selected countries in China's exports
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2.3.2.3   Composition of trade 
So, China’s trade composition has been changed considerably during the last two 
decades, as is clear from the figures in Table 2.7. On the one hand, food and fuels   
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had been important export products for many decades, accounting for more than 40 
per cent of China’s export in 1985. However, these products became less important 
since then, with a share in China’s export that decreased to 7.6 per cent in 2002. On 
the other hand, the manufactured goods, especially machinery and transport 
equipment, have increasingly gained importance. The share of manufactured goods 
(SITC 5-8 less 68) in China’s exports increased from 36.3 per cent in 1985 to 89.9 
per cent in 2002. The change in import composition is not as large as that in export. 
However, the share of fuels, machinery and transport equipment have been 
increasing, from 0.4 and 38.9 per cent, respectively, in 1985 to 6.6 and 46.4 per cent 
in 2002. These changes indicate that China has upgraded its trade structure: it no 
longer is a country that mainly exports material goods and imports manufactured 
goods. Of course, labor-intensive manufactured goods, largely consisting of footwear, 
clothing, toys, and other miscellaneous manufactured articles, have dominated 
China’s exports. However, in recent years, China has made substantial gains in other 
export categories, including more sophisticated electronics (office machines and 
automated data processing equipment, telecommunications and sound equipment, 
and electrical machinery), furniture, travel goods, and industrial supplies. For 
example, machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7, which includes electronics) in 
China’s exports increased from 2.8 per cent in 1985 to 46.4 per cent in 2002. In 
accordance with the changes in composition, China’s intra-industry trade (IIT) has 
increased: the IIT index  increased from 31.2 in 1992 to 39.4 in 2001 (Zhang and van 
Witteloostuijn 2005 ). More discussion about IIT can be found in Chapter 5. 
2.3.2.4   New forms of trade 
To promote export, China introduced new trade forms, such as processing trade, 
compensation trade, and small-scale border trade, in the post-1979 decades.  Among 
the most important of these is export processing. Export processing is a rather broad 
concept, encompassing both the processing of imported raw materials for export  
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and the assembly of imported components to produce exportable final goods. 
Beginning in 1979, China sought to promote export processing by offering the 
relevant processing firms priority in acquiring foreign exchange currencies and 
appropriate supplies of domestic raw materials, fuel and electricity (Lardy 1992). 
After 1984, the State Council approved two schemes that allowed duty-free import 
of components and raw materials for use in export industries. These schemes 
efficiently encouraged processing export. The share of processing trade increased 
from 4.4 in 1980 to 53.4 per cent in 1998, becoming the dominant trade form in 
China. After 1999, the share of processing trade decreased, but it sustained its 
position as the major trade form.8 The development of processing trade has changed 
China’s foreign trade structure, as can be seen in Table 2.8. More details about the 
influence of processing trade can be found in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 In order to promote export, the government implemented trade policy instruments 
such as export tax rebates, favorite policies for foreign invested enterprises, and 
duty-free import of components and raw materials for use in export industries. To 
take advantage of these policy instruments, some enterprises cheated the 
administration to earn extra profit. For example, some processing enterprises 
imported components and raw materials to subsequently sell them in domestic 
markets, instead of using them in export processing. In 1999, China’s State Council 
endorsed a new system for enhancing and improving the management of processing 
trade activities. Cheating in processing trade has been cracked down, which statistically 
produced a downturn in the growth of processing trade. 
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Table 2.7: Commodity composition of China’s foreign trade 1985-2002 
(in percentages) 
 All  food 
items (SITC 
0 + 1 + 22 
+ 4) 
Fuels 
(SITC 
3) 
Ores and 
metals 
(SITC 27 + 
28 + 68) 
Manufactur
ed goods 
(SITC 5 to 
8 less 68) 
Machinery 
and 
transport 
equipment 
(SITC 7) 
Export          
1985 16.7  25.9  2.6  36.3  2.8 
1990 12.7  8.4  2.1  71.4  17.4 
1995 8.2  3.6  2.1  83.9  21.0 
2000 5.4  3.2  1.8  88.2  33.1 
2002 5.0  2.6  1.6  89.9  39.0 
Import          
1985 4.4  0.4  5.3  78.0  38.9 
1990 8.7  2.4  2.9  79.7  40.3 
1995 7.0  3.9  4.4  78.5  39.7 
2000 4.0  9.2  5.9  75.6  40.8 
2002 3.3  6.6  5.3  80.2  46.4 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Statistics Section. 
 
 Table 2.8: Development of processing trade 1980-2002 
Processing trade  Processing trade  Year Total 
trade 100 
million$  Value Share(%) 
Year Total 
trade 100 
million$  Value Share(%) 
1980 381.4  16.7  4.4  1992  1658.7  711.6  42.9 
1981 440.2  24.8  5.6  1993  1956.7  806.2  41.2 
1982 416.1  35.2  8.3  1994  2365.3  1045.5 44.2  
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1983 436.2  42.2  9.5  1995  2810.2  1320.8 47.0 
1984 535.5  58.4  10.8  1996  2895.3  1465.0 50.6 
1985 696.0  75.4  10.7  1997  3252.9  1698.0 52.2 
1986 738.5  123.2 16.6  1998  3240.5  1731.5 53.4 
1987 826.5  191.9 23.2  1999  3606.5  1844.6 51.2 
1988 1030.4  288.5 28.0  2000  4743.1  2302.1 48.5 
1989 1119.5  361.6 32.3  2001  5097.7  2414.4 45.2 
1990 1156.8  441.9 38.2  2002  6207.0  3021.0 48.7 
1991 1362.3  574.9 42.2         
Source: Customs General Administration of the People’s Republic of China. 
2.4   Evolution of China’s Foreign Trade Regime and Trade Policy 
Instruments during 50 Post-war Years 
China’s foreign trade regime has experienced tremendous changes ever since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, as is summarized in Table 2.9. 
During the pre-reform period, the foreign trade principle was based on the idea of 
self-reliance and geopolitical motives. Accordingly, the trade regime was import 
substitution. After 1978, when “reform and open” was set as China’s basic policy, 
the foreign trade regime shifted to export promotion. Since 2001, WTO accession 
has brought China into a trade liberalization time. In line with the changes of foreign 
trade regime, the policy instrument portfolio has been changed. The period from 
1950 to 1958 was a transition period for China’s society, which transferred from a 
semi-feudal and semi-colonial country into a centralized socialist nation-state. During 
this period, state trading monopolies were set up by establishing national FTCs and 
taking over the foreign trade corporations that played a significant role in China’s 
foreign trade under the regime of the Nationalist Party.   C
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Even in this transitional period, foreign trade was heavily controlled by the state. 
Trade licenses were important instruments to control trade flows.9  From 1959 to 
1978, China’s foreign trade was conducted under a pure central planning system. All 
imports and exports were handled by a handful of FTCs and their branch companies 
in strict accordance with state plans. Thus the role of import and export licenses was 
reduced. Other instruments, such as licenses, quotas, foreign exchange policies, have 
been employed to control import. During 1979 to 1992, special economic zones, 
export processing, foreign exchange retention, export tax rebate, export subsidy, 
export credit and favorite policies for foreign invested enterprises were utilized to 
promote export. After 1992, administrative control was further reduced, and 
gradually withdrawn from trade management altogether. Other instruments, 
including tariff and non-tariff barriers, have been significantly reduced or eliminated. 
The export incentives that prevailed in the pre-reform period have also been lowered 
and eliminated. 
2.5   Foreign Direct Investment in China 
While China’s trade volume increased at a high speed, China’s inward FDI expanded 
extraordinarily. Since embarking on the open-door program at the end of the 1970s, 
China has emerged as one of the most attractive locations for FDI in the world. 
Chinese FDI inflow has risen tremendously, becoming a new factor contributing to 
6 
                                                      
 
 
9 In 1950, the central government issued the “Interim Regulations on Foreign Trade 
Management”, in which it was stated that “[w]hile importing and exporting any 
goods, the importer and exporter must apply to their local foreign trade 
administrative department for an import and export license” (MOFTEC). 
 
 
 
    
the growth of China’s foreign trade. In Lardy’s words, China’s trade expansion might 
well be the fruit of its liberal investment environment (Lardy 2002). Therefore, to 
better understand China’s foreign trade development, we need to consider the 
evolution of inward FDI in China and its contribution to China’s economy as well. 
2.5.1   Chinese success in attracting FDI 
2.5.1.1   High growth. 
China has been very successful in attracting FDI. By the end of 2003, China had 
approved a cumulative number of 465,277 foreign investment projects, which 
contracted and actually utilized an FDI stock amounting to US$943.13 billion and 
US$501.47 billion, respectively. Chinese FDI inflow has risen tremendously from 
nearly zero in 1978 to $53.5 billion in 2003. In Figure 2.4, we graph this evolution. 
Average annual growth is 30.2 per cent from 1983 to 2003.10  In 1999, Chinese FDI 
inflow decreased for the first time (-11.5%) due to the Asian crisis. But since 2000, it 
has recovered steadily with a growth rate of 1 per cent in 2000, 14.9 per cent in 2001, 
12.51 per cent in 2002, and 1.44 per cent in 2003.11
  37 
                                                      
 
 
10 Calculated from data of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
11 Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. 
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Figure 2.4: Utilized FDI in China 1979-2003
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Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. 
 
 
The increase of the absolute value of FDI is only part of the picture, though. The 
World Investment Report 2002 introduced the UNCTAD Inward FDI Performance 
Index to benchmark a country’s success in attracting FDI vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. This index is the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI flows to its share of 
global GDP. A country with an index of one receives FDI exactly in line with its 
relative economic size. A country with an index greater (lower) than one attracts 
more (less) FDI than may be expected on the basis of its relative GDP. Table 2.10 
shows that China’s Inward FDI Performance Index increased from below one, 0.9 
during 1988-1990, to above one, 1.2 during 1998-2000. This means China attracted 
less FDI than expected given its size in 1988-1990, but that it attracted more than its 
to-be-expected share in 1998-2000. Compared with other groups of countries, China 
not only scores higher than the group of developing countries as a whole, but also 
more than the developed countries as a whole, as well as the group of Central and 
Eastern European countries (cf. Table 2.10). Due to the slow economic growth in 
most parts of the world, global FDI inflows declined by 41 per cent in 2001, and fell 
8 
 
 
 
    
by another 21 per cent in 2002 – to $651 billion, the lowest level since 1998. 
However, in contrast with this worldwide downturn, China’s FDI inflow increased 
significantly in these two years, resulting in a higher inward FDI Performance Index 
of 1.3 during 2000-2002 (UNCTAD). 
Table 2.10: Inward FDI Performance Index for 1988-1990 and 1998-2000 
 1988-1990 1998-2000 
Developed countries  1.01  1.00 
Developing countries  0.99  0.99 
Asia 1.07  0.85 
Central and Eastern Europe  0.89  0.98 
China 0.9  1.2 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report  2001 (page 27). 
2.5.1.2   Important player in the world market 
The high growth of FDI inflow reflects the increasingly important role that China 
plays in the world’s capital flows. Table 2.11 indicates that the contribution of China 
to the world FDI inflow increased significantly. From 1980 to 2002, the ratio of 
China’s to the world FDI inflow stock increased from 1 per cent to 6.3 per cent, to 
developing countries from 2.5 per cent to 19.1 per cent, and to developing Asia from 
3.9 per cent to 31.9 per cent. In terms of annual FDI inflow, the share of China is 
even higher. In 2002, FDI inflow in China accounted for 8.1 per cent of world FDI, 
2.5 per cent of  FDI flowing into developing countries, and  55.5 per cent of the 
flow into Asia.12  
                                                      
 
 
12 Calculated from data of UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, table B.1. 
  39 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 Development of China’s Foreign Economic Relation Since 1949 
 
 
40 
 Indeed, China plays an increasingly important role in international production. In a 
global world that witnesses increased competitive pressures, multinational enterprises 
see China as an ideal place to expand their business. In the words of Roy Vallee, the 
chairman and chief executive officer of Avnet Inc., one of the world's largest 
business-to-business distributors of electronics: "To be successful in this industry, we 
have to be successful in China. We view China as an incredibly important market." 
(Spiegel 2001) 
                              Table 2.11: FDI inflow stock 1980-2001 (US$ Millions) 
  1980 1985  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
World   635534  913182 1871594 2911725 6258263 6845723 7122506 
Developing 245819  344463 484954 849915 2002173 2181249 2339632 
Asia   160000  227764 315412 567631 1243202 1325735 1402488 
China 6251  10499 24762  137435 348346 395192 447892 
China/World  1.0% 1.1%  1.3% 4.7% 5.6% 5.8% 6.3% 
China/Develo 2.5% 3.0%  5.1% 16.2%  17.4%  18.1%  19.1% 
China/Asia 3.9% 4.6%  7.9% 24.2%  28.0%  29.8%  31.9% 
Source: calculated from data of UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002 and World 
Investment Report 2003, Table B.3 
2.5.1.3   Contribution of FDI to domestic economy 
The Chinese economy expanded dramatically in the last two decades. The annual 
growth rate was 9.3 per cent during 1978-2001, about 6.1 percentage point above the 
 
 
 
    
world average.13 China now ranks as the world’s sixth largest economy in terms of 
gross national income.14 An important driving force for this development is the 
increasing openness of the economy, especially in the area of trade and FDI. Due to 
the positive interactive effect between trade and FDI (Liu, Burridge and Sinclair 
2002; Liu, Wang  and Wei 2001; Sun 2001; Sun 1999;  Wei, Liu, Parker and Vaidya 
1999; Zhang and Felmingham 2001), FDI has played a major role in China’s 
economic growth (Zhang 2001a; Berthelemy and Demurger 2000; Henley and 
Kirkpatrick 1999). 
First, FDI contributes to China’s high growth rate by expanding China’s 
manufacturing exports. Foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) play an increasingly 
important role in China’s export. The share of FIEs’ export and import in total 
national export and import increased from 1.9 and 5.6 per cent in 1986, respectively, 
to 54.8 and 56.2 per cent in 2003, as revealed in Figure 2.5. Proliferation of FIEs 
does not only augment China’s export volumes, but also upgrades its export 
structure. FIEs have become the major force of high-tech product exports in China. 
In 1999, FIEs contributed 65 per cent of the high-tech product exports (MOFTEC). 
The relationship between FDI and trade will be discussed in much greater detail in 
the following chapters. 
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13 Source: Xinhua, November 21, 2002. 
14 Source: World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators (page 14). 
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Figure 2.5: The share of FIEs in China's total export and 
import 
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Source:  Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.
Second, FDI enhanced China’s economic growth through raising capital formation, 
increasing industrial output, generating employment, and adding tax revenues. The 
ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital investment increased from a negligible level in 
1980 to 3.5 per cent in 1991, and then to 14.7 per cent in 1995. But in 2000, the ratio 
declined to 10.5 per cent because of the effect of the Asian financial crisis. Since 
2001, the ratio has increased steadily again (UNCTAD 2004: 396). The number of 
employees in FIEs increased from 0.06 million in 1985 to 1.65 million in 1991, and 
then to 6.42 million in 2000. The share of FIEs’ output in national output grew from 
5.3 per cent in 1991 to 14.3 per cent in 1995, and subsequently to 22.5 per cent in 
2000. Tax contributions from FIEs rose with FDI inflows: its share in China’s total 
tax revenues increased from 4.1 per cent in 1991 to 11.0 per cent in 1995 and 17.5 
per cent in 2000. Table 2.12 offers a summary.   
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Table 2.12: Contribution of FDI to China’s economy, 1991-2000 
 1991  1995  2000 
FDI inflows/gross fixed capital formation (%)*   3.5  14.7  10.3 
FIEs export/ total exports (%)**  16.8  31.5  47.9 
Number of employees in FIEs (million)***  1.65  5.13  6.42 
FIEs’ output/national output (%)**  5.3  14.3  22.5 
FIEs sales/national sales (%)*  5.3  14.3  31.3 
Tax contribution of FIEs/national tax revenue (%)**  4.1  11.0  17.5 
* Source: UNCTD, World Investment Report 1995 and World Investment Report 
2002. 
** Source: MOFTEC, Statistics on FDI in China 2001 and 1999. The output here only 
refers to the output of manufacturing. 
***Source: SSB (1997, 2001), China Statistic Yearbook. 
 
Third, FDI facilitates the Chinese transition process.  FDI has played a significant 
role in transforming China’s ownership structure, improving China’s corporate 
governance. The share of the assets of FIEs in total assets rose from negligible in 
1978 to 13.3 per cent in 1995, and subsequently to 15.2 per cent in 2001. 
Correspondingly, the share of the state’s and collectivities’ assets dropped from 
nearly 100 per cent in the late 1970s to 82.2 per cent in 1995, and further to 75.1 per 
cent in 2001.15 The changes in ownership structure were helpful in overcoming, at 
least in part, the shortcomings of corporate governance that were inherited from the 
times of state ownership. In a similar vein, FDI has facilitated the reform of the 
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) form. Directly, foreign enterprises have joined SOE-
restructuring initiatives through joint ventures (JV) or mergers and acquisitions 
                                                      
 
 
15  The assets here do not include financial assets. Source: Ministry of Finance of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
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(M&As). Indirectly, FDI influenced SOE-reform by the demonstration effects from 
the operations of FIEs.  
2.5.2   Policy and FDI 
National policies and legislations are important determinants of FDI inflow in China. 
Since 1979, China has started to liberalize its policies to establish a hospitable 
regulatory framework for FDI by relaxing rules regarding foreign ownership, mode 
of entry and operational freedom. The Chinese FDI regime has been liberalized 
gradually, and the legislative environment has been improved with the promulgation 
of a series of policies and laws regarding FDI. The evolution of the policy 
framework reflects the changes in the characteristics of FDI flow and FIEs in terms 
of entry modes (or legal form of FIEs), size of projects, contract performance, 
foreign sources and subnational location. 
2.5.2.1   First stage 1979-1982 
The initiation of the first stage was marked by the promulgation of the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (EJV law) in 1979, which was 
followed by the creation of four special economic zones (SEZs) in 1980. The four 
SEZs, including Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, were located in two 
coastal provinces in the vicinity of the Hong Kong (HK), Guangdong and Fijian 
province. In this cautious starting period, FDI inflows were contracted directly by 
ministries of the central government. 
Due to the uncertainty of this untested market’s potential and lack of political 
reliability, foreign companies preferred to minimize their resource and management 
commitment by using flexible arrangements such as contractual joint ventures (CJVs), 
subcontracting and compensatory trade agreements. Although there was no 
legislation at the national level governing CJVs, many overseas Chinese who 
 
 
 
    
originated from the Guangdong and Fujian provinces went back to their home 
towns to set up CJVs for the purpose of both receiving governmental incentives, as 
provided to joint ventures, and enjoying the flexibility of CJVs. The flexibility of 
CJVs refers to the option for the parties involved to pull out from all their lawful 
arrangements in a joint venture contract whenever they deem that necessary. For 
example, in a contract, parties can arrange that foreign investors can retrieve their 
investment from the JV’s profit before the Chinese partners recover their investment 
(Halasz and Lan 1996).  
Consequently, the most important FDI entry mode was the CJV. As can be learned 
from Table 2.13, in 1978-1982, the number of CVJs accounted for 87 per cent of 
total FDI projects, while their utilized value amounted to 45.5 per cent. Another 
important entry mode next to CJV was the so-called joint exploration (JE), which 
was adopted for the exploitation of natural resource fields, such as in the context of 
offshore and land co-operative oil prosecution and development projects. A JE is a 
cooperation project between foreign investors and central ministries and 
commissions. It accounted for 42.6 per cent of realized FDI in the first stage of FDI 
development. The other two modes, equity joint ventures (EJVs) and wholly foreign-
owned enterprises (WFOEs) were responsible for 8.6 per cent and 3.4 per cent, 
respectively. Note that the size of the JEs was relatively large, with an average project 
size of 38.3 US$ million, whilst the size of other FIEs was very small (0.67 US$ 
million for CJV). As a result of the importance of JEs, the average size of FDI 
projects was not small in comparison with later stages. FDI in this initial period was 
characterized by slow pace, small size, and high concentration in terms of source 
countries and sub-national allocation. More than 80 per cent of FDI came from 
Hong Kong, the US and Japan. The location of FDI was largely concentrated in the 
four SEZs in south China. Tables 2.14 to 2.16 provide summary statistics.   
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2.5.2.2   Second stage 1983-1989 
During the second period of FDI development, from 1983 to 1989, the law was 
extended to the WFOE16 and CJV17 form of FDI entry. The regulations for the 
implementation of the EJV law were promulgated in 1983.18 At the same time, a new 
set of regulatory measures was introduced to further facilitate FDI. In October 1986, 
the government issued The Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, as well as 
a set of central regulations to implement the provisions. Accordingly, provincial and 
municipal-level regulations followed. The investment environment thus improved 
not only by liberalizing FDI policies and introducing tax and tariff incentives, but 
also by a set of concrete operational measures with regard to repatriation of profits, 
transfer of technology, foreign exchange transactions, accounting methods, contract 
regulations, and guaranteeing the autonomy of joint ventures. In addition, the 
concept of SEZs was extended to another fourteen coastal cities (1984), Hainan 
Island (1988), two Delta regions (the Yangtze River Delta and the Pear River Delta), 
and one triangular area in Fujian province. 
With the improvement of the legal environment, the CJV form was losing its 
attraction. The flexibility of CJVs makes them not as stable as the EJV mode. In 
addition, establishing a CJV was not necessary to create a limited liability company. 
6 
                                                      
 
 
16 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
(WFOE law) was promulgated 1986. 
17The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint 
Ventures was promulgated in 1988. 
18 The whole title is The Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the PRC 
on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures. It was amended in 1986.  
 
 
 
    
Gradually, more investors preferred the EJV to the CJV form. The proportion of 
EJVs in the total value of both contractual and realized capital went up noticeably. 
Since 1986, the EJV had surpassed the CJV in terms of project number, contractual 
value and realized value, becoming the most popular entry mode for foreign 
investors. The EJV form accounted for 50.4 per cent of total realized FDI in 1983-
1989, whereas CJVs and WFOEs presented 29.4 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, 
in same period (see Table 2.13).  
Expanding the scope of SEZs allowed western companies to extend their activities 
to more provinces, to engage in more local market-oriented production, and to 
transfer their human-resource and capital-intensive technologies into their export-
processing operations. Compared with the first development stage, location of FDI 
extended from the first four SEZs to other open cities, although most FDI was still 
concentrated in the eastern region (cf. Table 2.15).  
2.5.2.3   Third stage 1990-2001 
After 1990, relaxation of FDI policy speeded up: China entered into the third stage 
of FDI development. The major policy advances in this period were: (a) a set of new 
and revised laws and regulations were issued; and (b) openness was widened and 
deepened in terms of regions and industries. 
First, China took a large step toward the further improvement of its legislation 
framework. The Chinese government issued a set of commercial laws and 
regulations that related to FIEs, launched detailed regulations on implementing the 
WFOE law (1990), and amended the three FIEs laws (2000 and 2001). Additionally, 
other reforms were implemented, such as the amendment of the tax system (1994), 
the elimination of the dual exchange rate system (1994), the relaxation of control on 
foreign exchanges, and the reduction of tariff and non-tarrif barriers for the import 
and export of a wide range of products. All this improved the investment climate 
dramatically. 
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48 
Second, the open-area policy was extended during this third development stage. The 
Pudong New Area was been created (1990), and 18 inland provincial-capital cities, 28 
cities and 8 areas along the Yangtze River, and 13 border cities were opened (1992). 
This provided foreign investors better access to the domestic interior market. Tax-
free zones started in Shanghai in 1990, in Tianjin and Shenzhen in 1991, and in 
Dalian and Guangzhou in 1992. Within these zones, ventures are supposed to 
produce solely for export. Since 1999, China has speeded up in implementing its 
development strategy of western China. The Chinese government has taken strong 
measures to implement the strategy to develop the western regions, which includes 
increased government input, fiscal support and tax cuts to attract (foreign) investors. 
The implementation of the western development strategy produces more 
opportunities for FDI in western China. The preferential policies for certain regions 
have gradually disappeared. 
During this period, WFOEs have seen rapid proliferation. Since 1997, WFOEs have 
surpassed EJVs as the most popular foreign investment vehicle in terms of number 
of contract approvals. Moreover, realized FDI in the form of WFOE has exceeded 
EJV FDI since 2000. The ratio of realized FDI in the form of WFOE to total FDI 
increased to 47.3 per cent in 2000 (see Table 2.13).  Sectoral FDI allocation changed 
within a relatively short time period. The share of manufacturing increased, as did 
“sensitive sectors” such as transportation and communication. The geographic 
distribution of FDI became less concentrated. The share of the central and western 
area increased at the expense of the east (cf. Table 2.15), as did the size of foreign 
enterprises. Finally, the country source of FDI became more diversified (see Table 
2.14). Hong Kang became less important compared with the previous period; the 
countries with a large market, high productivity and an advanced structure were 
capable of investing more in China, and they enjoyed a higher FDI value than other 
countries (Zhang 2005).  
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                                  Table 2.17: Regional openness in China 
Open area  Time  Location 
Shenzhen SEZ   1980  Guangdong, bordering Hong Kong’s Kowloon 
Shantou SEZ    1980  Southeast of Guangdong 
Zhuhai SEZ   1980  The south of Guangdong, west of the estuary of 
Pearl River, adjoining Macao to the south 
Xiamen SEZ   1980  Including Xiamen Island and Gulang Islet, located 
in the city of Xiamen, Fujian Province 
Hainan SEZ   1988  The entire island province, located to the south of 
China’s mainland 
14 coastal cities  1984  Dalin,  Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, 
Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and 
Beihai 
3 golden triangles  1985  Yangtze  River Delta, Pearl River Delta and 
Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle 
Pudong new area  1990  Shanhai 
Other open cities 
and regions 
 1992-
1994 
A number of border cities, all capital cities of 
inland provinces and autonomous regions, 13 free 
trade zones, 32 national-level economic and 
technological zones and 52 high-tech industrial 
development zones (Qin 1994) 
West region  1999  Shaanxi,  Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, 
Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou and Tibet 
Source: compiled by the author. 
2.5.2.4    Policy changes and their effect on FDI 
According to UNCTAD (1998: 92),  core FDI policies consist of rules and 
regulations governing the entry and operations of foreign investors, the standards of 
treatment, and the functioning of the markets within which they operate. In the case  
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of China, FDI policies can be broken down into two main parts: (1) the laws and 
regulations governing the entry and operations of foreign investors, and (2) the 
preferential policies for attracting foreign investment.  
The changes in the first part of FDI policies in last two decades can be summarized 
as follows. 
1  Legislation for FDI became stable and more concrete. 
2  The orientation of FDI policies was refocused not only on attracting more FDI 
to China, but also on promoting the integration of existing FIEs since the 
middle of 1990s. 
3  New business forms became available for FDI. In 1994, when China adopted 
the new Company Law, the foreign invested joint-stock company form (FIJSC)19 
was legally established as a new option for foreign investors. In 1995, MOFTEC 
promulgated a decree, Interim Provisions Concerning the Establishment of Investment 
Companies by Foreign Investors, granting MNCs permission to establish another new 
business firm, holding companies, to integrate their segmented businesses. 
4  Three FIE laws either deleted or amended the restrictions and regulations 
imposed on FIEs in such areas as foreign exchange balance, export obligation, 
priority of domestic sourcing, and the reporting requirements for production 
and operation plans. These changes facilitated the establishment of a legal 
system for foreign investment in conformity with international practice.  
 
 
 
19 FIJSC has been referred to with different names in English: company limited by 
share, stock enterprises with foreign investment, joint stock company, and stock 
company with foreign investment.  
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The second part of the FDI policies, preferential policies, can be seen as a form of 
regional development policy. They were first implemented in four SEZs at the 
beginning of  the 1980s, then extended to fourteen coastal cities, three golden 
triangle, Hainan, and finally extended to other parts of China in the 1990s (cf. Table 
2.17). Since 1999, FDI promotion policies were targeted at the development of 
central and western regions. Accordingly, the location of FDI has been significantly 
diversified. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index decreased from 0.89 in 1979-1982 to 
0.36 in 2000.20 However, when the preferential policies were widely adopted by all 
provinces, which resulted in policy competition for FDI among regions, the 
aggregated (country-level) efficiency of these policies declined. Zhou et al. (2002) 
have found evidence that the influence of preferential policies on location decision 
of foreign investors has indeed diminished over time. The experiences of some 
western provinces demonstrate the limitations of such policies. For example, the 
Yunnan province has taken strong measures to attract FDI, with measures even 
more favorable than those in the four pioneer SEZs. But the policies did not attract 
as much FDI as they were expected to do, which verifies an argument from 
UNCTAD that “policies are decisive in preventing FDI from entering a country. But 
once an enabling FDI regulatory framework is in place, the economic factors 
become dominant.” (UNCTAD 2003: 85). 
 
 
 
20 Herfindahl-Hirschman index = ∑
2
i
σ  ,  where  σi stands for the share of 
provinces in total FDI. The index is one if FDI concentrates in one province only, 
whilst an index close to zero means almost perfect diversification across all provinces.  
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2.6   Summary 
The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that China’s foreign economic 
relations have experienced great change during the last half century. China has grown 
up from a closed nation-state to an important trading country in the world market. 
China’s foreign trade regime has shifted from a highly centralized planning system to 
a market-oriented regime, and from an import-substitution strategy to an export-
promotion one. The composition of trade partners and trade commodities became 
greatly diversified in the past two decades. FDI in China has increased considerably, 
which largely facilitated the development of foreign trade.  These changes indicate 
that China has integrated itself into the world economy, now being a prominent 
trade economy. During this integration process, political commitment is an 
important element in the encouragement of trade and FDI. Starting from this 
background, we now move on to further investigate the effect of political factors on 
trade in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade 
Linkages 
China’s position in the international world during the past half-century provides vital information 
for investigating the relation between politics and trade. Although there is a substantial number of 
studies in this area, this study extends the literature in at least three ways: (1) it tests the impact of 
five political arrangements simultaneously, which is, as far as we know, more comprehensive than 
any former study; (2) it uses trade intensity instead of trade flows as the measurement of trade 
relations, which better reflects the mutual relationship between politics and trade; and (3) it accounts 
for zero observations, temporal dynamics and heterogeneity within one framework, and therefore 
better fits with the characteristics of the data than other models used in previous studies. By using 
data as to 78 of China’s trade partners over the 1950-2002 period, this study provides strong 
empirical evidence for the hypotheses that the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation, visits 
of heads of states and similarity of political systems are associated with higher intensities of trade 
linkages. Weaker empirical evidence is found in favor of Linder’s effect. The hypothesis that member 
countries of a Preferential Trading Agreement have had lower trade intensities with non-member 
countries such as China, is rejected. 
3.1   Introduction 
Over the past half-century, China has experienced great changes in its political and 
economic relationship to the international world. Few countries have seen such an 
incredible amount of change in such a short period of history. From an economically 
backward country it has become an emerging great power whose global integration 
will have a bigger impact on the world economy than that of any previous emerging Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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economy. Therefore, China’s experience may provide vital information for the 
development and test of a coherent theory of the relationship between politics and 
trade, applied to a non-democratic (communist) country, along the lines pioneered 
by such scholars as Hirschman (1945), Savage and Deutsch (1960), and Pollins 
(1989a, 1989b). 
The key argument is that in addition to economic invisible hands, such as 
comparative advantages, economies of scale and economic welfare, political visible 
arrangements play an important role in determining and shaping international trade, 
both in terms of size and direction. Plenty of studies have addressed the impact of 
political variables, such as military conflict, democracy, alliance and institutionalized 
political-economic cooperation. Starting from these studies, the contribution of this 
chapter to the study of political and trade relations is fivefold. First, the importance 
of China as a major economic and political power in transition deserves in-depth 
attention. For one, the Chinese case offers ample opportunities to test extant theory 
in the context of the largest non-democratic economy. Additionally, the study of 
China is justified by the country’s mere size and growing status in the world. 
Second, this chapter uses trade intensity as the measurement of trade relations, which 
better exposes the intensity of bilateral trade linkages than the absolute value of trade 
flows. The common approach in the study of trade in the political and economic 
literatures is the gravity model, which was introduced by Tinbergen (1962). To 
determine the importance of different trade-driving forces, this model involves the 
identification of variables explaining the size of trade flows between countries. 
Usually, it emphasizes the absolute size of bilateral trade flows, producing a good 
estimation fit (e.g., Bergstrand 1990; Rauch and Trindade 2002). In the present 
chapter, we employ the trade intensity index, which reformulates the gravity model 
such that the relative intensity of the bilateral trade linkages across different trade  
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partners is explicitly measured. In most cases, after all, a large bilateral trade volume 
does not imply a similarly close trade relationship. For example, the export value 
from China to the United States is ranked first among China’s trade partners in 1999 
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, or MOFTEC), but 
the trade linkage between these two countries is not necessarily the most intensive 
one, given the huge aggregate import value of the US (Zhang and van Witteloostuijn 
2004), or Chapter 4 below. 
Third, adopting trade intensity as the dependent variable enables us to fully focus on 
the estimation of political arrangements on bilateral trade. This is so because the 
main economic determinants in a gravity-type of model, such as economic size, 
international openness and the exchange rate, can be eliminated from this gravity-
based trade intensity specification. By contrast, with absolute trade flows as the 
dependent variable, all of these variables should be included in the model.  
Fourth, we investigate the impact of five political arrangements, which, as far as we 
know, is more than any former study, to date, has done: diplomatic ties, foreign 
cooperation (or conflict), high-level visits, political system similarity (or difference), 
and preferential trading arrangements. 
Fifth, we use long-period data with great variation, and appropriate methods for that 
data in the estimations. The study involves trade between China and 78 trade 
partners over the 1950-2002 period, which covers more than 90 per cent of Chinese 
foreign trade over the whole period. This long period of time and wide cross-section 
together provide substantial and highly relevant variation on all dependent and 
independent variables, which offers ample opportunities to investigate the impact of 
political policy changes on trade relations empirically. An interesting but also difficult 
aspect of our data set is the large number of zero observations – i.e., 18.6 per cent 
with respect to export and 25.9 per cent with respect to import. These zero Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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observations mainly occur in the period from 1950 to 1980, when China was isolated 
from the world economy and foreign trade was conducted strictly to central planning 
guidelines. To deal with these zero observations, we employ an estimation method 
based on the Tobit model. Additionally, the common problems of time-series / 
cross-section (TSCS) data – autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and panel correct 
standard errors – are accounted for in a unified approach. In so doing, we offer an 
estimation strategy that improves upon the methods applied in earlier work. 
By way of steppingstone, the next section of this chapter starts with an introduction 
of Chinese foreign policies and foreign trade from a historical perspective. 
Subsequently, we give a theoretical overview of the relationship between politics and 
trade from four different perspectives, and we formulate six hypotheses that can be 
derived from this theoretical literature review. The purpose of this study is to test 
whether these hypotheses, and thus whether the described politics-trade 
relationships, hold for China. After that, we describe the data and the empirical 
model, as well as our estimation methodology. We proceed by presenting and 
discussing the results of our empirical analyses. Finally, we give our conclusions, and 
offer a brief appraisal. 
3.2   Chinese Foreign Policy and Foreign Trade 
China’s foreign policy widely fluctuated in the post-1949 period. During Mao’s era 
(1949-1976), China’s foreign policy was characterized by militancy and self-reliance, 
whereas during Deng’s era (1978-1997), China’s foreign policy was associated with a 
shift towards peace with and openness to the outside world (Zhang 1998). In the 
literature,1 Chinese foreign relations over the past half-century are classified in five 
 
1 This classification is quite coherent in different information sources: see the website 
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study.  
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different periods: (1) the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s, which reflects a pattern of 
intra-communism relationships; (2) isolation and radicalism in the 1960s, in which 
China adopted an anti-imperialist (against the US) and anti-revisionist (against the 
Soviet Union) international united-front strategy; (3) increased international 
involvement in the 1970s, in which China’s relation with the Western world 
improved; (4) the independent and peace foreign policy in the 1980s, in which China 
gradually opened up to the world; and (5) world multipolarization in the 1990s, in 
which China established strategic partnerships with the major powers of the world. 
During each of these periods, China’s relations with the rest of the world underwent 
significant changes. In this study, we focus on the effects of these changes on 
(bilateral) trade. By time period, these effects can be characterized as follows. 
In the 1950s, China took a “lean-to-one-side” foreign policy, as declared by Mao in 
1949, resorting to the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc for help in rebuilding and 
development. In its First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), China adopted the Soviet 
economic model, primarily emphasizing industrial development at the expense of 
agriculture, with a particular focus on heavy industry and capital-intensive technology. 
In order to spur industrialization, China was keen to import machinery and 
equipment, which was the single largest import category. During this period, over 90 
per cent of all imports were producer goods, leaving less than 10 per cent for 
consumer goods. The producer goods, including many entire plants and pieces of 
equipment, were mainly imported from the Soviet Union. In addition, large numbers 
of Soviet engineers, technicians and scientists were sent to China to assist with the 
development and instalment of new heavy industrial facilities, which inevitably 
enhanced the trade relation between the two countries. The Soviet Union was by far 
the largest trade partner of China, which accounted for half of China’s foreign trade 
in the 1950s. Consequently, China’s trade intensity with the Soviet Unions was 
extremely high (see Figure 3.1). The three main reasons for the close relation with Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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Soviet Union during that period were: (1) the Soviet Union’s relatively advanced 
industry, which could meet the need of China’s construction; (2) the good political 
relationship, directed by mutual political sympathy; and (3) the barriers erected by the 
Western countries’ trade bloc. 
The break-up with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s triggered a precipitous decline 
in Sino-Soviet trade.2 In order to continue its construction, China started a new, 
although smaller, program of complete plant import in 1963. These plant imports 
largely came from Japan, due to the fact that the Sino-Japanese tense relation had 
been relaxed since 1959, when the former Japanese Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi 
visited China.3 The Sino-Japanese relation was a subtle one, though. On the one 
hand, China was using foreign trade as a means of establishing de facto diplomatic 
relations with Japan (Mah 1971). On the other hand, Japan assured that trade was a 
private matter, which should be separated from politics. This doctrine of Japan was a 
successful fiction that made it possible for Japan to adhere to close partnerships with 
the US and Taiwan, while simultaneously promoting a variety of contacts with China. 
As a result, China’s trade intensity with Japan significantly increased during the 
period 1963-1976, while China’s trade intensity with the Soviet Union considerably 
decreased (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
After the Sino-Soviet split, China also embarked on a more open campaign to obtain 
support from developing countries. At that time, Africa began achieving a degree of 
national self-determination, which offered fertile ground for China for seeking new 
 
2 In 1960, due to political conflicts, the Soviet Union scrapped the 600 contracts signed with China, 
withdrew all the experts and stopped supplying important equipment urgently needed in China’s 
construction. 
3 In general, Sino-Japanese relations were less stable due to the potential political and military threat 
throughout the Cold War era. However, the two countries had sought to build up a good trade 
relationship for economic reasons. For example, five non-governmental trade agreements have been 
signed during the 1952-1962 decade.    
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friends. The most spectacular diplomatic activity during that period was Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai’s goodwill visit to ten African countries between late 1963 and 
early 1964, which was a milestone in the history of Sino-African friendship. Since 
then, China has offered favorite terms for loans and aid to African countries so as to 
build and maintain a good political relationship with the newly rising African nations. 
As part of the foreign aid, China even bought up African coffee and chocolate, 
despite lack of demand for these products in China (Segal 1992). China’s African 
policy was very successful from a political perspective. For instance, Africa gave 
invaluable support to the restoration of China’s legitimate seat at the United 
Nations. 4 As a result of China’s Africa policy, the Sino-African trade relation 
considerably intensified. China became a large trade partner of Africa. China’s trade 
intensity with Africa reached its highest level during 1965-1978. 
In the early 1970s, motivated by geopolitical and strategic considerations, China’s 
relations with the Western world, especially with the United States, improved.5 As a 
consequence, China’s trade intensity with the Western world increased, more than 
that with the rest of the world (see Figure 3.4). In December 1978, at the milestone 
Third Plenum of the National Party Congress’ Eleventh Central Committee, the 
party leaders decided to undertake a program of gradual but fundamental reform of 
the economic system. They concluded that the Maoist version of the centrally 
planned economy had failed to produce efficient economic growth and had caused 
China to fall far behind the industrialized nations in the Western world, as well as the 
new industrial powers of Asia. Since then, China has shifted toward a more open 
policy. The political relations with the Western world have been normalized as of the 
 
4 Among the 76 votes for China, 26 were from African relations (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
5 The changes started when president Richard Nixon visited China in 1972. The United States’ trade 
embargo against China was ended in the same year. The improvement of the relations with the Western 
world enhanced China’s leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.   Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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1980s, and those with Asian and East-European countries have been significantly 
improved as of the 1990s. Since 1980, China has established diplomatic relationships 
with 50 countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China). In line 
with the diversification of the foreign political relationship portfolio, China’s foreign 
trade relations have diversified considerably. The number of trade partners (with 
trade value more than 10,000 US$) increased from 62 in 1980 to 198 in 2002. 
The anecdotal evidence above suggests that political arrangements are an important 
factor determining China’s foreign trade linkages. Political motives have been the 
major factor in China’s trade with communist nations and underdeveloped countries 
in the Third World. Of course, political arrangements are not the one and only factor 
that can explain trade, especially China’s trade with the Western world. Foreign trade 
with this part of the world was primarily directed towards breaking economic 
bottlenecks, and promoting exports to be able to finance imports. The trade system 
in this period is regarded as an extreme case of import substitution (Lardy 1992). For 
example, China imported large quantities of food grains from Australia and Canada 
to alleviate domestic food shortages in the early 1960s, caused by natural and man-
made disasters. Simultaneously, China exported large volumes of consumer goods to 
Hong Kong and Singapore-Malaysia to augment its foreign exchange earnings (Mah 
1971). At that time, China had no diplomatic relations with these countries.6 This 
example illustrates that both political and economic visible and invisible hands had 
an impact on China’s trade relations. 
 
 
 
6 China established diplomatic relations with Canada in 1970, Australia in 1972, Singapore in 1990, and 
Malaysia in 1974.  
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Figure: 3.1 China's TI with the USSR
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Figure 3.2: China's import TI with Canada and Japan
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Figure 3.3 China's TI with Africa
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Figure 3.4 China's export TI with the US
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3.3   The Relationship between Politics and Trade 
The idea that international political and economic processes are interrelated is not 
new. Mercantilism, for instance, prevailed in 17th and 18th centuries in the West. 
Mercantilists advocated a country to export more and to import less in order to 
enhance its political power. In later centuries, Marxists and imperialists have also 
been well aware of the fact that foreign trade can be an instrument of national power. 
Hirschman (1945) is one of the first modern economists who conceptualized the 
relationship between international trade and politics. He argued that Germany used 
the structure of its international trade to coerce Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to 
support its political objectives. Since the 1970s, particularly in 1980s and 1990s, 
researchers have attempted to specify and measure the relationships between 
international trade and politics quantitatively. Many empirical studies have appeared 
in the literature since then. Four arguments dominate this literature. Below we 
explain each of these arguments, and formulate the hypotheses that can be derived 
from these arguments with respect to China. 
Political cooperation and conflict 
The first argument is that trade flows are significantly influenced by political conflict 
and cooperation between nations. Savage and Deutsch (1960), and Pollins (1989a, 
1989b) formalized the foundations of this approach. Pollins’ model is based on the 
choices of utility-maximizing rational agents at every level of aggregation, from 
individuals and interest groups to industries and nation-states. Trade flows are 
affected by the decisions of these agents. Since agents are risk averse, they wish to 
minimize the risk of disrupting trade flows. Political conditions, therefore, are 
important, and must be taken into account when taking decisions. Pollins expects 
that the trade level between two countries will decline when their political 
relationships are becoming more conflictive, and that the trade level will increase 
when their political relations become more cooperative. Estimations with data from Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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25 countries over the period 1960-1975 supports this hypothesis (Pollins 1989b). 
Recent empirical studies (e.g., Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998; Bliss and Russett 
1998) also found evidence that supports this argument. 
In the present study, it is assumed that political relations have three dimensions. The 
first dimension pertains to the establishment of diplomatic ties, which are a 
precondition for a good political relationship. The second dimension relates to 
cooperation and conflict, which reveal what actually happened between two 
countries in the political arena. The third dimension focuses on high-level visits, 
which show what heads of states do for bilateral relationships. Accordingly, the 
following three hypotheses are used to test the first argument. 
HYPOTHESIS 3.1a: Diplomatic relationships have a positive effect on trade 
intensities. 
HYPOTHESIS 3.1b: Foreign cooperation (conflict) has a positive (negative) effect 
on trade intensities. 
HYPOTHESIS 3.1c: High-level visits have a positive effect on trade intensities. 
Joint political regimes 
The second argument is that shared democratic policies are associated with higher 
values of trade. Specifically, two countries that are both democratic will trade more 
than two countries of which at least one is not democratic, ceteris paribus. The reason 
behind this can be classified into two sub-arguments. First, from the perspective of 
state safety, it is less likely that a democratic trade partner will use its gains from 
trade to endanger their partners’ security (Oneal and Russett 1997). A pair of 
democratic countries can enter into relationships of economic interdependence for 
absolute welfare gains, without any worry about the hazard of relative economic 
gains as much as they might with non-democratic partners (Powell 1991).  
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Accordingly, governments of democratic countries may construct policies to 
encourage their private economic actors to trade with people in other democratic 
countries (Bliss and Russett 1998). 
Second, from the perspective of a private actor, trading with a democracy is less risky 
than trading with an autocracy. One reason is that the likelihood of conflict and the 
probability of war or threat of war between democratic countries tend to be lower 
than between non-democratic nations. Another reason is that entrepreneurs are 
more confident to do business in a country ruled by law than in a country ruled by 
people. A shared democracy, therefore, will likewise promote trade agreements. 
Empirical studies have found evidence supporting this argument (Bliss and Russett 
1998; Dixon and Moon 1993; Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998; Remmer 1998; 
Verdier 1998).7
Since China was and still is not a democracy, we cannot test whether democratic 
dyads enjoy higher trade intensities than other dyads. Instead, we investigate whether 
similarity in political regimes encourages trade. This argument is in line with Oneal 
and Ray (1997), who have stated that governments usually take effective steps to 
prevent their citizens trading with enemy countries and to promote them trading 
with allies. 
HYPOTHESIS 3.2: Similarity in political regimes has a positive effect on trade 
intensities.  
Preferential Trading Arrangements 
 
7 Most of those empirical studies have been reviewed elsewhere. Bliss and Russett (1998), for example, 
have reviewed studies on trade flows and political systems. 
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The third argument is that institutionalized political-economic cooperation increases 
international trade. The Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) is the major 
manifestation of institutionalized political-economic cooperation, which may take 
the form of free trade areas, such as customs, unions or common markets (Anderson 
and Blackhurst 1993). According to the theory of PTA, pioneered by Viner (1953), a 
PTA is likely to trigger trade-creation effects for its member states (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya 1996). Empirical studies in both politics and economics have found 
evidence for this. Aitken (1973) examined the effect of the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC) on trade over the 
1951-1967 period. Pelzman (1977) measured the impact of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) on the trade among the seven communist members. 
Brada and Mendez (1983) investigated the impact of five regional integration 
schemes (EEC, EFTA, CACM, LAFTA and Andean Pact) on trade. Krueger (2000) 
reported a preliminary assessment of the effect of NAFTA on the trade of the US 
and Mexico. Pollins  (1989a, 1989b) investigated this impact with emphasis on dyadic 
political relations. Mansfield and Bronson (1997) estimated the effects of PTAs on 
bilateral trade flows from 1960 to 1990. Martinez-Zarzoso (2003) reported the effect 
of six PTAs (EU, NAFTA, CARICOM, CACM, MAGREB and MASHREK) on 
trade. 
China has not joined any formal PTA. Hence, the argument as to the direct trade 
impact of a PTA does not apply to China. However, if PTAs are expected to trigger 
trade-creation effects for its member countries, the trade intensity of non-member 
countries with these countries will fall. This indirect effect is the basis for our third 
hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 3.3: Countries that are member of a PTA have lower trade 
intensities with China.    
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Military alliances 
The fourth argument is that military alliances influence the direction of trade (Gowa 
1989, 1994; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield 1994). The causal relation between 
military capability and international trade is reciprocal. According to standard trade 
theory, trade increases both countries’ wealth. Furthermore, if one country invests its 
gains from trade to increase its military power, its trade partners will also gain from 
this increase in military power so long as the military alliance pursues similar ends. 
Conversely, a country might impede trade with enemy nations for fear that these 
countries would use the benefits of trade to build up their military capability and 
hence post a greater threat. Accordingly, free trade is more likely within than across 
military alliances. Recent studies have found empirical evidence that supports this 
political argument (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; 
Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998). In addition, it has been found that military 
alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions when embedded in a 
bipolar rather than a multipolar system (Gowa 1994: 31). 
China’s involvement in military alliances has been limited in the 1950-2002 period to 
the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s. The relationship between China and the Soviet 
Union during the 1950s can be characterized as a bipolar military alliance, which 
suggests our fourth hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 3.4: The military alliance between China and the Soviet Union has 
had a positive effect on China’s trade intensity with the Soviet Union. 
3.4   An Empirical Model for Trade Intensity 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in this study are China’s export and import intensity indices. 
Although we have no a priori reason to expect that export and import react Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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differently to political arrangements, we would like to test whether the results are 
indeed symmetrical. The trade intensity index (TI), developed by Kojima (1968), 
Roemer (1976), Kunimoto (1977) and Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), measures the 
degree to which two countries trade more or less intensively with each other than 
they do with the rest of world. For export, the trade intensity of country c with 
country f is defined as a ratio with in the numerator c’s export share in f’s total 
import and in the denominator c’s export share in total world import. For import, an 
equivalent ratio can be calculated. This study’s dependent variables are the export 
trade intensity index (ETI) and the import trade intensity index (MTI) of China. 
Since China cannot export to (or import from) itself, the denominator must be 
modified by using overall world trade reduced by China’s import (export). This gives 
the trade intensity indices 
 
,
) E E /( m
E / m
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) m m /( E
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=
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=
, and                                                                  (3.1) 
where Ecf is Chinese export to country f, mf is total import of country f, Ec  is 
Chinese total export, mw is world import, and mc is Chinese total import. Similarly, 
mcf  is Chinese import from country f, Ef  is total export of country f, mc is Chinese 
total import, Ew is world export, and Ec  is Chinese total export. A value of TI greater 
than one indicates that China exports to (or imports from) country f more 
intensively than it does to (or from) the rest of the world. Conversely, a value of TI 
less than one reflects that China exports to (or imports from) country f less 
intensively than it does to (or from) the rest of the world. 
Following gravity-type of logic, determinants of bilateral trade (export or import) can 
be classified into three categories of variables: (1) total potential supply of the  
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exporting country c, Pc; (2) total potential demand of importing country f, Pf; and (3) 
“resistance” to trade from potential supplier c to potential buyer f, Dcf. The first two 
categories of variables offer proxies for the trade potential of the countries c and f, 
respectively, which are determined by a set of characteristics of c and f, such as 
economic size, international openness and the exchange rate. Prominent examples of 
resistance variables are (a) discriminatory trade integration, (b) geographical distance, 
(c) historical and political affinities, (d) cultural (dis)similarity, and (e) economic 
structure overlap (Linnemann 1966; Parsley and Wei 2001). 
In the international trade linkages literature, the common approach to determine the 
impact of these three categories of variables is the gravity model, which takes the 
following functional form: 
γ β α
cf f c cf D / P P E =  and  ,                                                   (3.2)  γ β α
cf f c cf D / P P m =
where α, β and γ represent unknown parameters to be estimated. Starting from this 
model, China’s total export can be written as 
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== =
γ β α γ β α = = =
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where n represents the number of countries in the world, except China. Similarly, 
total import of a particular country f (except f itself) can be rewritten as 
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In logarithmic form, this formula can be rewritten as 
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Similarly, China’s import intensity index is 
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Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) show that both the export and import intensity index are 
a function of three groups of determinants, and that both functions are identical to 
each other. The first term at the right-hand side of Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b), Dcf, 
represents the “resistance” to trade between China and its trade partner f. The 
second term includes total world import (except for China) minus China’s export 
potential. The latter is determined by demand factors in other countries, weighted by 
distance. Importantly, this term is independent of f. If China’s trade intensity index is 
regressed on a variable from this group of determinants using TSCS data, this 
variable will be country-invariant. This implies that time dummy variables may be 
used to control for this group of determinants. The third term in equation 3.6 
measures the export potential of other countries than China. Note that this term is 
independent of focal country c (here, China); it measures the linkages of China’s 
trade partners with the rest of the world. For that reason, data on these determinants 
are often difficult to obtain. If China’s trade intensity index were regressed on a 
variable from this group of determinants using TSCS data, this variable would still 
vary over space and time. In this context, country and time dummy variables may  
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used to control for these determinants at least partially.  
In sum, the trade intensity index primarily depends on the first group of 
determinants, provided that the second and the third group of determinants are 
controlled for by country and time dummy variables. This is an extremely important 
observation, because it offers the opportunity to restrict the analysis on “resistance” 
to trade between China and its trade partners and, more specifically, on the 
estimation of political determinants of bilateral trade, which is the purpose of this 
study. By contrast, the main economic determinants in a gravity-type of model, such 
as economic size, international openness and the exchange rate, can be eliminated 
from the trade intensity model.  
Independent variables 
To test our hypotheses, the trade intensity indices are taken to depend on six political 
variables. In addition, we control for key economic factors, as well as time and 
country dummy variables. Below, we introduce all our independent variables and 
measures, one by one. 
The first political variable, DIPLO, reflects whether China and its trade partner had a 
diplomatic relationship at time point t. Since the trade intensity index measures a 
country’s import share from China (or China’s import share from a particular 
country) to its import share from the rest of he world, this 0-1 variable must be 
taken relative to the total number of countries with which China had a diplomatic 
relationship at time point t. This set-up implies “decreasing returns to scale”; the 
greater the number of countries with which China has a diplomatic relationship, the 
smaller the impact of establishing a diplomatic relationship with another country on 
the trade intensity with that country. After all, if China would have diplomatic 
relationships with all countries in the world, this type of political arrangement can no Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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longer explain any cross-sectional differences among trade intensity indices. A similar 
set-up is used for the other political variables. 
The second political variable, COOP, measures whether and to which extent China 
and its trade partner cooperate or are in conflict. Following Goldstein (1992), daily 
events as to conflict and cooperation are weighted and aggregated into annual 
numbers for each (potential) trade partner. Events (with their weights in parentheses, 
adopted from Goldstein 1992) included are: military attack or assault (-2); break-up 
of diplomatic relation (-1.4); non-military sanction (-1.1); expel organization or 
person (-1); formal complaint or protest (-0.5); apologize (0.25); suspend sanctions 
(0.3); agreement (1); and economic aid (1.1).  
The third political variable, VISI, represents the annual number of high-level visits of 
heads of states and other influential politicians, the first weighted by 2 and the 
second by 1. The fourth political variable, SYST, pertains to the political system 
similarity and reflects whether  (1) or not (0) China’s trade partner is a socialist or a 
transition country. With the latter coding rule, we avoid a discontinuity in our time 
series, as many former communist countries turned into transition economies in the 
years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
As our fifth political variable, to investigate the political impact of institutionalized 
political-economic cooperation, seven PTAs are considered: Central American 
Common Market (CACM), European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the European 
Union (EU), the North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), and the Latin-American MERCOSUR. Each PTA variable reflects whether 
(1) or not (0) China’s trade partner was member of a PTA at time point t. 
The sixth and last political variable, ALLI, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 during the years that the relationship between China and the Soviet Union can be  
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characterized as a bipolar military alliance, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable 
affects only a single bilateral trade relationship directly – the Sino-Soviet trade 
linkage –, since China’s post-1949 history witnessed only one formal military alliance 
(during the 1950s). 
To collect the information necessary to construct these political variables for the 78 
countries under study over the period 1950-2002, we developed our own database 
(available upon request). COPDAB and WEIS, two existing data sources that are 
commonly used in the political science literature, fall short for our purposes mainly 
because of incomplete records with respect to China. Admittedly, our database is not 
complete either, but much more so than COPDAB or WEIS. Information about 
diplomatic relations, high-level visits, cooperation and conflict are obtained from 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese embassies, Xinhua News Agency, 
and the relevant Chinese law and regulation websites.8 Trade data are obtained from 
the IMF, and completed by data from Eurostat and the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China. Eventually, we were able to collect 3,830 observations with respect to 
export and 3,786 observations with respect to import. Finally, GDP data are 
obtained from the World Bank, and completed by either Penndata or information 
from the Groningen Growth and Development Center. 
To control for economic “resistance” variables, we consider two economic variables. 
The first economic variable, DIST, measures the geographical great-circle distance 
between the economic center of China and that of its trade partner. In line with the 
gravity model, a lower trade intensity is expected, the longer this distance. The 
second economic variable is based on Linder’s theory (Linder 1961). Linder 
concluded that the closer trade partners are in their demand patterns, the more 
similar will be their trade commodities composition and the larger will be their 
                                                           
8 For example, http://www.hotlong.com/lawv2.  Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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volume of bilateral trade. Specifically, the Linder effect refers to the impact of 
income level similarity on how a country distributes international trade across foreign 
partners. Because most finished and many intermediate goods are produced in and 
traded from developed countries, a long list of empirical studies have reported strong 
evidence for the existence of Linder’s effect among developed countries, but very 
weak or no evidence for less developed countries (LDCs) (e.g., Thursby and Thursby 
1987; Hanink, 1990). In the 1980s and 1990s, however, along with rapid economic 
transformation in a number of developing countries, a positive Linder effect was also 
found for intra-LDC trade (Weinblatt and Schrager 1985; Arnon and Weinblatt 
1998). In the current study, the income difference between China and its trade 
partner, GDPdif, is measured by the relative difference of GDP per capita (in 
absolute value), c f c GDP / GDP GDP GDPdif − = . A negative sign of this variable 
indicates Linder’s effect.   
3.5   Estimation Strategy 
The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of political arrangements on 
China’s trade performance. For this purpose, the dependent variables, both the 
export and import trade intensity index, are regressed on the independent variables 
using time-series / cross-section (TSCS) data on 78 countries for the 1950-2002 
period, with a maximum of 53 time points for those countries having complete data. 
One of the central research questions in modeling TSCS data relates to selecting the 
right econometric model, which is anything but easy. A series of papers in the 
political science literature has discussed how to treat TSCS data and the problems 
that must be investigated (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001): (1) Panel Correct 
Standard Errors (PCSE), (2) temporal dynamics, (3) limited dependent variables, and 
(4) heterogeneity. Below we discuss these problems in more detail and explain how  
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they have been dealt with in this study. The main methodological innovation of the 
empirical analysis in the present study is its novel treatment of zero observations in 
combination with PCSE, temporal dynamics and heterogeneity.  
Panel Correct Standard Errors 
The analysis starts from a simple linear model between a dependent variable Y and a 
set of K independent variables X: 
, X X ... X X Y it it it Kit K it 2 2 it 1 1 it ε β ε β β β + ′ = + + + + =                             (3.7) 
where i (= 1, ..., N) refers to a country, t (= 1, ..., T) to a given time period, 
K 1 ..., , β β   are fixed but unknown parameters, and  it ε   are independently and 
identically distributed error terms for all i and t, with zero mean and variance  . If 
the errors are “spherical”, we can get optimal estimates of β using OLS. However, if 
the errors would be non-spherical, e.g., due to heterogeneity, spatial dependence 
among the observations at each point in time, and/or serial dependence among the 
observations on each country over time, then the OLS estimator loses its property of 
being efficient. To deal with this problem, one could correct for panel-
heteroskedastic, contemporaneously correlated and/or temporary correlated errors. 
The problem with this approach is that the number of observations is generally too 
small relative to the number of parameters to be estimated and that the standard 
errors are underestimated by 50 to 200 per cent, depending on T (Beck and Katz 
1995). Instead, Beck and Katz propose to use Panel Correct Standard Errors (PCSE), 
with the square roots of the diagonal elements of 
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1 1
PCSE ) X ' X ]( X ' X [ ) X ' X ( ) ˆ ( Cov − − Ω = β ,                                                         (3.8a) Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
where  ,                                                   (3.8b)  T
2
N N 2 N 1
N 2
2
2 12
N 1 12
2
1
I
...
. ... . .
...
...
⊗
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
= Ω
and where σij measures the interaction between countries. PCSE computed 
according to this set-up correct for panel-heteroskedastic and contemporaneously 
correlated errors, but not for temporary correlated errors. 
Temporal dynamics 
TSCS data often reveal dynamics. The old-fashioned treatment is to think of these 
dynamics as a nuisance – that is, to model them as serially correlated errors – so that 
t , i 1 t , i t , i v + = − ρε ε ,                                                                                   (3.9) 
where vi,t replaces εi,t as the white noise error term. This correction can also be used 
to determine PCSE (Beck and Katz 1995). However, this approach has been highly 
criticized. Hendry and Mizon (1978) were among the first to point out that serial 
autocorrelation correction cannot be considered a serious effort to find the ‘correct’ 
equation (cf. Hendry 1995, Chapter 7; Mizon 1995). Instead of improving an initial 
econometric model when it appears to be unsatisfactory, one better starts with a 
more general model containing, nested within it as special cases, a series of simpler 
models that ideally should represent all the alternative hypotheses requiring 
consideration. The general model Hendry and Mizon have recommended as a 
generalization of the first-order serial autocorrelation model, is the first-order serial 
autoregressive distributed lag model; a linear dynamic regression model in which Yi,t 
is regressed on Yi,t-1, Xi,t and Xi,t-1. This model is also adopted in this study.  
Limited dependent variables  
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A serious problem of our data set is that a large number of observations is censored 
at zero: 711 observations with respect to export trade intensity and 981 observations 
with respect to import trade intensity are zero, because export or import is smaller 
than the minimum value of 10,000 US$. These zero observations mainly occur in the 
first three decades (1950-1980), when China was isolated from the world economy 
and foreign trade was conducted strictly according to central planning guidelines. 
Under this closed planning system, Chinese foreign trade was concentrated in a 
limited number of countries. 
If the zero observations would be excluded from the sample, this creates a sample 
selection bias – and hence the regression parameters are likely to be biased. This 
treatment of zero observations assumes that these countries have zero import 
demand for Chinese commodities or that China has zero import demand for 
commodities from these countries indeed, which is not necessarily the case; some 
countries may have decided not to trade on political grounds. It would be more 
appropriate to assume that, in choosing not to trade, countries with zero trade 
intensities are still displaying market behavior, and for this reason it is important to 
include both zero and non-zero observations whilst estimating trade models. 
Furthermore, to eliminate zero observations or to shorten the observation period to 
get rid of the zero-observations problem is really a waste of data that may well yield 
important information. 
It is evident, then, that trade involves the ‘decision’ whether or not to trade and, if 
the decision is to do so, what the intensity of trade should be. A statistical model that 
has often been used to deal with this two-stage ‘decision’ is the Tobit model. Define 
Yit* to be the desired but unobservable trade intensity index and Yit the observed 
trade intensity index with a particular country. We then have Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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, Y   if       
and   , Y   if         
*
it
*
*
it
C Y Y
C C Y
it it
it
≥ =
< =
                                                          (3.10) 
where C denotes the limiting value of the model at hand, which in the case of trade 
intensity indices seems to take the value of zero at first glance. 
We deliberately used the verb ‘seem’, because an additional problem which has to be 
solved is that the typical gravity model is in a double-log form, expressing the 
variables as log(Z), where Z represents any of the dependent or independent 
variables. The problem is that log(Z) is not defined for values of Z equal to zero. To 
preserve the double-log form, the variables can be expressed as log(1+Z). This 
adjustment yields results similar to a standard double-log form, since for large values 
of Z, log(1+Z) ≈ log (Z), whereas for values of Z approaching zero, log(1+Z) ≈ Z, 
approximating a semi-log relationship (e.g., Eichengreen and Irwin 1998; Coughlin 
and Wall 2003). This adjustment has also been applied in the current study to the 
political variables. 9 Importantly, in the case of the trade intensity index, this 
adjustment has only been applied to its numerator, because the problem of zero 
observations is limited to Ecf (or mcf). The log of the export trade intensity index 
defined in (3.1) can be rewritten as 
). m m log( ) E log( ) m log( ) E log( )
) m m /( E
m / E
log( exTI log c w c f cf
c w c
f cf
cf − + − − =
−
=          (3.11) 
Therefore, Y, Y* and the limiting value C in the Tobit model (3.10) can best be 
specified as (including the +1-adjustment discussed above) 
0 E    if    ) m m log( ) E log( ) m log( Y *
cf c w c f cf < − + − − = , and                  (3.12a) 
                                                           
9 It has not been applied to the economic variables, because none of these variables have zero values.  
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0 E    if    )
) m m /( E
m / ) 1 E (
log( Y *
cf
c w c
f cf
cf ≥
−
+
= .                                                     (3.12b) 
A similar set-up is adopted for the import trade intensity index. Note that instead of 
being zero and constant, the limiting value determining Ycf when Ecf is zero is now 
different for different countries and different time periods. The strength of this 
approach is that we still utilize the information recorded by the variables mf, Ec and 
mr-mc. The larger a country’s total import or the larger China’s total export, both 
relative to world trade, the less likely it is that China and this country do not trade. If 
we would adopt a zero and constant limiting value, this information is not utilized. 
Heterogeneity 
A TSCS model, even if it is dynamic, still treats the countries as completely 
homogeneous, differing only in their explanatory variables. The PCSE were designed 
to guard against one type of heterogeneity – i.e., unequal variances between countries. 
A panel data approach would presume that heterogeneity is a feature of the data, and 
would attempt to model that heterogeneity. The simplest way of doing so is to 
assume that each country and each time period has its own intercept, thus changing 
the error structure to  t , i t i 1 t , i t , i v + λ + µ + ρε = ε − , where µi denotes a set of country 
dummy variables, one for every country, and λt indicates a set of time dummy 
variables, one for every time period. Note that if both sets are included, one dummy 
should be dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap.  
Estimation method 
Methods to estimate a dynamic Tobit model with fixed effects in both the cross-
section and time-series domain are not yet available. Dynamic Tobit models without 
fixed effects have been studied by Lee (1999). The problem of this class of models is 
that the distinction between an observed and a latent variable not only has to be Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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made at the left-hand side of the regression equation, as we did for the trade 
intensity index in Equations (3.12), but also at the right hand-side for the lagged 
value of this trade intensity index. This complicates the analysis considerably. 
LIMDEP is an econometric software package that can be used to estimate Tobit 
models with fixed effect (Greene 2002, Chapter E21: 80-85). If the lagged value of 
the trade intensity index is included among the regressors, one naturally obtains a 
coefficient estimate of this variable. However, this coefficient is likely to be biased, 
because this routine ignores that the lagged value of the trade intensity index is 
censored. 
Another problem is how to determine PCSE for a Tobit specification. Although 
software for heteroskedastic Tobit models is now widely available (e.g., LIMDEP; 
see Greene 2002, Chapter E21: 41-53), this type of heteroskedasticity is not suitable 
to deal with panel-heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation. 
Huang (1999) has developed an algorithm to estimate SUR Tobit models, but not for 
models containing lagged dependent variables. 
An alternative to Tobit is scaled OLS, which is based on the striking empirical 
regularity that the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates of the Tobit model can 
be approximated by dividing the least-squares estimates by the proportion of non-
zero observations. This estimation method is quite popular in the trade literature (see, 
e.g., Eichengreen and Irwin 1998; Coughlin and Wall 2003). Its advantage is that it 
can easily be extended with serial dependence among the observations over time, 
panel-heteroskedasticity (country and time dummy variables), and contemporaneous 
spatial correlation (via PCSE) within one framework, three phenomena which in the 
political science literature have recently received such a prominent place (Beck 2001). 
This extension is possible as follows. The standard estimation method for the fixed-
effects model is to eliminate µi and λt from the regression equation by demeaning  
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the Y and X variables and then estimate the resulting demeaned equation by OLS. 
The demeaned variable of Y is obtained by  
∑∑ ∑
== =
= = = + − −
T
1 t
N
1 i
T
1 t
it ..
N
1 i
it .t it . i .. .t . i it   Y
NT
1
Y   and   , Y
N
1
Y   , Y
T
1
Y    where , Y Y Y Y ∑
=
                                                          
.   (3.13) 
Similar transformations apply to the X variables. To correct the demeaned equation 
for zero observations, we may use scaled OLS instead of OLS, and to correct the 
demeaned equation for contemporaneous spatial correlation, we may compute PCSE 
using Equation (3.8). These extensions are relatively simple to implement.10 A final 
reflection is that the OLS estimator of the response coefficients in the demeaned 
equation is inconsistent if T is fixed (read: small) (Baltagi 2001, Chapter 8), but in this 
study this problem is of minor importance, since the average number of observations 
for each country is greater than 48. 
3.6   Empirical Results 
Table 3.1 reports the means of the variables and their correlation coefficients. The 
mean reported for the political variables and trade intensity indices reflects the 
average relative non-zero value. The mean value of the DIPLO variable  (0.0212), for 
example, indicates that the average number of countries with which China has 
established diplomatic relationships over the observation period amounts to 
1/0.0212 = 47 countries. In other words, the lower the mean value of a political 
variable, the more countries are involved. 
Table 3.1 makes clear that the variables DIPLO, SYST and GDPdif changed so 
slowly over time that their observed values at time point t-1 and time point t are 
 
10 Software written in Matlab is available upon request. 
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highly correlated (over 0.87). For this reason, their lagged values have been 
eliminated from the regression equation. The lagged values of the seven separate 
PTA variables have been eliminated, too, because when taken together into one 
variable, PTA, this variable also appears to have changed slowly over time. The 
mutual correlation coefficients of the remaining independent variables are rather 
limited, except for the correlation coefficient between the CMEA (Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance) and the SYST variables. This is because the countries 
involved partly overlap. By eliminating the first variable, multicollinearity is not 
expected to be a problem anymore. 
From Table 3.1 it can also be seen that the partial correlation coefficients of the 
independent variables with the current and lagged values of the export and import 
trade intensity indices have the expected sign: DIPLO (+), SYST (+), COOP and 
COOP-1 (+), VISI and VISI-1 (+), ALLI (+), DIST (–) and GDPdif (–). Only the 
signs of the partial correlation coefficients of the PTA variables tend to be 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.3.   
Despite its positive correlation coefficient with the trade intensity indices, the ALLI 
variable has been dropped from the regression equations because it only takes the 
value of 1 with respect to the Soviet Union during the 1950s. This is too little to find 
any empirical evidence in favor of our Hypothesis 3.4. As an alternative, we could 
estimate a separate trade intensity model of China for the Soviet Union, but this 
would be no more than a reconfirmation of Figure 3.1 or of the partial correlation 
coefficients in Table 3.1. 
A general problem of country dummy variables is that they are perfectly collinear 
with any independent variables that do not change over time, so they force us to 
drop such variables from the regression equation. This happens to the DIST variable. 
From Table 3.1 it can be seen that this variable is negatively correlated with the trade  
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intensity indices, as expected. This negative relationship also appeared to be 
significant when the model was estimated by (scaled) OLS without country dummy 
variables. Unfortunately, when country dummies are included in the regression 
equations, the DIST variable becomes part of them, as a result of which its separate 
effect can no longer be estimated. This is acceptable, however, because its coefficient 
is not of main interest in this study anyway. 
The estimation results are recorded in Table 3.2, in panel A with respect to China’s 
export intensity index and in panel B with respect to China’s import intensity index. 
The first two columns of both panels contain the coefficient estimates and their t-
values. Basically, the coefficient estimates reflect elasticities. That is, each coefficient 
of a particular variable reflects the percentage change in the associated trade export 
or import intensity index when this variable rises by 1 per cent. 
The coefficients in the first column reflect short-term effects. Long-term effects can 
be obtained from the short-term estimated effects by multiplying the latter by 
, where τ ˆ  is the coefficient estimate of the lagged trade intensity index. In 
case of the COOP and VISI variables, the long-term effects can be obtained by 
) ˆ 1 /( 1 τ −
) ˆ 1 /( ) ( 1 t t τ − β + β − , where the βs are the coefficient estimates of the current and 
lagged values of these variables. The last two columns of both panels report these 
long-run effects and their corresponding t-values. 
The first thing to note is that the fit of the models in view of the number of 
observations is quite high. The R-squared is 0.75 for the export equation and 0.60 
for the import equation. Part of this result is explained by the 78 country and 53 time 
dummies, of course. When these are excluded so that only the explanatory power of 
the 14 political and economic variables is measured, the R-squared reduces to 0.59 
for the export equation and 0.41 for the import equation, which is still more than Chapter 3  China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade Linkages 
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reasonable, indicating that our set of economic and political variables explains 
substantial variance. 
The second thing to note is that the results obtained for the export intensity index 
and for the import intensity index are not fully symmetrical. Although there is no a 
priori reason to expect export and import to react differently to political 
arrangements, in practice they appear to do so, to some extent. Generally, export 
needs more time than import does to adjust itself to its new equilibrium value after a 
change in one of its determinants. This follows from the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable, which is 0.853 for export and 0.756 for import. By contrast, the 
short-run responses of export to cooperation and conflict (COOP) and high-level 
visits (VISI) exceed those of import. The results also show that there is hardly any 
difference in the long-term effects: the size and significance level of the DIPLO, 
COOP and SYST variables in both equations is comparable. The long-term effect of 
the GDPdif variable appears to be significantly different from zero in the import 
equation, but not so in the export equation: their mutual difference is not 
significantly different, though. Only some of the short-term and long-term effects of 
the PTA variables (MERCO, EU, CACM) differ from each other. 
Strong empirical evidence is found in favor of the Hypotheses 3.1a, 3.1b, 3.1c and 
3.2. The short-term as well as the long-term effects of any of the DIPLO and COOP 
variables are positive and significant in both the export and the import equation. The 
long-term effect of the VISI variable is also positive and significant in both the 
export and the import equation, but its short-term effect is only significant in the 
export regression.  
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The confirmation of Hypothesis 3.1a implies that without diplomatic relationships 
the economic driving forces of trade may not grow to full stature. China’s 
government has made great efforts to establish diplomatic ties with the rest of the 
world.  During the first upsurge in the establishment of diplomatic relations from 
1949 to 1955, China established diplomatic ties with 23 countries, such as the USSR, 
the East-European socialist states and some neighboring Asian nationalist countries. 
From the latter half of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s, China launched diplomatic 
ties with many more countries, forming a second upsurge in the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. At the end of 1969, there were 50 countries that had diplomatic 
ties with China. All the newly added countries, except France, were developing 
nations from Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the 1970s, another 70 countries, 
from both the developing and developed world, established diplomatic ties with 
China. In 1979, China had diplomatic relations with 120 countries. As of 2003, this 
number had increased to 165. 
To test Hypothesis 3.1b, the following aspects of cooperation and conflict have been 
investigated: (1) economic cooperation, international aid, scientific and technological 
exchange and cooperation, military exchange and cooperation, and culture exchange, 
and (2) military attacks and assaults, break-up of diplomatic relations, non-military 
sanctions, expulsion of organizations or persons, and formal complains or protests. 
The estimation results imply that if politicians in China and its trade partner put 
more effort in encouraging cooperation and diminishing conflict, the two countries 
are likely to enjoy higher trade intensities. This result is very intuitive for the situation 
before 1979 when China’s foreign trade was conducted strictly according to central 
planning guidelines. Politicians completely controlled the direction of trade, which 
enabled China to use foreign trade as a strong weapon in international political 
struggles. From 1980 to 1992, the regime of exclusively mandatory trade was 
replaced with a system of combined mandatory and advisory planning. After 1992,  
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administrative control was further reduced, and gradually trade management was 
removed altogether. However, effects of political relations on trade, although not so 
direct as before, still exist. According to Pollins (1989b: 741), economic agents 
incorporate all kinds of risk-avoiding concerns into their trade decisions and 
therefore tend to decrease trade with a particular country if the political relation with 
their country is becoming more conflictive.  
High-level visits have always been seen as important events in China’s foreign 
relations. A few historical diplomatic visits indeed changed China’s position in the 
international system. One example is Premier Zhou Enlai’s goodwill visit to ten 
African countries in the 1960s, which helped China to gain more friends in the Third 
World. Another famous example is the visit of US President Richard Nixon to China 
in 1972, which dramatically improved China’s relation with the Western World. The 
objectives of high-level visits are to promote bilateral foreign relations by 
enhancement of understanding and improvement of cooperation between the 
countries involved. The confirmation of Hypothesis 3.1c shows that China has 
indeed benefited from these high-level visits in terms of trade. 
The confirmation of Hypothesis 3.2 implies that China’s close, historical contacts 
with most of the communist countries during the past half-century have contributed 
to the intensification of its trade exchange network. Previous studies mainly focused 
on the effect of democracy on trade, assuming that democratic dyads have greater 
trade flows than non-democratic dyads (e.g., Morrow, Siverson and Tabares 1998). 
In addition to that, the present study reveals that similarity of the political system 
between non-democratic dyads also has a positive impact on bilateral trade.  
The results with respect to the PTA variables are rather mixed, but generally do not 
favor Hypothesis 3.3. Of the seven PTA variables only the short-term effects of EU  
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in the export equation and of MERCO and CACM in the import equation appear to 
be negative, albeit neither of these effects is significant statistically. The fact that 
during the past half-century many countries were member of a PTA, while China 
was not, apparently did not have a negative effect on China’s trade linkages to these 
countries. The reason might be that China is an attractive trade partner for all 
member countries from PTAs anyway, because of its mere size: the Chinese market 
is so huge that no country is willing to sacrifice the associated market opportunities 
just because China is not a member of a PTA.  
 With regard to our economic control variables, our findings only weakly indicate 
that Linder’s effect applies to China and its trade partners. The short-term as well as 
the long-term effect of the GDPdif variable is negative in both the export and the 
import equation, but only one of these four effects is significant statistically. Again, 
as suggested above, the reason for this rather weak Linder’s effect might well be the 
mere size of the Chinese economy, making the economic “resistance” variables 
much less important than they have proven to be for smaller countries in earlier 
work. 
Finally, the estimation results in Table 3.2 offer the opportunity to compare the 
relative importance of different political arrangements. The results indicate that the 
establishment of diplomatic relationships and similarity in political systems have had 
a greater impact on trade intensities than cooperation (and conflict) and visits of 
heads of states or other influential politicians. An explanation may be that the latter 
are the more accidental manifestations of the former. 
3.7   Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis on trade intensities between China and 78 trade partners over 
1950-2002 has shown that political arrangements play an important role in shaping  
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international trade. By covering a long time window with much variation and more 
appropriate methods for analyzing that data, and by using a relative rather than 
absolute bilateral trade measure, this study has been able to find strong empirical 
evidence in favor of our four Hypotheses: diplomatic relationships have a positive 
effect on trade intensities (Hypothesis 3.1a); foreign cooperation has a positive effect 
on trade intensities (Hypothesis 3.1b); high-level visits have a positive effect on trade 
intensities (Hypothesis 3.1c); and similarity in political regimes has a positive effect 
on trade intensities (Hypothesis 3.2). Of these four political arrangements, the 
establishment of bilateral relationships and similarity of political systems appeared to 
have the strongest impact.  
The results are less strong for Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.4. The estimation strategy 
employed in this study was not able to produce empirical evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis 3.4 that the military alliance between China and the Soviet Union had a 
positive effect on China’s trade intensity with the Soviet Union. Although 
Hypothesis 3.4 is confirmed by Figure 3.1 and the partial correlation coefficients of 
the ALLI variable with the export and import trade intensity indices in Table 3.1, the 
variation in this variable appeared to be too low to find any empirical evidence in 
favor of this Hypothesis 3.4 in Table 3.2. However, the pattern in Figure 3.1 does 
provide supportive anecdotal evidence, as the Sino-Soviet trade intensity flourished 
in the 1950s when China and the USSR were involved in a military alliance. Finally, 
although the results are mixed, Hypothesis 3.3 that member countries of a PTA 
(Preferential Trading Agreement) have had lower trade intensities with China must 
be rejected. Apparently, China is too important for the members of PTAs to have 
their trade intensities affected. 
The findings for our two economic control variables seem to suggest that, in the case 
of China, politics is more important than economics. For one, only weak empirical  
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evidence has been found in favor of Linder’s economic effect, according to which 
the closer China and its trade partners are in their demand patterns, the more similar 
will be their trade commodities composition and the larger will be their volume of 
bilateral trade. Although the negative sign of the GDPdif variable in both the export 
and the import equation is in line with the existence of Linder’s effect, only the long-
term effect of this variable in the import equation appeared to be significant 
statistically. Similarly, we could not find evidence for the argument that the greater 
the geographical distance between China and its trade partner, the lower will be their 
mutual trade intensity indices. Although the expected relationship between distance 
and trade is confirmed by the negative partial correlation coefficients of the DIST 
variable and the trade intensity indices in Table 3.1, its separate effect could not be 
estimated in Table 3.2 due to the inclusion of country dummy variables. 
Of course, the current study is characterized by a number of limitations that point 
the way to future work. One methodological challenge is to develop an algorithm 
able to produce the maximum likelihood estimates of our dynamic Tobit model with 
fixed effects in both the cross-section and time-series domain. Although our 
approach comes a long way, this would further improve the quality of the estimation 
strategy. One challenge from an economic and political viewpoint, next to replicating 
this study in different settings, is to extend the analysis with the reversal relationship 
between politics and trade. Using cointegration and Granger-causality methods, as 
done in earlier work, might be instrumental in unraveling the politics-trade causality 
relationships. Here, it would be interesting to find out how causality linkages run for 
different aspects of politics (as well as among them), and whether or not the causality 
chain is different for export vis-à-vis import. 
 
  
Chapter 3 China’s Politics and Bilateral Trade LinkagesT 
 
98 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
Chapter 4 
Economic Openness and Trade 
Linkages of China: An empirical 
study of the determinants of Chinese 
trade intensities from 1993 to 1999 
The Chinese economy is on the move. In the 1980s, the Chinese regime took a number of piecemeal 
steps toward economic liberalization. This process accelerated impressively in the 1990s. This 
chapter reports an empirical study into the determinants of the emerging pattern of Chinese trade 
(export and import) intensities in the liberalization decade by exploring international trade statistics 
for 1993 to 1999. That is, six models are estimated that seek to explain the shifts in the export 
and import intensities of trade with different trade partners in the 1993-1999 period. The 
estimation results reveal striking differences for export vis-à-vis import trade intensities, as well as 
for 1993 versus 1999. For example, a key result is that the political determinants of trade 
intensities that were still very important in 1993, have been moved to the background by economic 
explanations in 1999. Clearly, China is opening up to the world at large, de-emphasizing political 
preferences in the economic trade arena. 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Since the launch of a market-oriented reform program in 1978, Chinese international 
trade has experienced an extraordinary expansion with an 18 per cent average annual Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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growth rate.
1 Nowadays, Chinese export and import play a non-negligible role in 
worldwide international economic activities. In 1999, China became the ninth largest 
trader in the world.
2 In 2001, entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
finally established. Without any doubt, China moves rapidly to join the global 
economy, contributing to the growing integration of global business more 
substantially than ever before in the communist era. During the transition from a 
closed to an open economy, the market mechanism started to function in Chinese 
society, which inevitably involved intensifying bilateral trade linkages with many 
countries. Not surprisingly, given the huge potential of China’s billion-plus 
population, a substantial body of literature has emerged that is concerned with 
Chinese trade issues. However, among this rapidly expanding stock of studies, there 
is little analysis of the dynamics of Chinese trade linkages with trade partners. For 
sure, there are many studies that focus on the bilateral trade linkage between China 
on the one hand and a specific trade partner such as East Asia, Japan or the US on 
the other hand (e.g., Platte 1991; Wu and Zhang 1998; Loungani 2000). However, 
few studies aim at understanding the distribution of Chinese export and import over 
all trade partners so as to unravel the factors that explain the (shifts in) Chinese trade 
intensities. The purpose of the current study is to fill this gap by answering three 
questions: How have Chinese bilateral trade linkages developed in the 1990s?; What 
factors may explain the distribution of Chinese trade over different countries in the 
1990s?; and How has the (relative and absolute) importance of these factors changed 
during the transition period of the 1990s?  
                                                      
 
1 Source: World Bank 2000 Yearbook. 
2 The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).  
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In the international trade linkages literature, an important approach is the gravity 
model, which involves the identification of variables that determine the size of trade 
flows between countries, in so doing analyzing the relative importance of different 
trade-driving forces. Introduced by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has been 
successfully applied to bilateral trade flows, usually producing a good estimation fit 
(Anderson 1979). This model emphasizes the explanation of the absolute size of 
bilateral trade flows (e.g., Bergstrand 1989 & 1990; Rauch and Trindade 2002). In 
this chapter, we employ the trade intensity index, which reformulates the gravity 
model such that the relative intensity of the bilateral trade linkages across different 
trade partners is explicitly measured. In most cases, after all, a large bilateral trade 
volume does not imply a similarly close trade relationship. For example, the export 
value from China to the United States is ranked first among the Chinese trade 
partners in 1999 (MOFTEC), but the trade linkage between these two counties is not 
necessarily the most intensive one, given the huge aggregate import value of the 
United States. The empirical study reported below reveals that the mere volume of a 
trade flow from country y to x alone is not enough to unravel the relative importance 
of this trade linkage for country y or x completely.  
In contrast to the trade volume measure, the trade intensity index is an explicit 
measure of the relative importance of the trade linkage between two countries (e.g., 
Chow 1999; Foroutan 1998; Greytak and Tuchinda 1990; Peh 1999). Using this trade 
intensity index, for both export and import, this chapter identifies the factors that 
affect the intensity of the trade linkages between China and a large set of different 
trade partners. Using trade intensity indices to measure trade linkages has a twofold 
advantage. First, the trade intensity index normalizes many factors that may affect 
the absolute trade flows, such as the countries’ international openness, exchange rate Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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and price level. Since these country-specific factors have equal impact on the bilateral 
trade flows of this country with all its trade partners, these factors affect the 
aggregate trade volume but not the across-partners trade structure of this country. 
Second, and related to the above, the trade intensity index is an indicator that reveals 
the relative importance of the trade relationship between two counties explicitly. A 
trade intensity index with country y larger than one implies that the relative 
importance of that trade linkage with this partner y is above average.   
Another theoretical model that targets the explanation of trade flows is Linder’s 
theory (Linder 1961). The departure point of Linder’s approach is that an important 
source of production and trade is domestic demand. From that perspective, Linder 
concludes that the closer trade partners are in their demand patterns to focal country 
y, the more similar will be their trade commodities composition and the larger will be 
their volume of bilateral trade. In other words, patterns and intensities of 
international trade are determined by similarities in the level of development, and so 
by convergence of domestic consumption patterns. Specifically, the Linder effect 
refers to the impact of income level similarity on how a country distributes 
international trade across foreign partners. Because most finished and many 
intermediate goods are produced in and traded from developed countries, a long list 
of empirical studies have reported strong evidence for the existence of a Linder 
effect among developed countries, but very weak or no evidence for less developed 
countries (LDCs) (e.g., Hufbauer 1970; Greytak and McHugh 1977; Ahmad and 
Simos 1979; Thursby and Thursby 1987; Shelburne 1987; Linnemann and van Beers 
1988; Hanink, 1990). In the 1980s and 1990s, however, along with rapid economic 
transformation in a number of developing countries, signs of a positive Linder effect 
were also found for intra-LDC trade (Weinblatt and Schrager 1985; Arnon and 
Weinblatt 1998). The current study employs gross domestic product per capita,  
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education expenditures and industry structure measures to test for a Linder effect in 
the context of Chinese trade. 
Overall, the contribution of this chapter to the study of bilateral trade linkages is 
fivefold. First, the examples of the gravity model and the Linder effect illustrate the 
need to adopt an integrative perspective, taking on board a large set of explanatory 
variables from different theoretical perspectives. This chapter introduces gravity and 
Linderian variables in a trade intensity estimation model. On top of that, this study 
adds additional variables to the explanatory model, such as foreign direct investment 
and the size of the Chinese immigrant population in the trade partners’ societies. 
Second, instead of the mere volume of trade flows, this study introduces the trade 
intensity index to measure the relative weight of a set of trade linkages, which 
explicitly reveals the relative importance of trade between two countries.
3 Third, the 
current study involves China and 71 major trade partners, which – as far as we know 
– is much more than any former study, to date, has done. Fourth, regressions are run 
for export and import trade intensities separately, allowing us to explore whether or 
not the across-countries distribution of Chinese export and import flows are driven 
by similar or dissimilar forces. Fifth, this study tries to unravel the impact of the 
recent Chinese trade liberalization program on bilateral trade linkages by estimating 
 
 
3 Doing it all in a single chapter would be too much, as we already have to report an 
interpretation of a multi-way comparison of the findings for the whole time window, 
two milestone years and two intensity measures. The results of similar analyses for 
absolute trade flows, rather than relative trade intensities, are available upon request, 
however. Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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trade intensity models for the 1993-1999 period, as well as for the 1993 and 1999 
milestone years separately.   
4.2    Trade Reforms and Trade Partners 
4.2.1   Trade reforms 
Starting in 1978, China has introduced a series of opening policies toward foreign 
trade and investment. Roughly speaking, Chinese trade liberalization history can be 
divided into two stages. The first stage ranges from 1978 to 1992. During that period, 
the policy as to the transition toward a market-oriented system followed a gradual 
step-by-step approach. In this period, the opening process started with the 
establishment of a few special economic zones, targeting specific industries only. In 
terms of the trade administration system, decentralization was introduced at three 
levels. First, rights and responsibilities were passed from the central government to 
local authorities, with the aim to encourage local state-owned trading companies to 
develop international trade linkages (Rauch 2001). Second, a contracting-out and 
management-responsibility system was launched, which gave more decision-making 
power to trading companies. Third, trading companies were allowed to retain part of 
the foreign exchange they earned, so enabling them to profit from their trading 
activities and to operate in the foreign exchange market. Fourth, in the 1986-1991 
period China decreased the import tariff rates for a small group of commodities. 
That is, the tariff rates for 81 (from about 6,300 duty codes, in total) were lowered by 
30 to 85 per cent (Tariff Policy Commission of the State Council of China 1991). All 
these reforms together put an end to the era of Chinese ‘splendid isolation’, hence 
triggering the emergence of Chinese international trade. However, the reforms in this 
period were not sufficient to change much because the trade system suffered from 
disorder and even chaos, as conflicts between regions and among different levels of  
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authorities raised to trade-impeding degrees. The result was that much confusion and 
inefficiency were produced by this mixture of centralized regulation and 
decentralized administration. 
A new stage of Chinese economic reform began in 1992. Since then, the Chinese 
trade system has been adapted to better reflect international norms, and the process 
of trade liberalization has accelerated, through five routes. First, the Chinese 
government lowered trade tariff rates more broadly and more significantly. In 
January and again in December 1992, China reduced import tariffs for 3,596 duty 
codes, reflecting different product categories, by an average of 7.3 per cent. In the 
same year, China eliminated an adjustment tax that had been levied since 1985 on the 
import of 16 categories of goods. In December 1993, China further cut back on 
import tariff rates for 2,898 duty codes by an average of 8.8 per cent. In January 
1994, import tariff rates for sedans were reduced from 220 per cent and 180 per cent 
(depending on the model) to 150 per cent and 110 per cent, respectively. In April 
1996, import tariffs for 4,971 items were lowered by an average of 35 per cent, 
reducing the country’s average tariff rate from 35 to 23 per cent for all goods. The 
average rate was further decreased to 17 per cent on October 1 1997 (Customs of 
the People’s Republic of China). In 2001, China cut import tariff rates on 3,462 
items by an average of 6.6 per cent, bringing the country’s average tariff rate down to 
15.3 percent (China Daily of May 1 2001). In all, the trade liberalization program 
during the post-1992 period is associated with a drop of the arithmetic average of 
tariff rates from 43.2 per cent in 1992 to 15.3 percent in 2001. 
Second,  non-tariff trade barriers were reduced substantially, or even demolished 
altogether. In 1992, the government lowered the number of export goods subject to 
quota license regulation from 212 to 183, and fully eliminated import-quota license Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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requirements for 16 categories of goods. In December 1993, China canceled import 
license requirements for 9 categories of goods that comprise 283 products, including 
steel products, pesticides, civil airplanes, and black-and-white television tubes. In 
May 1994, China eliminated import license requirements for another 195 goods, 
including 30 goods that were to be relieved of requirements by the end of 1994 in 
accordance with a Sino-US memorandum of understanding. In 1995, another 120 
goods were relieved of import license regulation. In April 1996, 30 per cent of the 
remaining quotas were dropped. In addition, 1994 was the last year in which the 
government issued mandatory instructional plans for export and import trade. The 
mandatory plans were compulsory and restrictive, being based on strict centrally-
controlled foreign exchange regulation.  
Third, the government started a program of administrative reforms by (a) developing 
an adapted trade-related regulatory and international law system and (b) making the 
international trade administration system much more transparent. The “Law of 
Foreign Trade of the People’s Republic of China” was promulgated in May 1994, 
and entered into effect only two months later. Several regulatory measures that are 
associated with this new law are currently under review, including “Regulations for 
Import Goods”, “Regulations for Export goods”, “Anti-Dumping Statute”, “Anti-
Subsidy Statute”, “Safeguard Regulations”, “Regulations for Punishing Low-Price 
Exports”, and “Regulations for Responding to Anti-Dumping Suits against China’s 
Exports”. All these administrative reforms will further smooth the process of 
international trade by bringing Chinese practice more in line with international 
standards. 
Fourth, along with the liberalization of the international trade system, the reform 
program has been extended to services industries and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Since 1992, additional industries, including a number of sensitive industries in  
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the services sector, were gradually liberalized to allow for entry by foreign firms. On 
top of this, more geographical areas were opened for foreign direct investment, 
including inland cities, which provided foreign investors much better access to the 
domestic interior market of mainland China. In addition, FDI-related reforms were 
speeded up, such as a tax relaxation. This set of FDI-directed reforms greatly 
improved China’s investment environment, so promoting China’s international trade 
position. So, the liberalization of services industries in combination with FDI-
stimulating measures has introduced a further impetus to the development of 
international trade. 
Fifth, many exchange rate reforms have been implemented. As of January 1 1994, 
China took a major step toward currency convertibility by unifying the official and 
swap market exchange rates. This was a real breakthrough in the reform of China’s 
foreign trade system, which helped to bring China’s foreign trade operations closer 
to international norms, playing a positive role in gaining full membership of the 
WTO. The measures taken included: unification of the exchange rates and adoption 
of a managed, market-based, uniform floating exchange rate; abolition of the 
retention schemes and introduction of a foreign exchange surrendering system; 
abolishment of the compulsory foreign exchange plan, permitting users to buy 
foreign exchange from designated banks on presentation of valid import 
documentation; termination of the issuing of Foreign Exchange Certificates (FECs) 
and phasing out FECs already issued; and establishment of an inter-bank foreign 
exchange market. The new exchange rate system has improved the efficiency of Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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foreign exchange allocation and strengthened the central bank’s ability to stabilize 
the rate (e.g., Lichtenstein 2000; Lu and Zhang 2000), with a huge impact on trade.
4
Together, by launching a series of reforms in the above five trade-related policy 
domains China has speeded up the pace of liberalization impressively since 1992. By 
now, the reform of trade policies, exchange rate regime and administrative 
procedures has triggered an unprecedented convergence toward international norms. 
Based on this observation, we selected 1993 to 1999 as the milestone period to 
analyze the regulation-driven changes in Chinese bilateral trade linkages (see also 
below). In this period, we expect the model (see below) to work, as international 
trade was liberalized such that the resulting changes in trade linkages could 
materialize. Note that trade liberalization measures are not introduced as 
(independent) variables in the model below, as Chinese liberalization is a continuous 
process that cannot be associated with clear-cut and discrete deregulatory events. 
Rather, we have decided to run three sets of analyses: for the whole 1993-1999 
period, as well as for both milestone years 1993 and 1999 separately, In so doing, 
particularly by comparing the results for both benchmark observation years 1993 and 
1999, we hope to be able to observe the effect of the Chinese liberalization program 
over time. 
4.2.2   Trade partners 
Ever since the trade liberalization program is in effect, an important feature of 
Chinese trade patterns is the increased diversity of trade partners. The number of 
 
 
4 Export grew at 20.9% in 1994 and 18.7% in 1995, whereas import increased by 
31.9% in 1994 and 23.0% in 1995 (Customs General Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China).  
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trade partners (representing a trade value above the one-million US dollar threshold) 
increased from 148 in 1990 to 183 in 1999. Additionally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration index of Chinese export dropped from 0.47 in 1990 to 0.34 in 1999.
5 
Hong Kong had for long been China’s largest trade partner, counting for 43.2 
percent of Chinese exports in 1990, but Hong Kong’s share dropped to an interim 
low of 18.9 per cent in 1999 (IMF 1995, 2000). Besides increasing trade partner 
diversity, China’s regional spread of trade linkages has changed along with the 
process of international trade liberalization. A frequently used indicator for trade 
linkages is the regional distribution of export and import. Of China’s major trade 
partners, the share of the European Union, the United States, Asia (except Hong 
Kong and Japan) and Africa has increased, while the linkages with Hong Kong and 
Japan have slackened. The data in Table 4.1 substantiate, by and large, this claim by 
listing the export and import trade shares for eight regions. 
However, as stated above, although regional trade shares are an interesting measure 
of trade linkages, we opt for the trade intensity index to measure the relative 
importance of a country or region to China’s trade vis-à-vis the importance of the rest 
 
 
5 The Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index is commonly used as a measure of 
market structure (Daems and Douma 1989). We use this index to measure the 
regional concentration of Chinese export: 
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index = ∑
=
n
i 1
2 σ , 
where n denotes the number of trade partners, and σ stands for the share of export 
of a specific country in total export. The index is 1 if there is only one trade partner, 
while an index close to 0 reflects almost perfect trade diversification. Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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of the world. It is here where the country or region-level trade intensity index adds 
value (see below for a formal definition). Table 4.2 shows that the trade intensity 
with Asian countries is relatively high, followed by United States, the Middle East, 
the European Union and the Western Hemisphere (in that order). 
Table 4.1 Geographical composition of Chinese export and import in 1991-1999 (%) 
Region    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 1993-1999 
EU Export  12.81 12.72 12.79 13.12 13.50  14.85  16.02  25.06% 
 Import  14.71 16.09 16.08 14.31 14.09  14.20  16.24  10.40% 
USA Export  18.49 17.74 16.61 17.67 17.90  20.65  21.54  16.50% 
 Import  10.28 12.08 12.26 11.64 11.45  12.04  11.76  14.40% 
Japan Export  17.20 17.83 19.13 20.44 17.42  16.14  16.62  -3.37% 
 Import  22.37 22.77 21.96 21.02 20.37  20.16  20.38  -8.90% 
Hong Kong  Export  24.05 26.75 24.20 21.78 23.96  21.08  18.93  -21.29% 
  Import  10.10 8.21 6.51 5.64 4.91  4.75  4.16 -58.81% 
Rest of Asia* Export 12.75 13.55 15.80 15.52 15.64  13.42  14.23  11.61% 
   Import  24.60 25.39 27.19 29.46 31.95  32.85  32.18  30.81% 
Africa  Export  1.30 1.10 1.30 1.40 1.40  1.84  1.69 30.00% 
  Import  0.70 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.60  1.02  1.40 100.00% 
Middle  East Export  2.80 2.40 2.30 2.30 2.30  NA**   2.73  -2.50% 
  Import  1.60 1.20 1.70 2.20 2.70  NA** 2.19 36.88% 
Western         Export  1.70  1.90  2.00  2.00  2.40  2.81  2.56  50.59% 
Hemisphere  Import  1.80 1.80 2.10 2.50 2.60  2.07  1.77 -1.67% 
*   Rest of Asia comprises the Asian continent except for Japan and Hong Kong. 
** NA denotes not available. 
Sources:  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1995 and 2000. 
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                                 Table 4. 2: Trade intensities of China in 1999 
Region Export 
intensity 
Import 
intensity 
EU 0.44  0.42 
USA 1.19  0.96 
Japan 3.10  2.74 
Hong Kong  6.10  1.35 
Rest of Asia*  1.05  2.03 
Africa 0.90  0.75 
Middle East  0.98  0.71 
Western  Hemisphere     0.42  0.33 
* Rest of Asia comprises the Asian continent except for Japan and Hong Kong. 
Sources:  MIF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2000. 
4.3   Hypotheses 
The hypothesized determinants of the trade intensities should be variables that 
influence the direction of trade flows among countries, and not so much those that 
affect the levels of trade in the world at large. After all, we are interested in 
explaining the distribution of trade flows over countries rather than the absolute 
trade volumes. Our first group of variables is derived from the gravity model 
literature. In an early contribution to the literature, Linnemann (1966) classified the 
factors that determine bilateral trade into three categories of variables, i.e., measures 
of 
(1) total potential supply of the exporting country A, 
(2) total potential demand of importing country B, and Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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(3) “resistance” to trade from potential supplier A to potential buyer B.  
The first two categories of measures offer proxies for the trade potential of the 
countries A and B, respectively, whereas the third category captures the barriers and 
drivers of trade intensity between the countries A and B. As far as the third category 
is concerned, which is of central interest in the current study, former empirical 
studies introduced a series of variables that offer proxies for different kinds of inter-
country distance. The key argument here is that the larger the distance between 
country A and B, along whatever dimension relevant for international trade, the 
lower their trade intensity will be. Prominent examples of such distance-related 
measures are (a) discriminatory trade integration, (b) geographical distance, (c) 
historical and political affinities, (d) cultural (dis)similarity and (e) economic structure 
overlap (Linnemann 1966; Yamazuwa 1971; van Beers and Linnemann 1991; Parsley 
and Wei 2001). In the current study, apart from these five established factors, we 
introduce another variable that may influence the trade intensities of China: foreign 
direct investment. Below, we formulate six hypotheses as to the expected effect of 
this set of six independent variables on the Chinese trade intensities. Note that we do 
not develop separate hypotheses for export vis-à-vis import trade intensities or for 
1993 versus 1999, as the (empirical and theoretical) literature offers insufficient 
arguments to ground diverging predictions in either direction. So, as far as these 
comparisons are concerned, we let the data speak. 
First, trade integration is an important issue in many parts of the world. A prominent 
example is the discriminatory trade bloc phenomenon. After all, a discriminatory 
trade bloc is an important barrier-reducing vehicle for the bloc’s member states, but 
a similarly important barrier-increasing institution for non-member nations. 
According to the theory of customs unions, pioneered by Viner (1953), 
discriminatory trade blocs are likely to trigger trade-creation effects for the member  
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countries, so positively affecting the intensity of trade between member states. The 
other side of the coin is that non-member countries are likely to lose sales inside the 
bloc, suffering from trade-diversion effects. This well-established type of argument 
induces Hypothesis 4.1 (Foroutan 1998; Soloaga and Winters 2001). 
HYPOTHESIS 4.1: The Chinese trade intensities are higher (lower) with non-
member (member) countries outside (inside) the world’s discriminatory trade blocs. 
Second, historical and political affinities cannot be ignored in a study of international 
trade (Loungani 2000). For one, for obvious reasons of path dependencies, a long 
history of inter-country exchange is likely to introduce auto-correlation in the 
relevant international trade time series. Moreover, friendly political relationships 
among similar political regimes will benefit the bilateral trade between the countries 
involved through policies of preferred trade arrangements. Both mechanisms 
together give Hypothesis 4.2.  
HYPOTHESIS 4.2: The Chinese trade intensities are higher (lower) with countries 
that are (not) tied to China through (a) long historical bonds or (b) political system 
similarities.  
Third, many empirical studies have shown, in accordance with modern trade theory, 
that transport costs negatively influence trade flows (e.g., Geraci and Prewo 1977). 
The geographical distance of a country from world markets and the transportation 
conditions inside a country, for example, determine the transport cost level (e.g., Yu 
and Zietlow 1995). If transportation distance from a country to potential trade 
partners affects the geographical distribution of international trade, then the trade 
intensities are affected accordingly. This is Hypothesis 4.3. Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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HYPOTHESIS 4.3: The Chinese trade intensities are higher (lower) with countries 
that are nearby (far away) in terms of geographical distance. 
Fourth, in general cultural and language affiliations can facilitate transaction 
efficiency and effectiveness in an uncertain environment (Rauch 2001; Wei 2000). 
Ethnic linkages, for example, play an important role in international business. 
Among the ethnic group networks active in international trade, the overseas Chinese 
settlements have received the most attention. Earlier studies have produced two 
related results that are particularly interesting in the context of this chapter: (a) the 
overseas Chinese networks play an important role in international trade in general 
(e.g., Redding 1995; Rauch and Trindade 2001); and (b) ethnic ties are a crucial 
stimulus for doing business with China in particular (e.g., Dixon and Newman 1998; 
Luo 2001). Based on these findings, we assume that the size of the Chinese 
immigrant population in a trade partner’s society influences the bilateral trade 
intensity positively. This is reflected in Hypothesis 4.4. 
HYPOTHESIS 4.4: The Chinese trade intensities are higher (lower) with countries 
that host a large (small) Chinese immigrant population. 
Fifth, as stated in the introduction, many studies in the Linderian tradition have 
found evidence in support of the argument that inter-country similarity in terms of 
economic structure, particularly in terms of consumption patterns, has a positive 
effect on bilateral trade, especially in the developed world. The findings are not 
unambiguous, though, as other studies fail to support this hypothesis, particularly for 
the developing world (Linnemann 1966; Linnemann and van Beers 1988; Peh and 
Wong 1999). Here, we formulate the hypothesis in line with the original contribution 
of Linder (1961). This is Hypothesis 4.5.  
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HYPOTHESIS 4.5: The Chinese trade intensities are higher (lower) with countries 
that reveal (dis)similar economic structures. 
Sixth, it is clear that foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade are 
closely interrelated as the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have 
distinctive effects on the structure of international trade, of both home and host 
countries. That is, the MNE’s ability and willingness to internalize cross-border 
transactions affect the value-added activities both within a country and between 
countries (Dunning 1992). In general, the literature is unanimous about the 
importance of this link. However, the exact nature of the relationship between FDI 
and trade is a controversial issue in the international economics and business 
literature. This is because the relationship works out differently under different 
circumstances. For example, market-penetration FDI may substitute for the import 
from host countries, whilst factor-seeking investment may increase exports from the 
host nation to the home country (Root 1994). Summarizing the literature on the 
FDI-trade relationship, we can conclude that this relationship largely depends on (a) 
the types of FDI and trade being considered, (b) the nature of the 
internationalization strategies of the MNEs and (c) the characteristics of the 
industries and countries involved. So, not surprisingly, the evidence in the empirical 
literature is mixed. A number of studies have confirmed the idea that outward FDI 
and export trade are complementary activities, especially in the case of the developed 
world (e.g., Swedenborg 1979, 1985; Lipsey and Weiss 1981; Pearce 1990; Wei et al. 
1999). Other work has reported that FDI and international trade are substitutes, and 
thus negatively related (e.g., Horst 1972). As far as China is concerned, empirical 
studies tend to reveal a positively significant impact of FDI inflow on China’s total 
trade volume (e.g., Chen 1996; Sun 1999, 2001; Wei et al. 1999). In our context, we Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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take this finding as the benchmark hypothesis. That is, FDI is expected to influence 
the trade intensities between China and the investors’ home countries positively. 
This produces Hypothesis 4.6. 
HYPOTHESIS 4.6: The Chinese trade intensities are higher (lower) with countries 
that represent (not) much foreign direct investment in China. 
4.4    Measures, Data and Methodologies 
4.4.1   Measures 
In total, we collected data on two dependent and ten independent variables. The 
dependent variables are the Chinese export and import trade intensities. The trade 
intensity index (TI), developed by Kojima (1968), Roemer (1976), Kunimoto (1977) 
and Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), measures the degree to which two countries trade 
more (or less, for that matter) intensively with each other than they do with the rest 
of the world. For export, it is defined as the ratio of a focal country c’s export share 
in total imports of another country f on the one hand and the percentage this 
country c represents of total exports in world trade on the other hand. For import, an 
equivalent ratio can be calculated. This study’s dependent variables are the export 
trade intensity index (exTI) and the import trade intensity index (imTI). Obviously, 
the index is influenced by the absolute volumes of either partners’ trade. The trade 
intensity index used here, though, measures the extent to which the trade relation (in 
terms of either export or import) of China, c, with foreign partner f is more close (or 
loose) than that with the rest of the world. The uncorrected trade intensity indices 
are expressed as follows:  
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Here, exuTIcf is defined as the uncorrected Chinese export intensity with country f, xcf 
is Chinese export to country f, mf is total import of country f, xc  is Chinese total 
export and    xw is world export. Similarly, imuTIcf is defined as the uncorrected 
Chinese import intensity with country f,  mcf  is Chinese import from country f,  xf  is 
total export of country f, mc is Chinese total import and mw is world import. Since 
China cannot export to (or import from) itself, the formulas above must be modified 
by using overall world trade reduced by China’s import (export). This gives the 
corrected trade intensity index (dropping the u in the shortcut reference) 
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In this study, we use expression (4.2) to calculate the export and import TIs. A value 
of the TI greater than one indicates that China exports to (or imports from) country f 
more intensively than it does to (or from) the rest of the world. Vice versa: a value of 
TI less than one reflects that China exports to (or imports from) country f less 
intensively than it does to (or from) the rest of the world.  
In total, we use ten independent variables. The first one relates to the issue of 
discriminatory trade integration (Hypothesis 4.1). We use a dummy variable labeled 
regional integration (INTE) as a proxy for the relative height of such barriers, with 0 Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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denoting non-membership and 1 membership of a trade bloc. In 1999, four close 
trade blocs – the European Union (EU), the North-American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Latin-
American MERCOSUR – are taken into account. In 1993, only the EU and the 
ASEAN are taken on board since at that time the other blocs were not yet mature 
enough.  
The second pair of independent variables relates to historical and political affinities 
(Hypotheses 4.2a and b, respectively). Our second independent variable is the 
duration of diplomatic ties (DIPLO) and the third one relates to political system 
similarity (POLI), which together offer proxies for the historical and political affinity 
variables. For DIPLO we have calculated the duration in years after the date when 
China and a trade partner set up a formal diplomatic relationship; and for POLI we 
use a simple 0-1 dummy with a 0-code for capitalist countries and a 1-code for 
communist or transitional nations. 
The transport cost variable is proxied by a straightforward indication of geographical 
distance (Hypothesis 4.3), which is denoted as DIST. This is our fourth independent 
variable. Considering the most popular sea-road transportation route of goods from 
and to China, we code border countries as 0, non-border Asian countries as 1, 
Oceanic countries as 2, European and Africa countries as 3, and American countries 
as 4. We decided to use this categorical variable rather than a capital-to-capital 
kilometer one (as is often done in gravity model analyses) because international trade 
can happen everywhere outside of the capital of a huge country like China. China’s 
border countries are more likely to trade with Chinese border provinces than with 
Beijing. The geographic distance between Beijing and Hanoi is about two times that 
between Beijing and Ulaanbaatar, but we cannot say that South Korea is two times 
further away from China than Mongolia is. For this reason, we suppose that the  
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impact of distance on bilateral trade is the same for all border countries, no matter 
how far the distance between the capital cities is.  
The fifth independent variable is a proxy for cultural affinity, i.e., the relative size of 
the Chinese immigrant population in non-Chinese countries (Hypothesis 4.4). We 
use the share of the Chinese immigrant community in the trade partners’ population 
(CHIpop) as our cultural affinity measure. 
The economic structure similarity is measured through four different proxies, which 
are introduced to test for the (non)existence of the Linder effect in China 
(Hypothesis 4.5). The sixth independent variable is gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita (PGDP). Here we use PGDPdif to measure the difference, which can be 
expressed as  PGDPc PGDPf PGDPc PGDPdif / ) ( − = , where PGDP is measured in 
PPP-price (recall that c denotes China and f the foreign trading partner). The seventh 
independent variable is the ratio of education expenditure to GDP (denoted as 
EDUC), which is an indicator of the level of labor cost, as well as the availability of 
high-skill labor or high-brow technology. Again, we calculate EDUCdif to measure 
the discrepancy between China and trade partner f, which is expressed as 
. The eighth independent variable is an 
industry structure measure. We use the share of services in GDP, which is denoted 
as SERV%. Among the 71 trade partners (see below), all partners have a higher 
SERV% than China, except for Cameroon and Loa. Therefore, we suppose that the 
higher  SERV%, the larger the economic structure difference.
EDUCc EDUCc EDUCf EDUCdif / ) ( − =
6  The ninth 
                                                      
 
6 Another reason to use SERV% instead of a SERV%-discrepancy measure is that 
we conjecture that SERV% per se is positively correlated with TI. The argument is Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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independent variable is a measure of the similarity of the commodity composition of 
trade, which is labeled COS. COS was developed originally by Linnemann (1966).
 
COS varies between 0 (no similarity) and 1 (perfect similarity).
7
The tenth, and final, independent variable relates to foreign direct investment. In the 
post-1991 period, FDI inflow in China has increased extraordinarily, which 
inevitably influences China’s export and import performance. In 1999, the share of 
foreign investment companies in Chinese total export and import were 45.5 and 51.8 
per cent, respectively.
8 These figures reflect the impact of China’s dual trade regime 
(Naughton 1996, 1999) and illustrate the important role played by FDI in China’s 
foreign trade. Earlier studies on the FDI-trade relationship used the previous year’s 
FDI-level, thus exploiting time-series data, as the explanatory variable (e.g., Zhang 
and Song 2000). Our study is different in two ways, though: (a) we focus on trade 
intensity instead of trade flow as the dependent variable; and (b) we use cross-
sectional data for two years (1993 and 1999: see below) next to and on top of time-
series information. Therefore, we start from the assumption that all the active FDI 
inflows affect the TI. Based on data availability limitations, we use the previous three 
years’ cumulative FDI inflow as our tenth independent variable, denoted as FDIsum. 
                                                                                                                                     
 
that a high share of services in GDP implies an advanced services industry, which 
facilitates foreign trade with high-quality services products, such as transportation, 
telecommunication, insurance, banking and financial services. 
7 COS = 
∑∑
∑
kk
fk
2
ck
2
k
fk ck
M * X
M * X , where  ck X is the export volume of China in commodity 
class k, and  is the import volume of China’s trade partner in commodity class k.  fk M
8 General Administration of Customs of China.  
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4.4.2   Data 
We chose 1993 and 1999 as our two milestone observation years in order to analyze 
what happened to Chinese export and import trade intensities, and their underlying 
driving or impeding forces, in the decade of accelerated liberalization. There are two 
reasons to select 1993. First, the new period of intensified international trade reform 
started in 1992, and 1993 is the first year in which the new policies functioned. So, 
the great changes – if any, of course – have largely materialized in the post-1993 
period.
9 By comparing the results for 1993 vis-à-vis 1999 we can hope to reveal the 
changes brought about by the continuous process of international trade reform. The 
other reason is related to FDI. As stated above, for year t we use the sum of FDI in 
the previous three years t-1, t-2 and t-3 as a key explanation for TI in year t. Before 
1990, however, FDI inflow was consistently at a very low level. In effect, in the pre-
1990 period most trade partners had no FDI in China whatsoever. Even in 1990, 
there were only 34 countries with a Chinese FDI level above the (very low) $10,000-
threshold (MOFTEC 1990). In early 1992, Chinese government reaffirmed the open-
door policy and called for a massive FDI influx into China. The FDI inflow in China 
in 1992 doubled the figure of 1991, and in 1993 the inflow of FDI doubled the 
 
 
9 Of course, whatever benchmark year is selected, a degree of arbitrariness is 
unavoidable. After all, trade-affecting events happen all the time: for example, the 
Tiananmen crisis in 1989, China’s nuclear testing in 1995, and the bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. We do believe, however, that 1993 is a good 
choice. For example, the sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen crisis had been 
relaxed during the two years after the event, as Japan lifted the sanctions after one 
year and the US after 18 months. Therefore, we can safely assume that the short-
term effects of the event on bilateral trade had diminished by 1993. Indeed, statistics 
show that bilateral trade with the Western world increased at a high speed after 1991. Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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figure of 1992. The number of investing countries increased to 59 in 1992 
(MOFTEC). Therefore, the 1990-1992 period is the turning point that demarcates 
the entry from a, basically, non-FDI into a new pro-FDI epoch.  
The source of the international trade data is mainly the IMF, complemented by 
sources from inside The Custom of People’s Republic of China. In total, data for 71 
trade partners are available (see the Appendix). Diplomatic data are from the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information about the sizes of the per-country Chinese 
immigrant population abroad are largely copied from the Overseas Chinese Economy 
Yearbook 1990 (Poston and Yu 1991), which includes the latest census data available 
for most countries, complemented by figures from The Encyclopedia of the Chinese 
Overseas (Pan 1999). Data for education expenditures, GDP per capita and services 
industry share are collected from the Worldbank 2000 database. Finally, FDI 
information has been provided by MOFTEC.   
The descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c (though without 
the COS variable: see below for an explanation) 
Table 4.3a: Mean levels, standard deviations and correlation coefficients (1993-1999) 
  Mean  s.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  INTE  0.32  0.47  1.00         
2  DIPLO 26.24  14.16  -0.05 1.00        
3  POLI  0.17  0.38  -0.27 0.03 1.00       
4  DIST  2.38  1.36  0.14 -0.15 -0.15 1.00      
5 LogCHIpop -3.98  3.05  0.44 -0.08 -0.30 -0.14 1.00        
6 PGDPdif  2.51  3.04  0.50 -0.06 -0.15 0.21 0.38 1.00      
7 EDUCdif  1.17  0.89  0.10 -0.11 0.07 0.26 -0.18 0.42 1.00    
8 SERV%  54.35  12.08  0.32 -0.06 -0.15 0.41 0.19 0.63 0.37 1.00   
9 FDIsum  0.0043  0.01  0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15 0.34 0.42 0.05 0.21  1.00 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
Table 4.3b: Mean levels, standard deviations and correlation coefficients (1999) 
  Mean  s.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  INTE  0.41  0.50  1.00         
2  DIPLO 28.92  14.70  -0.09 1.00        
3  POLI  0.17  0.38  -0.37 0.04 1.00       
4  DIST  2.38  1.37  0.34 -0.16 -0.15 1.00      
5 LogCHIpop -3.98  3.07  0.53 -0.07 -0.30 -0.14 1.00        
6 PGDPdif  1.94  2.68  0.54 -0.01 -0.17 0.20 0.38 1.00      
7 EDUCdif  1.11  0.81  0.01 -0.14 0.06 0.30 -0.20 0.39 1.00    
8 SERV%  55.76  12.89  0.35 -0.21 -0.07 0.35 0.18 0.58 0.44 1.00   
9 FDIsum  0.0055  0.02  0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.19 0.38 0.52 -0.01 0.22  1.00 
 
Table 4.3c: Mean levels, standard deviations and correlation coefficients (1993) 
  Mean  s.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  INTE  0.23  0.42  1.00         
2  DIPLO 23.24  14.10  -0.04 1.00        
3  POLI  0.17  0.38  -0.24 0.03 1.00       
4  DIST  2.38  1.37  -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 1.00      
5 LogCHIpop -3.98  3.07  0.46 -0.08 -0.30 -0.14 1.00        
6 PGDPdif  3.22  3.56  0.39 -0.04 -0.14 0.22 0.39 1.00      
7 EDUCdif  1.28  1.00  -0.06 -0.10 0.10 0.20 -0.20 0.36 1.00    
8 SERV%  54.20  11.22  0.25 -0.07 -0.23 0.46 0.23 0.75 0.33 1.00   
9 FDIsum  0.0033  0.01  0.00 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 0.23 0.43 0.04 0.18  1.00 Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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4.4.3   Methodologies 
The empirical study starts from a general log-linear specification of an estimation 
model using the dependent and independent variables introduced above.
10 After 
various tests (available upon request), we decided to specify the basic model as 
follows: 
. %
log log
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
ε β β β β
β β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
FDIsum SERV EDUCdif PGDPdif
CHIpop DIST POLI DIPLO INTE TIcf                            (4.3)  
The following aspects about the model are worthwhile discussing. 
First, we ran regressions for different model specifications. Note that the superiority 
of specification (4.3) above obviously offers partial evidence against Hypothesis 4.5, 
as the COS variable has dropped out. That is, the COS coefficient is insignificant, 
and the plausibility of the parameter estimates improves if COS is removed. This 
implies that inter-country export-import similarity does not contribute to the 
intensity of trade between China and its trade partners. 
Second, we calculated the Pearson correlation coefficients among all explanatory 
variables of model (4.3) so as to identify possible cases of problematic multi-
collinearity. The results are reproduced in Tables 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c above. 
According to the rule of thumb test, multi-collinearity is not a problem since the all 
the values of the correlation coefficients are below 0.7 (or above –0.7, for that 
matter), except for the PGDPdif – SERV%  0.75 correlation for 1993, which we 
tolerate as both variables are proxies for the Linder effect. Therefore, the results 
                                                      
 
10 This is different from the usual log-log specification in gravity analyses for two 
reasons. First, trade intensity is a ratio rather than an absolute value dependent 
variable. Second, many of our independent variables can take value zero.  
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reported below are based on the regression model (4.3) with nine independent 
variables. 
Third, the logarithm is taken of the Chinese immigration population share variable in 
trade partner countries, because we expect that the relation between the TI and 
CHIpop is not linear. The data reveal that the marginal increase in TI with respect to 
an increase in CHIpop is indeed a decreasing function of CHIpop. For example, the 
CHIpop of Singapore and Vietnam was 68 and 0.7 per cent in 1999, respectively, but 
we cannot expect the influence of CHIpop in Singapore to be 100 times larger than 
that of Vietnam. 
Fourth, for the remaining discrepancy variables as to the similarity of economic 
structures, EDUCdif and PGDPdif, we do not take the absolute value, because we 
may expect different effects of positive vis-à-vis negative economic distance on TI. 
Although there are studies that report evidence for a Linder effect in developing 
countries, the GDP of the countries included in those studies were not very low 
compared to the developing countries’ average. In effect, most studies support the 
hypothesis that the Linder effect exists only in countries with per-capita income 
above a relatively high threshold (Hanink 1990; Arnon and Weinblatt, 1998; and 
Chow and Kellman 1999). Estimating a simple linear regression model for the 24 
countries which GDP per capita lower than China, we find a weak positive relation 
between export TI and the absolute value of both PGDPdif and EDUCdif in 1999.
11 
 
 
11 For the PGDPdif variable, we ran all analyses for the developed and developing 
countries separately, which China offering the cut-off level. This produces estimation 
results qualitatively similar to the ones reported below in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 for the Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
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Therefore, we conjecture that the PGDP and EDUC-discrepancy measures are 
negatively related to TI if the trade partner’s GDP per capita is higher than that of 
China, but positively related if the trade partner’s GDP per capita is lower than that 
of China.
12
Fifth, we estimate log-linear rather than linear TI models. The reason is that the 
linear models are associated with a standard residual plot that indicates the existence 
of non-constant variance (available upon request). If we apply a natural logarithmic 
transformation to the TI variable, then the problem of non-constant variance does 
not emerge. The result of White’s heteroskedasticity test (available upon request) 
indeed reveals that heteroskedasticity plagues the linear models, but not their log-
linear alternatives. 
Below, we report the results of OLS-estimates
13 of the log-linear model (4.3) above 
for the whole 1993-1999 period, two milestone observation years (1993 and 1999), 
two independent variables (export and import TI) and 71 trade partners (see the 
Appendix). In so doing, 93 and 94 percent of Chinese export in 1999 and 1993, 
 
 
whole country sample. This could not be checked for the case of EDUCdif, due to 
the small number (five) of countries with education levels below China’s. 
12 The results for different model specifications, as referred to above (available upon 
request), support this assumption. That is, model specification with absolute values 
of EDUCdif and PGDPdif produces inferior results. 
13 We did not use a fixed-effect model because three out of seven explanatory 
variables are time-invariant. These three variables would be swept away by a fixed-
effect transformation, implying a major loss of information. A random-effect model 
is suitable for estimation with a huge sample. However, we only have 71 (72) cross-
sectional units (i.e., countries).  
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respectively, and 95 and 96 percent of Chinese import in 1993 and 1999, respectively, 
are covered.
14
4.5   Evidence 
The regression results are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. As a benchmark for the 
discussion of the results, Table 4.6 offers an overview of how the measures and the 
findings relate to the six hypotheses for the 1993-1999, 1993 and 1999 regressions, 
respectively.  
The regression results for the whole 1993-1999 period are reported in Table 4.4. For 
one, the explanatory power of the export trade intensity is much larger than for 
import trade intensity, with an R-squared of 0.565 and of 0.254, respectively. As far 
as the hypotheses are concerned, the export trade intensity regression produces 
support for Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2a, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.6, whereas the import 
trade intensity analysis does so for Hypotheses 4.3, 4.5c and 4.6 (with the exception 
of EDUCdif estimate, all at the 1% level of significance). Significant results with 
unexpected signs emerge for political system similarity in the export trade intensity 
regression (at the 1% significance level), and education discrepancy in the import 
trade intensity analysis (at the 10% level of significance). Of course, the regressions 
 
 
14 Chinese import and export here refers to the trade of mainland China with other 
countries, but excluding trade with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. By not covering 
all export and import flows, we avoid another econometric pitfall (because otherwise 
the TIs would sum up to one). Additionally, we decided not to include Hong Kong 
in our analyses because this ‘special’ part of China introduces much noise as a result 
of re-export and re-investment distortions (Fung 1998; Fung and Lau 2001). Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
for the pooled 1993-1999 data may mask underlying processes of change that emerge 
gradually over time. This is why we, in addition, report results for both milestone 
years 1993 and 1999 separately, in reverse order of chronology, before we move to 
the interpretation of our findings. 
Table 4.4: Empirical results for Chinese bilateral trade intensity in 1993 to 1999 
 Log(exTI)  Log(imTI) 
 
Intercept 
0.441 
(2.758) 
0.869 
(2.328) 
 
INTE  -0.403*** 
(-5.699) 
0.201 
(1.220) 
 
DIPLO  0.010*** 
(5.365) 
0.004 
(0.970) 
 
POLI  -0.323*** 
(-4.195) 
-0.175 
(-0.970) 
 
DIST  -0.257*** 
(-10.895) 
-0.455*** 
(-8.233) 
 
LogCHIpop 
0.042*** 
(3.701) 
0.006 
(-0.208) 
 
PGDPdif  -0.083*** 
(-5.717) 
0.029 
(0.847) 
 
EDUCdif  -0.073** 
(-1.990) 
0.178* 
(2.085) 
 
SERV%  -0.002 
(-0.729) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.337) 
 
FDIsum  20.297*** 
(9.000) 
19.231*** 
(3.654) 
N 497  497 
R-squared 0.565 0.254 
F 70.327*** 18.342*** 
P-value 0  0 
Notes:  * p≤0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01; and values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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         1999           1993 
 Log(exTI)  Log(imTI)  Log(exTI)  Log(imTI) 
Intercept 0.042 
(0.086) 
1.337 
(1.547) 
0.794 
(0.902) 
-0.933 
(-0.775) 
INTE -0.607*** 
(-2.678) 
0.022 
(0.055) 
-0.489 
(-1.416) 
0.058 
(0.123) 
DIPLO 0.009 
(1.602) 
0.007 
(0.752) 
0.022** 
(2.569) 
0.015 
(1.313) 
POLI -0.522** 
(-2.481) 
-0.771** 
(-2.058) 
-0.546 
(-1.592) 
0.800* 
(1.705) 
DIST -0.171*** 
(-2.566) 
-0.420*** 
(-3.525) 
-0.362*** 
(-3.453) 
-0.485*** 
(-3.383) 
LogCHIpop 0.057* 
(1.746) 
0.081 
(1.392) 
0.052 
(1.047) 
-0.018 
(-0.258) 
PGDPdif -0.110** 
(-2.236) 
-0.090 
(-1.031) 
-0.069 
(-1.049) 
0.012 
(0.129) 
EDUCdif -0.279** 
(-2.402) 
0.443** 
(2.140) 
-0.036 
(-0.257) 
0.028 
(0.149) 
SERV% 0.013 
(1.525) 
-0.025* 
-1.718 
-0.010 
(-0.525) 
0.008 
(0.339) 
FDIsum 15.196*** 
(2.530) 
18.155* 
(1.696) 
19.976* 
(1.891) 
15.655 
(1.084) 
N 71  71  71  71 
R-squared 0.593  0.425  0.468  0.303 
F 9.855***  5.00***  5.967***  2.941*** 
P-value 3.4E-09  4.77E-05 5.96E-06 5.78E-03 
Notes:  * p≤0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01; and values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Table 4.5: Empirical results for Chinese bilateral trade intensity in 1993 vis-à-vis 1999 
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  For the regression with the export trade intensity, log (exTI), for 1999, the F-
statistic (F = 9.855) is significant at the 1% level (with a p-value of 3.4E-09), 
producing an R-squared of 0.593. INTE is significant at the 1% level, negatively 
influencing TI. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 4.1. The DIPLO-coefficient 
turns out to be insignificant, which is not in line with Hypothesis 4.2a. POLI is 
negatively significant at the 5% level, which is contrary to our expectation in 
Hypothesis 4.2b. An interpretation of this result may refer to the set of trading 
partners. Only twelve trading partners are transitional countries. Among the twelve 
transitional countries, nine are from Eastern Europe, two from Middle Asia and one 
from Southeast Asia. As a result of European economic and political dynamics, the 
nine East-European countries integrate rapidly into Western Europe (Drabek and 
Smith 1995; Festoc 1997; Liargovas and Papazoglou 1999). This biased economic 
orientation is likely to produce the low export TI with China. DIST is negatively 
significant at the 1% level, which is in line with Hypothesis 4.3. The logCHIpop-
coefficient is positively significant at the 10% level. This finding offers support for 
Hypothesis 4.4, although the low coefficient value of logCHIpop (0.057) indicates this 
element is not that important in explaining the Chinese export TI. EDUCdif and 
PGDPdif are both negatively significant at the 5% level, which offers evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis 4.5. SERV%, however, does not reach significance, which 
implies a failure to support Hypothesis 4.5. Perhaps, this is so because the value of 
SERV% of a country x does not differ across its trade partners, implying that this 
variable has an effect on the scale of trade only, and not on the trade distribution. 
Overall, Hypothesis 4.5 is associated with mixed evidence. FDIsum clearly turns out 
to be a significant factor, positively influencing the Chinese export TI at the 1% level. 
The coefficient of FDIsum is as large as 15.196, which may indicate that FDI plays a 
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very important role in increasing the Chinese export TI. This result strongly supports 
Hypothesis 4.6.  
The estimation of the model with the Chinese import trade intensities, log(imTI), in 
1999 is associated with a significant F-test (F = 5.00), too, again at the 1% level (the 
p-value is 4.77E-05). The R-squared is much lower, though (0.425). INTE, DIPLO, 
logCHIpop and GDPdif turn out to be insignificant, which fails to produce (partial) 
support for Hypotheses 4.1, 4.2a, 4.4 and 4.5. DIST is negatively significant at the 
1% level, POLI is negatively significant at the 5% level, SERV% is negatively 
significant at the 10% level and FDIsum is positively significant at the 10% level, 
offering (partial) support for Hypotheses 4.3, 4.2b, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. In 
contrast with the expectation reflected in Hypothesis 4.5, EDUCdif is positively 
significant at the 5% level. The latter result may reflect international industry 
specialization along the lines of the traditional theory of comparative advantage, 
implying that low-wage and low-skill countries (such as China) are forced to import 
advanced products from high-wage and high-skill trading partners. 
Comparing the import TI with the export TI results for 1999 reveals a large number 
of interesting differences: 
a)  Discriminatory trade bloc membership has a (negative) effect on the export 
trade intensity with China, but does not influence the import trade intensity. 
b)  Geographical distance plays a much more prominent (negative) role in 
determining import trade intensity than in explaining export trade intensity. 
c)  Chinese immigrant population share does (positively) influence the export 
trade intensity with China, but leaves the import trade intensity unaffected. 
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d)  GDP discrepancy only (negatively) influences a trade partner's export trade 
intensity with China, having no impact on the import trade intensity. 
e)  Education discrepancy has a negative impact on export trade intensity, but a 
positive influence on import trade intensity. 
f)  China imports more intensively from countries with low services industry 
shares than from countries with large services industry shares, whereas an 
export effect is absent.  
g)  Although FDI is important throughout, MNE behavior has a stronger 
impact on export than on import trade intensities. 
h)  Overall, the explanatory power of the model is much larger for export than 
for import trade intensities. 
For both model estimates for 1993, the F-statistics (F = 5.967 for export trade 
intensity, and F= 2.941 for import trade intensity) are significant at the 1% level. The 
R-squares of the 1993 regressions are substantially lower than of the 1999 
regressions (0.468 for import intensity and 0.303 for import intensity). At the level of 
the independent variables, the results for 1993 are very different from those for 1999. 
In the export trade intensity regression, only the DIPLO,  DIST and FDIsum 
estimates reach significance, the direction of the effects being in accordance with the 
Hypotheses 4.2a, 4.3 and 4.6, respectively. In the import trade intensity regression, 
only the POLI and DIST coefficients are (positively and negatively) significant, 
supporting Hypotheses 4.2b and 4.3, respectively. A comparison of the results for 
1993 vis-à-vis 1999, produces a number of additional insights: 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4 Economic Openness and Trade Linkages of China 
 
 
 
 
134 
i)  Political factors (diplomatic ties and political regimes) affect trade intensities 
positively and significantly in 1993 (for export and import, respectively), but 
not at all in 1999. In contrast, political system similarity is negatively 
associated with export and import trade intensities in 1999. 
j)  From the list of economic variables, apart from geographical distance, only 
FDI (positively) influences the (export) trade intensities significantly in 1993. 
k)  The political determinants of trade intensities that were still very important 
in 1993, have been moved to the background by economic explanations in 
1999. 
l)  The explanatory power of the models is much larger for 1999 than for 1993, 
both in terms of export and import trade intensities. 
Overall, the findings suggest two main conclusions. First, from the angle of 
comparing the export versus the import TI regressions, it becomes clear that the 
model is much better in explaining export than import trade intensities. This is true 
in terms of both overall explanatory power as well as variable-level results. Second, 
the 1993-1999 comparison reveals that the economic effect of China’s market-
oriented reform needed time to materialize after the trade liberalization measures 
were launched in the beginning of the 1990s. In this context, the shift from political 
to economic drivers of trade diversity speaks a telling tale. Many of these underlying 
shifts in trade-determining forces were masked in the pooled 1993-1999 analyses. 
4.6   Conclusion 
Since 1992, the Chinese government has strengthened the program of market-
oriented reform, which resulted in major changes in the pattern of bilateral trade 
linkages. Here, increased trade partner diversity stands out as an important shift in 
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China’s presence in the global market place. In terms of their share of foreign trade, 
not taking account of Hong Kong and Japan, the importance of non-Asian regions is 
increasing. In 1990, the two largest non-Asian trade partners, the European Union 
and the United States, accounted for 18.4 per cent of total Chinese export. In 1999, 
their joint share has increased to 37.6 per cent (IMF 1997, 2000). This shift in 
China’s trade distribution in the outward-oriented 1990s is much more in line with 
the important position of these two traders in the world market than in the ‘old’ days 
of inward-oriented Communism. In terms of trade intensity, however, there is still a 
long way to go. After all, even in 1990, the trade intensity with the United States is 
not high compared with Asian countries, whilst the trade intensity with the 
European Union still is very low.  
The regression analyses unravel the factors that influence the trade intensities, as well 
as the changes brought about by the reform program in the 1990s. In this context, 
without any pretention of being complete, we would like to emphasize three 
conclusions. First, after seven years of further reform, the economic drivers of trade 
intensities have gained momentum. This confirms the common sense belief that 
China is integrating rapidly into the world market, and that the market mechanism is 
starting to work properly in the area of Chinese foreign trade. In 1993, the dominant 
factors affecting trade intensities were still geographical and political distance. But in 
1999, next to the geographical distance, a number of key economic elements do 
indeed influence bilateral trade linkages, pushing the role of political affinities to the 
background. An interesting example here is the positive effect of a trade partner's 
Chinese immigrant population on export trade intensity (but not on import trade 
intensity!). Apparently, as the Chinese economy was opening up to the world market, 
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the slumbering potential of ethnic ties could be activated such that the overseas 
Chinese communities came in use as a foothold for entry into foreign markets.  
Second, comparing the findings for the export and import trade intensities, 
economic factors appear to be, by and large, more influential in the export than in 
the import domain. This suggests that export activities depend more on the 
characteristics of trade partners than import does. An illustrative example is the 
impact of FDI. FDI is related more significantly to export than to import trade 
intensities. This is likely to reflect the effect of different Chinese FDI policies, with 
an overall bias toward stimulating export-oriented FDI. That is, export-oriented 
foreign investments were (and still are) highly encouraged by the Chinese 
government through special tax rebates, low land-usage fees, and offering water, 
electricity and other infrastructure services. For sure, FDI can also impact upon 
import activities, which is reflected in the regression results as well. For instance, 
many MNEs in low-skill host countries tend to import high-tech equipment and 
material from their high-skill home regions. In this context, the Chinese government 
introduced preferential regulations for MNEs that import advanced equipment and 
ditto materials, which cannot be produced in China. Examples of such measures are 
the “Detailed Regulations on the Management of Import by Foreign Investment 
Enterprises” (June 9 1995 MOFTEC) and the “Notices on Import Tariff Policy for 
Further Encouraging FDI” (September 1 1999, MOFTEC). But foreign enterprises 
still have to face not only tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also the complicated 
formalities that come with import activities. Probably, this is one reason why FDI 
does influence import trade intensity less significantly than export trade intensity. 
Another case in point is the diverging results for the impact of a trade partner’s 
membership of a discriminatory trade bloc. The discriminatory trade bloc barrier 
strongly influences Chinese export to member nations, but not so import from those 
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countries. This implies that regional integration elsewhere in the world offers a big 
challenge to Chinese export activities. 
Third, the results of the regression analyses for 1999 and the pooled 1993-1999 
period suggest that the Linder effect does indeed exist in a transitional country like 
China, especially in the export domain, for trade partners with higher GDP per 
capita than China. Take the results for the education discrepancy measure. EDUCdif 
is an indicator of labor cost and technology skill differences. Our findings reveal that 
the higher the education discrepancy, the lower is the export trade intensity. Similarly, 
the higher the discrepancy in terms of GDP per capita, the lower is the export trade 
intensity. For China, this means that export activities to developing countries are 
more intensive than the export linkages with the developed world. But for import, 
the Linder effect is very weak. That is, importing from countries with high education 
expenditures is more intensive than importing from countries with low education 
expenditures. This evidence supports the idea that developing and transitional 
countries, like China, need to import technology-intensive products from developed 
countries. As a Linder effect is absent in 1993, this observation only holds true for 
countries that have entered into the international trade arena by launching a 
liberalization reform program that stimulates a convergence toward international 
standards. 
7 
Of course, the current study is characterized by a number of limitations that point 
the way to future work. Here, we would like to offer two suggestions. First, future 
research might focus on a lower level of aggregation. That is, a breakdown of 
international trade flows by industry offers additional research opportunities. After 
all, since the elasticities of supply and demand might differ widely across industries, 
the response to international trade barriers may vary substantially across industries, 
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too (Learner and Bowen 1981). Therefore, a follow-up study could investigate the 
impact of industry-specific characteristics on trade linkages, so figuring out the 
factors that influence the (export and import) trade intensities in different industries, 
in and over time. Second, given the key role of FDI, future research might seek to 
unravel the underlying impact of the FDI pattern and MNE behavior. That is, how 
does FDI in China affect international trade at the level of different firms and 
different industries, and how is this related to home and host country features? 
APPENDIX: List of countries 
Asia  (19):  Japan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Loa, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Jordan 
and Yemen. 
Americas (12):  The United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Oceania (2):  Australia and New Zealand. 
Europe (24):  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Africa  (14):  Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zimbabwe and Egypt. 
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Chapter 5 
Chinese Bilateral Intra-Industry 
Trade: A Panel Data Study for 50 
Countries in the 1992-2001 Period 
This study examines the features and determinants of Chinese intra-industry trade during the 
transition period from 1992 to 2001 for 50 of China’s trade partners. In order to detect the 
determinants properly, we disentangle our total intra-industry trade (TIIT) measure into vertical 
intra-industry trade (VIIT) vis-à-vis horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT). The findings indicate 
that Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade, particularly VIIT, increased significantly during this 
transition period. In an attempt to estimate a more comprehensive empirical model, we first exercise 
factor analyses for the purpose of data reduction, and then we employ generalized least square (GLS) 
for the model estimations with the factor scores as the explanatory variables. On the one hand, 
VIIT appears to be positively related to differences in consumer patterns. On the other hand, HIIT 
is negatively related to these differences. In addition, we find that FDI has played an important role 
in determining IIT, especially VIIT. Other significant intra-industry trade drivers are geographical 
distance, economic size, trade openness and trade composition. This set of results implies, again, that 
the market mechanism has started to work properly in this transition period in China’s recent 
history. Finally, the impact of China’s policies and the special role of Hong Kong are demonstrated.
5.1   Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the intensity of bilateral trade linkage.  However, the 
trade structure is also important in assessing bilateral trade relationship. In the years 
following the Second World War, researchers have found much evidence of rapidly 
increasing  intra-industry trade. Balassa (1966) first coined the term intra-industry 
trade to signal the simultaneous import and export of goods within one and the same 
industry in both trade partners. Since then, a large number of theoretical and 
empirical studies have sought to explain this phenomenon. Studies in this tradition  
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mainly focus on three issues: (1) measuring the magnitude of intra-industry trade 
(e.g., Grubel and Lloyd 1975; Brulhart 1994); (2) developing theoretical explanations 
for intra-industry trade’s existence (e.g., Krugman 1979; Falvey 1981); and (3) 
examining the empirical determinants of intra-industry trade (e.g., Helpman 1987; 
Greenaway, Hine and Milner 1994). The current study will add new elements to the 
literature in the third area for the special case of the emerging transition economy of 
China. 
Trade in emerging economies such as China has attracted increasing academic 
attention due to their high growth rate and rapid integration into the world economy. 
Institutional reform programs have greatly changed the position of these countries in 
the world economy. International trade in these countries has developed quickly in 
terms of scale and structure, which played – and still plays – an important role in 
driving their economic development, as well as the restructuring of the world 
economy. With its huge population size, high development pace and unique reform 
program, China is a noticeable economic force in the current transition era. The 
multi-faceted liberalization of the Chinese economy has generated the success of 
China’s trade, witnessing impressing growth rates and radical pattern shifts (e.g., 
Garnaut and Song 1999; Doi, Tiwari and Kawakami 2002). The Chinese experience 
may provide vital information for the development of a coherent explanation and 
theory of intra-industry trade. The present study therefore aims to detect what 
country-specific factors influence bilateral intra-industry trade over the transition 
period by exploring a rich panel data set. 
China started to introduce liberal economic policies in the area of foreign trade and 
investment in 1978. During the period from 1978 to 1992, the overall reform and 
opening-up policy reflected a gradual, step-by-step movement toward a more  
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market-oriented system. Although the era of isolation was ended as a result, China’s 
trade barriers, including a plethora of tariff and non-tariff measures, were still 
maintained at levels similar to those in highly protectionist developing countries. 
After 1991, though, the relaxation of the foreign trade and investment policies 
accelerated. For example, year after year simple mean tariffs have been cut down 
with large slices, which dropped average import tariffs from 43.2 per cent at 
beginning of the 1990s to 15.3 per cent in 2001. In line with this process of 
accelerated liberalization, Chinese trade has expanded impressively, simultaneously 
producing a significant upgrade of China’s trade pattern. The ratio of exports to 
GDP increased from 19 per cent in 1992 to 23 per cent in 2001, and the share of 
manufactured goods in exports increased from 80 per cent in 1992 to 90 per cent in 
2001.1 The intra-industry trade indices increased from 31.2 in 1992 to 39.4 in 2001.2 
These figures indicate the dramatic change in China’s trade structure since 1992. 
By exploring the case of China, we aim to make a contribution in this intra-industry 
trade research area in four ways. First, this chapter adds new evidence to the intra-
industry trade literature by analyzing the case of the world’s largest transition 
economy. A great deal of intellectual effort has been invested in explaining the 
circumstances in which intra-industry trade will arise (Greenaway, Hine and Milner 
1994). However, most of the extant intra-industry trade literature focuses on 
developed countries. While there are a limited number of intra-industry trade studies 
that relate to transition countries, empirical evidence concerning China’s intra-
 
1 The figures are computed using data from China Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
2 The intra-industry trade indices are calculated on the basis of the four-digit SITC 
statistics from the OECD database.  
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industry trade is even scarcer. Only a couple of studies deal with intra-industry trade 
in China (e.g., Hellvin 1996; Hu and Ma 1999). Second, the present study employs a 
rich panel dataset, 50 countries over a 10-year period, which will help to repair the 
deficiencies of the cross-section design employed in most previous studies. In 
addition, this study incorporates all trade in the commodities at the four-digit 
industry aggregation level in calculating horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade 
measures, which reflects another improvement over earlier cross-country studies that 
only include a limited set of industries in their estimations. Third, the current study 
incorporates more potential explanatory variables into the analysis, compared to 
earlier work in the intra-industry trade domain. The majority of the previous studies 
only focus on a sub-set of the potential determinants of intra-industry trade.3 Failing 
to include a key explanatory variable can seriously bias the results of the estimation, 
and cause problems of interpretation. This study includes 15 explanatory variables 
that were identified in the literature. Fourth, the present study disentangles the 
measure of total intra-industry trade (TIIT) into vertical vis-à-vis horizontal intra-
industry trade (VIIT and HIIT, respectively) in order to improve our understanding 
of their different determinants. 
5.2   Theoretical background 
In the theoretical literature, the distinction of the two types of intra-industry trade – 
i.e., horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade – is very important, because the 
theories of the driving forces of horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade lead to 
 
3 For example, by using the case of China, Hu and Ma (1999) include four variables 
into each of their regression models to detect the determinants of two types of intra-
industry trade. Some key variables, such as trade barriers and geographical distance, 
however, were excluded in their two cross-country models.   
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contradictory hypotheses (e.g., Abd-Rahman 1991; Greenaway and Milner 1995). In 
line with the extant literature, we adopt the OECD’s classification of intra-industry 
trade. HIIT is trade in differentiated varieties of similar products (e.g., cars of a 
similar class in a similar price range). VIIT is trade in vertically differentiated 
products that are distinguished by quality and price (e.g., China exports lower-quality 
clothing to France and imports higher-quality clothing from France), as well as trade 
that emerges from vertical specialization of production in similar goods at different 
stages of production (e.g., China import parts of electronic equipment, but exports 
electrical machinery and equipment). By comparison, HIIT enables countries with 
similar factor endowments to benefit from economies of scale by specializing in 
“niche” products. Trade in vertically differentiated products may reflect different 
factor endowments, particularly in terms of the skills of the workforce or high fixed 
research and development (R&D) costs. Vertical specialization of production across 
countries may be driven by comparative advantages, such as cheap unskilled labor 
for assembly purposes or specialized personnel for R&D-intensive products (OECD 
2002: 160). 
The early work on intra-industry trade concentrated on horizontal differentiation by 
applying the traditional monopolistic competition approach (e.g., Grubel and Lloyd 
1975; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Krugman 1979, 1980, 1981; Lancaster 1979, 1980). 
These models emphasize the major role of scale economies and product 
differentiation in determining HIIT. These models suggest that the more similar 
countries are in terms of their incomes, the greater the share of HIIT will be that is 
driven by scale economies and product differentiation. Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
synthesized insights into a unifying theoretical model, which became known as the 
so-called Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin (CHO) model. This model incorporates  
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factor endowments, decreasing costs and horizontal product differentiation in an 
international trade model, which generates both intra- and inter-industry trade. The 
model predicts a higher share of intra-industry trade in total trade when the relative 
factor endowments of both trade partners become more similar. Bergstrand (1990) 
expanded earlier theoretical work by using a gravity-like equation to explain HIIT. 
His framework reveals how the share of HIIT relates to factor endowments and 
income levels. In the Bergstrand approach, important determinants of the share of 
HIIT in total trade are: (a) differences between both countries in terms of their 
capital-labor endowment ratio, per-capita income, and economic size; and (b) both 
countries’ averages in terms of development level, capital-labor endowment ratio, 
economic size, and tariff levels. 
Linder’s theory (Linder 1961) can also contribute to the explanation of HIIT. When 
two countries are similar in their income level and consumer preference, they can 
produce more products that can simultaneously serve consumers in both countries. 
Due to the economic scale effect, both countries produce differentiated products 
with similar quality, but with different characteristics or attributes. So, the closer 
trade partners are in terms of their demand patterns, the more similar will be their 
trade commodities composition and the larger will be their volume of HIIT. Indeed, 
the rapid rise in the living standard in many developing economies, including China, 
seems to provide ample opportunity for ‘Linder-driven’ intra-industry trade in 
differentiated products. Based on Linder’s and the above theoretical arguments, we 
propose our first pair of hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 5.1: HIIT is more prominent among countries that are more similar 
in terms of consumer patterns and factor endowments.  
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HYPOTHESIS 5.2: HIIT is more prominent among countries that are large in terms 
of their economic size. 
Following the CHO theory, the models of Falvey (1981), Shaked and Sutton (1984), 
Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987) show how trade in 
vertically differentiated products takes place between countries with different per-
capita incomes and factor endowments. Their logic runs as follows. At the supply 
side, vertical differentiation is caused by differences in the trade partners’ capital-
labor ratios. High-quality products are more capital and technology intensive than 
their low-quality counterparts. Hence, the price of high-quality products is higher 
than the one of low-quality products. At the demand side, each individual consumer 
prefers only one type of differentiated product, which is determined by her or his 
level of income. Given that aggregate income is not equally distributed, aggregate 
demand targets a variety of vertically differentiated products. The models by Falvey 
(1981) and Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) indicate that the relatively high-income 
and capital-abundant countries specialize in (and thus export) relatively high-quality 
products, whereas the relatively low-income and labor-abundant countries focus on 
the production (and export) of low-quality manufactures. In addition, the model by 
Flam and Helpman (1987) emphasizes the effect of technology. They suggest that 
the quality differences between the varieties from developing and developed 
countries originate from differences in technology. Therefore, VIIT is determined by 
comparative advantage, as in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
Because aggregate income is not equally distributed in any country, Linder’s theory 
can also be employed to explain VIIT. Linder’s theory argues that an important 
determinant of production and trade is domestic demand. That is, developing 
countries tend to specialize in the export of lower-quality products because their  
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low-income consumers prefer such cheaper low-quality products, whilst developed 
countries tend to supply the high-quality differentiated products that fit with the high 
income of their consumers. As result, demand variety in both developing and 
developed countries provides the opportunity for intra-industry trade in quality-
differentiated products. In line with Linder’s and the above theoretical arguments, 
we introduce our third hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 5.3: VIIT is more prominent among countries that are different in 
terms of factor endowments and consumer patterns. 
The product lifecycle theory of Vernon (1966) provides an argument for explaining 
VIIT by introducing the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI). In line with the 
product lifecycle model, on the one hand, a higher developed country initially 
develops new products distinguished by certain characteristics or attributes that are 
considered technologically superior to existing products. The continuous 
introduction of such new products enables the higher developed country to sustain a 
monopoly position in supplying new products. On the other hand, as the technology 
becomes available to a less developed country through FDI, imitation, and 
technology transfer, the location of production of the “old” products will move to 
this less developed country, which enjoys a cost advantage due to lower wages. This 
will lead to VIIT between both countries, with the higher developed country 
exporting the latest versions of technologically differentiated products to the less 
developed country, simultaneously importing older versions in the same product 
category from the less developed country. The magnitude of this type of intra-
industry trade depends on how quickly new products replace old ones in the entire 
market in question (Fukasaku 1992).  
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Based on Vernon’s product lifecycle theory, we expect that FDI is positively 
associated with VIIT. This expectation is conditional on the assumption that those 
foreign firms combine their superior technology with local endowments to produce 
goods that are subsequently shipped back to the home market.4 In this setting, the 
foreign firms’ investment is generally labeled as efficiency-seeking FDI. However, if 
FDI is of a market-oriented nature, then FDI may substitute for the import of the 
goods that were previously produced in the investing firms’ home countries. In the 
case of China, we expect that efficiency-seeking FDI dominated during the transition 
period under investigation due to the export-oriented FDI policy of the Chinese 
government.5
Similarly, from a theoretical perspective, the relationship between FDI and HIIT can 
run both ways, depending upon the type of FDI involved. That is, the motivation of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the export structure of the trade partners 
determine the sign of the FDI-HIIT linkage. Market-seeking FDI may substitute for 
trade, whilst efficiency-seeking FDI may facilitate trade. In the case of China, the 
chance that MNEs produce horizontally differentiated products in China and ship 
them back to their home countries is low. The reason is that, in theory, this form of 
intra-industry trade should emerge between countries that are quite similar in terms 
of their development level, as explained above. However, by far the largest 
 
4 In most cases, this type of transaction happened through intra-firm trade between 
the parent firms and their foreign affiliates. 
5 Some empirical studies have found evidence to support this idea. For the case of 
Sino-Japan trade, Kiminami and Kiminami (1999) argue that the increase of intra-
industry trade in the textile industry could be attributed to FDI by Japanese textile 
firms into China. With data for 45 countries, Hu and Ma (1999) found that FDI is 
positively and significantly related to VIIT.  
Chapter 5 Chinese Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
148 
                                                     
proportion of Chinese FDI inflow originated from countries that are more advanced 
than China, being driven by efficiency-seeking motives. Given our empirical setting, 
we therefore focus on efficiency-seeking FDI. Then, combining both arguments 
produces our fourth hypothesis. 
HYPOTHESIS 5.4: (a) VIIT is more prominent if efficiency-seeking FDI inflow is 
large, whereas (b) HIIT is not. 
Additionally, the literature has maintained that trade structures and trade barriers are 
key determinants of intra-industry trade. First, earlier studies have argued that intra-
industry trade will be stimulated if the degree or potential of product differentiation 
is high (e.g., Helpman 1981; Krugman 1981).  In general, manufacturing goods are 
associated with higher degrees of product differentiation than are primary 
commodities. Therefore, high intra-industry trade will only emerge when the share of 
manufacturing products in total export is high enough.6 Second, the trade barrier 
issue is closely related to the trade structure. Generally speaking, trade barriers tend 
to be low when the share of manufacturing goods in the trade structure is large. 
Moreover, studies have suggested that intra-industry trade tends to be high when 
trade barriers are low (Falvey 1981; Matthews 1998). One reason for this negative 
association is that the imposition of a tariff creates a range of non-traded qualities, 
and hence less chance for intra-industry trade. In accordance with this line of 
reasoning, we formulate our fifth hypothesis. 
 
6 The share of manufacturing goods in export can indicate the trade structure better 
than their share in import. When the share of manufacturing goods in export is high, 
their share in import is also high. This is indeed the case in most developed countries. 
However, when the share of manufacturing goods in import is high, the share of 
manufacturing goods in export is not necessarily high as well. This is indeed the case 
in most developing countries.   
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HYPOTHESIS 5.5: Both HIIT and VIIT are more prominent if (a) the share of 
manufacturing goods in the trade structure is large and (b) trade barriers are low. 
Traditionally, geographical distance has been considered to be an important 
determinant of intra-industry trade (Loertscher and Wolter 1980; Balassa 1986a, 
1986b; Culem and Lundberg 1986; Balassa and Bauwens 1987, 1988a, 1988b; 
Hummels and Levinsohn 1995; Stone and Lee 1995; Blanes and Martin 2000). One 
of the robust empirical findings is that measures of intra-industry trade relative to 
inter-industry trade decline with geographical distance (Amiti and Venables 2002). 
The reason for this can be summarized with reference to three arguments. First, the 
trade process of intra-industry trade makes this type of trade attenuate more rapidly 
with geographical distance than inter-industry trade. As Balassa and Bauwens (1987) 
explain, more information is needed on the characteristics of differentiated products 
than on the attributes of standardized goods. Since long distance will increase 
information costs, the transition costs of intra-industry trade will increase quicker 
than that of inter-industry trade when the distance between a pair of countries 
increases. In addition, physical distance acts as a natural trade barrier, which deters 
trade of closely substitutable products more than that of standardized products. 
Second, in many cases, the production and demand patterns in a pair of neighboring 
countries are more similar than those of a pair of distant countries. Therefore, intra-
industry trade will cover a larger share of trade between proximate countries than it 
does between distant countries. However, some scholars are reluctant to attribute 
this effect to geographical distance, arguing instead that close countries engage in 
much intra-industry trade not because of their physical proximity, but rather because 
they have similar economic structures. Hence, other variables but geographical 
distance should be included to explain this effect (Rice, Stewart and Venables 2002).  
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Third, intra-industry trade could occur in weight-gaining products between bordering 
countries (Grimwade 1989). The weight of these products increases with the degree 
of manufacturing (e.g., bricks and cement). This product characteristic necessitates 
locating production as near as possible to the end consumer. When the bordering 
countries integrate well, a producer in country A may export products to those 
consumers in country B who are geographically closer to this producer than to the 
domestic rivals in country B. Similarly, a producer in country B might export 
products to the consumers in country A who are geographically closer to this 
producer than to country A’s domestic competitors. However, this type of intra-
industry trade is not likely to be prominent in China, since the number of products 
that are involved in this type of trade is quite limited. Moreover, the degree of 
integration between China and its neighboring countries is probably not high 
enough.7 So, we expect that the first effect is the main driver of intra-industry trade. 
According to the definition of HIIT and VIIT, the products involved in HIIT are 
more easily substitutable than the products subject to VIIT. Therefore, we expect 
HIIT to be more sensitive to geographical distance than VIIT. 
HYPOTHESIS 5.6: (a) Intra-industry trade is more prominent vis-à-vis inter-industry 
trade if geographical distance is short, (b) which is especially the case for HIIT. 
 
7 Although bordering trade in China could benefit from a lower trade barrier than 
normal trade, most of these trade flows reflect inter-industry trade.  
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5.3    Methodology 
5.3.1   Measurement of intra-industry trade 
In this study, we compute the extent of intra-industry trade by using the adjusted 
Grubel and Lloyd index (1975), which corrects for the bias caused by the imbalance 
of bilateral commodity trade. This index is defined as 
100
) (
) ( ×
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ =
− − +
− − +
Mi Xi Mi Xi
Mi Xi Mi Xi IIT                                                                        (5.1) 
where Xi and Mi stand for the values of export and import of product group i, 
respectively. The intra-industry trade index varies from 0 (complete inter-industry 
trade) to 100 (complete intra-industry trade). 
As frequently done in the literature (e.g., Abd-el-Rahman 1991; Greenaway, Hine 
and Milner 1995), we disentangle total intra-industry trade (TIIT) into both 
components – HIIT and VIIT – by using a range of relative export/import unit 
values (UV). Specifically, the HIIT index is given by Equation (5.1) for those 
products i that satisfy the criterion 
α 1
importUV
exportUV
α 1
i
i + ≤ ≤ −  
Similarly, the VIIT index is given by Equation (5.1) for those products i where  
α + > 1
importUV i
i
export UV
  or     α + < 1
importUV i
i
export UV
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Following Hu and Ma (1999), we use a unit value dispersion of 25 per cent (α = 0.25) 
for the analysis.8
An inevitable Gordian knot that has to be cut relates to the level of aggregation used 
to compute our TIIT, HIIT and VIIT indices. We decided to calculate our intra-
industry trade indices on the basis of data at the four-digit level of the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC), implying that about 1,200 product groups 
are included in our measures. In general, the three-digit SITC statistics separate 
commodities into groups that correspond most closely to the economic definition of 
an industry (Grubel and Lloyd 1971). However, at this digit level an aggregation bias 
introduces too much noise in the analyses. For example, then products might be 
grouped together that are not close substitutes in production. That is, they are not 
produced with similar factor production or input requirements. For example, yarn of 
synthetic filaments (SITC 6516) and yarn of wool or animal hair (SITC 6511) are 
very different in terms of their production features, although they are classified in the 
same three-digit group (SITC 651). Another, more important, reason for not using 
three-digit industries is that at this aggregation level HIIT and VIIT are too difficult 
to disentangle, as the average unit price is used to distinguish HIIT from VIIT.  
However, even finer-level data than our four-digit classification is frequently used in 
the literature to disentangle total intra-industry trade into its HIIT and VIIT 
components. For example, Greenaway, Hine and Miller (1994) chose to work with 
 
8 Some studies choose a range of 15 per cent (e.g., Greenaway, Hine and Miller 1994). 
However, in our data, using the range of 15 per cent results in very low HIIT indices, 
so failing to reveal the actual situation of Chinese intra-industry trade. China is a 
large and diversified country, so that a larger price variation should be allowed for, 
considering the difference of transaction costs.  
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the five-digit SITC level for the UK, whereas Blanes and Martin (2000) even opt for 
the six-digit level of CN for Spain. The reason that we decided to stick to the four-
digit level is threefold. First, if the intra-industry trade index is based on the very low 
level of sub-industries, then the index’s value will be upward biased if the trade 
imbalances of two product varieties have opposite signs.9 Second, this study defines 
vertical differentiation as not only the same product with different qualities, but also 
as a similar good at different stages of production. Four-digit data are better able 
than finer-level ones to capture this latter form of differentiation. Third, the absolute 
levels of summary statistics of intra-industry trade per se are not very meaningful 
anyway, since they depend critically on the level of industry aggregation that is 
chosen in the analyses. The current chapter focuses on comparisons across countries. 
We put more weight on the detailed and comparable specification at the country 
level, rather than on the fine-grained investigation of trade in specific industries. 
Four-digit statistics are more likely to produce such a compatible cross-country 
dataset. 
Considering China’s transition program and the availability of the data, we focus on 
the 1992-2001 period. China’s intra-industry trade indices with 50 countries are 
calculated throughout this period. The 50 countries are selected on the basis of the 
value of bilateral trade, with annual trade values being larger than US$ 10,000, and 
data availability for the other independent variables. In total, they account for 86 per 
 
9 If products 1 and 2 belong to the same industry, and if X1 < M1 and X2 > M2, then 
the IIT index would be upward biased when we use finer-level data in which the two 
products are grouped into two different industries. If we group the two products 
into different industries, the later part of numerator of IIT changes into 
) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 M M X X + − + , which is larger than 
2 2 1 1 M X M X − + − if they are treated as  
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cent of Chinese export and import during this period. In order to avoid the bias 
caused by special events and irregular deals, we use sub-period trade data instead of 
annual trade data to smooth the changes in our intra-industry trade indices.10 We 
break down our time window into three sub-periods: 1992-1994, 1995-1998, and 
1999-2001.  
5.3.2   Explanatory variables 
In order to detect the country characteristics associated with TIIT and the extent to 
which these characteristics differ for HIIT vis-à-vis VIIT, we introduce the following 
set of explanatory variables, as reflected in the hypotheses introduced above. The 
first group of explanatory variables is related to differences in demand (or consumer 
pattern) between China and its trade partners. Three variables are introduced to 
measure these differences. First, cultural distance (CULTURE) is measured by using 
the four dimensions of national cultures developed by Hofstede (1980). For a given 
country pair, cultural distance is calculated as the arithmetic average of the deviations 
in Hofstede’s four dimensions, correcting for the overall variance of each of these 
four dimensions (Kogut and Singh 1988). Second, the difference in GDP per capita 
(GDPPC) can be expressed as  
   GDPPC / ) GDPPC GDPPC ( GDPPC c f c − = ,  
                                                                                                                                     
products from the same industry. As a result, the IIT index is larger than it should be. 
10 Chinese bilateral IIT indices, especially with small trade partners, are strongly 
influenced by a limited number of extraordinary deals. For example, intra-industry 
trade with Vietnam is about twice as large in 1998 than in other years, which is 
caused by extraordinarily high intra-industry trade in four product groups (SITC 
2924, SITC 3343, SITC 4211, and SITC 6821). Intra-industry trade in these four 
groups was very low, or even zero, in other years.  
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where  GDPPCc and GDPPCf  denote GDP per capita in China and of its trade 
partner, respectively. A high GDPPC indicates that the difference in income level 
between China and its trade partner is high. Third, the difference in the Gini 
coefficient (GINI)11 is computed as  
c f c GINI / ) GINI GINI ( GINI − = ,  
where GINIc and GINIf  denote the Gini coefficient in China and in the trade partner, 
respectively. A high GINI indicates that the income distribution in the two countries 
is very different.12  
The second group of explanatory variables concerns the difference in endowments 
between China and its trade partners. Here, we incorporate four variables. First, the 
difference in electric power consumption per capita (POWER) follows from 
c f c POWER / ) POWER POWER ( POWER − = ,  
where POWERc and POWERf denote the power consumption per capita in China 
and of its trade partner, respectively. The higher POWER is, the more different is the 
                                                      
11 The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure that is popular in the income inequality 
literature – i.e., being measured as the ratio of income accruing to a particular 
percentage of the population to the total population examined. If everyone in the 
population earns an identical income, the Gini coefficient for that population would 
be zero. Alternatively, if all income went to one individual, the Gini coefficient 
would be one, denoting complete inequality. Thus, the higher the Gini coefficient is, 
the greater the degree of income inequality present in a population (Filer, 
Hamermesh and Rees 1996: 580). 
12 Some researchers have used a similar proxy in intra-industry trade studies (e.g., 
Tharakan and Kerstens 1995; Hu and Ma 1999). The difference is that they defined a 
dummy variable based on the difference in the trade partners’ Gini coefficients, 
whilst we use the difference directly as a continuous variable.    
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trade partner from China in terms of physical capital endowment.13 Second, the 
difference in public education expenditures (EDU) is measured via 
c f c EDU / ) EDU EDU ( EDU − = ,  
where EDUc and EDUf  denote the public education expenditures in China and of its 
trade partner, respectively. A high EDU indicates a large difference between China 
and the trade partner in terms of human capital endowment, as well as labor cost. 
Third, the difference in school enrollment rate in secondary education (SCHOOLs) is 
expressed as  
sc sf sc s SCHOOL / ) SCHOOL SCHOOL ( SCHOOL − = ,  
where  SCHOOLsc  and SCHOOLsf   denote school enrolment rate in secondary 
education in China and the trade partner, respectively. Fourth, the difference in the 
enrolment rate in high or tertiary education (SCHOOLt) is calculated in same way as 
is SCHOOLs. A high value of SCHOOLs and SCHOOLt indicate a large discrepancy 
in human capital endowment between China and the trade partner in the area of 
normally educated and highly educated labor, respectively.  
The third group of explanatory variables deals with measures of economic size. In 
this context, we use two variables: first, GDPppp of the trade partners (GDP), 
measured in PPP-prices; and, second, the population size of the trade partners 
(POPU). The fourth (singleton) group of explanatory variables relates to the 
operation of MNEs in China. We introduce FDI inflows that originate from a trade 
partner as our key proxy (FDI). The fifth group of explanatory variables has to do 
                                                      
13 Hansson and Lundberg (1987), too, have used energy consumption per capita to 
proxy physical capital endowment.  
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with the characteristics of international trade per country. The first variable is the 
ratio of import duties to total import value (TARIFF),14 the second variable is the 
share of high-tech products in total export (HIGHTECH),15 and the third variable is 
the share of manufactured products in the total export (MANUEX).16 The sixth pair 
of explanatory variables is related to geographical distance. We employ two variables. 
For one, the geographical distance between the capitals (DIST) is calculated by the 
latitude and longitude of the two cities, taking the great-circle distance and assuming 
a spherical earth. Additionally, a border country dummy (BORD) is coded 1 if the 
trade partner and China share a border, and 0 if not. These two variables are 
expected to have an opposite influence on intra-industry trade (DIST negative, and 
BORD positive). 
In line with the dependent variables, all explanatory variables are measured for three 
sub-periods, if appropriate: 1992-1994, 1995-1998, and 1999-2001. The data for the 
first three groups of variables are mainly from the World Bank database. The 
national culture data are downloaded from the International Business Center’s 
website (http://geert-hofstede.international-business-center.com). The FDI data 
come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ( MOFTEC, 
 
14 Import duties comprise all levies collected on goods at the point of entry into the 
country. The levies may be imposed for protectionist or revenue purposes. The 
higher the TARIFF variable is, the higher is the country’s trade barrier. 
15 High-technology exports involve products with high R&D intensity. They include 
products such as aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and 
electrical machinery. 
16 Manufacturing comprises commodities in the SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic 
manufactures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous 
manufactured goods), excluding division 68 (non-ferrous metals).  
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Yearbook of China’s Foreign Economic Relation and Trade 1993-2002). The trade data are 
mainly from the World Bank database, complemented by information from the 
OECD database. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide the usual key descriptives. 
Table 5.1: China’s intra-industry trade indices in 1992-2001 
 1992-1994  1995-1998  1999-2001 
 TIIT VIIT HIIT TIIT VIIT HIIT TIIT VIIT HIIT 
World 30.8  19.4    11.4  38.4  27.6 10.8 39.9 32.4  7.6   
Australia 7.4  6.3  1.1 10.6 7.8 2.8 9.9 7.4 2.5 
Austria 5.9  5.8  0.1 10.3 9.6 0.7 17.5 15.9 1.6 
Brazil 4.1  3.2  0.9 4.4 4.1 0.3 5.9 5.5 0.4 
Cameroon 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Canada 7.6  6.5  1.1 9.2 8.0 1.3 9.7 9.2 0.6 
Colombia 1.4  1.0  0.4 3.6 3.2 0.3 4.0 3.9 0.1 
Costa Rica  0.0  0.0  0.0 3.4 3.4 0.0 5.7 2.6 3.1 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Denmark 7.6  4.4  3.2 11.9 10.6 1.3 15.9 14.6 1.4 
Ecuador 0.3  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 
Egypt 1.4  1.3  0.1 3.8 3.4 0.3 1.8 0.8 1.0 
Finland 10.4  10.1  0.3 17.7 17.2 0.5 39.3 36.1 3.2 
France 11.1  10.2  1.0 14.6 13.2 1.4 21.6 18.4 3.2 
Germany 11.9  10.9  1.0 16.9 15.4 1.5 23.9 21.4 2.5 
Greece 5.9  5.3  0.6 8.7 8.2 0.5 12.1 10.7 1.4 
Hong Kong   61.8  42.9  18.9 88.4 59.0 29.4 86.3 59.9 26.4 
Hungary 3.9  3.6  0.4 11.0 10.8 0.2 29.5 29.0 0.5 
India 10.5  5.7  4.9 20.5 7.3 13.2 22.0 10.5 11.5 
Indonesia 8.0  5.8  2.2 9.4 9.3 0.1 13.1 12.6 0.6 
Ireland 6.1  5.4  0.8 29.9 25.3 4.6 26.4 24.0 2.4 
Italy 11.5  9.7  1.8 16.2 13.3 3.0 21.9 19.7 2.1 
Jamaica 2.4  0.7  1.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Japan 18.3  12.7  5.6 25.5 18.5 7.0 26.7 24.0 2.7 
Kazakhstan 1.5  1.3  0.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.0  
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Korea, Rep.  24.5  16.3  8.1 33.5 24.5 9.0 37.4 26.8 10.6 
Malaysia 12.3  10.1  2.3 25.8 16.4 9.4 43.1 37.5 5.6 
Mexico 2.3  2.1  0.1 7.9 6.7 1.2 38.0 37.5 0.5 
Nepal 12.3  11.0  1.3 11.9 8.4 3.5 17.3 11.5 5.8 
Netherlands 14.7  12.1 2.6 23.6 21.1 2.6 28.9 26.4 2.5 
New Zealand  4.6  4.0  0.6 5.6 5.2 0.4 5.7 4.4 1.3 
Norway 9.3  9.0  0.3 6.3 6.0 0.3 6.1 5.7 0.4 
Pakistan 3.6  2.1  1.5 2.7 2.2 0.4 2.6 2.2 0.4 
Philippines 13.0  6.9  6.1 32.3 27.1 5.2 26.5 24.7 1.7 
Poland 1.7  1.6  0.0 6.9 5.7 1.2 9.2 7.9 1.3 
Portugal 3.2  2.7  0.6 10.7 9.3 1.3 28.5 25.4 3.2 
Romania 4.0  3.7  0.3 1.9 1.7 0.3 2.8 2.3 0.5 
Russian 4.6  4.0  0.5 3.6 2.6 1.1 3.0 2.7 0.4 
Singapore 27.6  13.6  14.0 31.8 25.0 6.9 42.0 29.6 12.4 
Slovenia 0.3  0.2  0.1 3.6 3.1 0.4 15.3 13.8 1.5 
South Africa  2.8  2.5  0.2 3.6 3.0 0.6 3.6 3.2 0.4 
Spain 7.5  6.6  0.9 17.1 14.8 2.3 34.3 28.8 5.5 
Sweden 6.7  6.3  0.4 19.2 17.5 1.7 32.5 31.2 1.4 
Thailand 16.4  13.0  3.4 24.2 19.6 4.6 44.5 36.6 7.9 
Tunisia 0.1  0.1  0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 3.4 3.4 0.1 
Turkey 1.2  0.8  0.4 8.4 7.5 0.9 11.2 9.8 1.4 
UK 14.0  11.8  2.2 25.1 22.0 3.1 33.9 30.6 3.3 
US 15.9  14.4  1.6 22.0 19.5 2.5 35.0 31.8 3.2 
Uruguay 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vietnam 0.06  0.03  0.03 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01 
Zimbabwe 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Source: own calculations based on figures from the OECD database. Calculations 
are made from figures at the four-digit SITC level (SITC Rev.3), adjusted for trade 
imbalances. 
 
  
Chapter 5 Chinese Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
160 
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 CULTURE  GDPPC GINI  POWER EDU SCHOOLs SCHOOLt  GDPppp 
CULTURE  1,000               
GDPPC  0,724***  1,000           
GINI  0,656***  0,730*** 1,000         
POWER  0,684***  0,714*** 0,972*** 1,000       
EDU  0,590***  0,400*** 0,548  0,571*** 1,000    
SCHOOLs  0,733*** 0,629*** 0,586*** 0,583*** 0,477 1,000     
SCHOOLt  0,677*** 0,705*** 0,742*** 0,691*** 0,371 0,629*** 1,000   
GDPppp  0,197*** 0,327*** 0,221*** 0,238*** -0,021 0,081*** 0,313*** 1,000 
POPU -0,202***  -0,122*  -0,114*  -0,130* -0,221 -0,184  -0,137** 0,431*** 
FDI -0,132*  0,133*  0,020  0,043  -0,163 -0,090*** -0,037  0,006 
TARIFF -0,550***  -0,554  -0,432*** -0,480*** -0,187 -0,327** -0,530***  -0,113* 
HIGHTECH 0,107*  0,380  0,217*** 0,258*** 0,034 0,156** 0,246***  0,232*** 
MANUEX 0,148**  0,345  0,063 0,087 0,031 0,118* 0,140**  0,240*** 
DIST 0,117*  -0,159*  -0,076  -0,061  0,171 -0,056 -0,027 0,005 
BORD -0,339***  -0,244  -0,159**  -0,187**  -0,411 -0,184** -0,177** -0,019 
 
  POPU FDI  TARIFF HIGHTECH  MANUEX DIST BORD 
POPU  1.000           
FDI  -0.041  1.000         
TARIFF  0.331*** -0.141*  1.000         
HIGHTECH  -0.051 0.107* -0.389*** 1.000       
MANUEX  0.115* 0.198***  -0.398*** 0.378***  1.000     
DIST  -0.161**  -0.288***  0.074 -0.328***  -0.429***  1.000  
BORD  0.348*** 0.310*** 0.208***  -0.149**  0.040  -0.546***  1.000 
Note:  * p≤0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
5.3.3   Methods 
In line with much previous empirical work in the intra-industry trade tradition, our 
approach is eclectic, rather than focused by testing a specific model of intra-industry 
trade. As stated above, 15 variables were identified in the literature, and were  
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subsequently included in the present study. Although each of these variables 
represents a different potential determinant of intra-industry trade, they – as a group 
– represent a number of overlapping theoretical perspectives. As a result, seven 
correlation coefficients are higher than 0.7 (see Table 5.2), which implies that the 15 
variables cannot be included into a single estimation directly. Therefore, in order to 
facilitate interpretation and further analysis, a data reduction exercise is first 
undertaken by means of exploratory factor analysis.17 Principal component analysis 
with oblique rotation is employed, because the factors need not to be uncorrelated. 
For example, when a country enjoys a high level of production and demand, its trade 
structure may reveal large export and import flows. The result of the factor analysis, 
as explained below in greater detail, indeed reveals that the level of production and 
demand (factor 1) is related to trade development (factor 4). 
In the second step of the analysis, we introduce the factor scores as the independent 
variables in a regression that investigates the impact of six groups of variables on the 
TIIT, HIIT and VIIT indices. We estimate models of the following general form: 
IITkt=α+βXkt+µkt                                                                                                                                                      (5.2) 
where IITkt stands for China’s total, horizontal or vertical IIT index (TIIT, HIIT or 
VIIT) with partner country k in sub-period t, and Xkt is a set of country-specific 
variables of country k in sub-period t. Because the residuals reveal cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity, we employ Generalized Least Squares (GLS) in the estimations, in 
which each pooled equation is weighted by an estimate of the cross-sectional 
 
17 Both Bartlett test of sphericity (Chi-square is 1599.6) and the measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.73) indicate that our factor analysis is appropriate.  
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residual’s standard deviation.18 In the factor and regression analyses alike, the three 
sub-period data across 50 (with Hong Kong) and 49 (without Hong Kong) countries 
are pooled.19 Because of the special role of Hong Kong in China’s international trade, 
we perform separate analyses for the complete sample with Hong Kong and for the 
sample without Hong Kong.20   
5.4    Evidence 
China’s intra-industry trade indices in the three sub-periods with 50 countries are 
listed in Table 5.1. The table reveals that intra-industry trade not only occurred 
between China and developing countries (see, e.g., the TIIT with India of 22.0 in 
1999-2001), but also between China and developed countries (see, e.g., a TIIT with 
France of 21.6 in 1999-2001). Hong Kong has enjoyed the highest bilateral TIIT, 
 
18 Many intra-industry trade studies also apply the logit transition method. There is 
no consensus as to whether or not to use this technique. Some scholars, such as 
Tharakan (1986) and Caves (1981), support the use of a log transformation, given the 
limited range of the dependent variable. However, some other researchers, such as 
Greenaway and Milner (1986), insist that there is no need for such a transformation 
when the aim of the analysis is to investigate the determinants of intra-industry trade, 
and not to forecast it. In this study, several observations for intra-industry trade have 
a value of zero. Hence, a log transformation is not possible anyway. 
19 A drawback of our decision to work with three sub-periods, rather than with 
annual data, is that we could not check for the (non)stationarity of the time series. 
This is a limitation that must be tackled in future research. In the current chapter, we 
thought it more important to avoid the bias caused by special events and irregular 
deals, as explained above. 
20 Hong Kong was China’s largest trade partner in most years in the 1992-2001 
period, although Hong Kong is not a large economy. It has been an important 
entrepot of mainland China, though. Because of the special China – Hong Kong 
linkage, intra-industry trade between mainland China and Hong Kong is extremely 
high (cf. Table 5.1).   
 
 
    
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
163 
VIIT and HIIT with China, which illustrates the special China – Hong Kong linkage. 
Additionally, Table 5.1 indicates that most of the bilateral IIT indices have increased 
steadily during our period of analysis. This development is shared by all three intra-
industry trade indices – i.e., TIIT, HIIT and VIIT. Finally, Table 5.1 makes clear that 
VIIT is much higher than HIIT in most cases,21 and that VIIT has increased faster 
than HIIT. In many instances, HIIT even declined: at the world level, China’s HIIT 
index decreased from 11.4 in 1992-1994 to 7.6 in 1999-2001. Conversely, the 
aggregated VIIT index increased from 19.4 in the first sub-period to 32.4 in the third 
sub-period. This dual trend indicates that vertically differentiated products have 
increasingly dominated China’s intra-industry trade, vis-à-vis horizontally 
differentiated goods. This observation suggests that comparative advantage might 
well be the main reason for Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade. 
We performed two factor analyses, one with and one without Hong Kong. The 
results of both factor analyses, reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, are quite similar, 
producing five underlying factors that cumulatively explain 77 per cent of the 
variance. 
This factor structure appears to make good conceptual sense, with five interpretable 
dimensions that are potentially important in the explanation of intra-industry trade. 
The interpretation of each of these five factors runs as follows. 
Similarity (Factor 1). The first factor has high positive and significant loadings on 
seven variables. These variables reflect the difference between China and its trade 
partners along seven dimensions: cultural distance, GDP per capita, Gini index, 
                                                      
21 If transfer pricing is taken into account, the VIIT index should be higher.  
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energy consumption, public expenditure on education, secondary school enrolment, 
and tertiary education enrolment. This set of seven variables exactly matches with 
the first two groups of the explanatory variables. This factor is therefore interpreted 
as the difference in consumer patterns and factor endowments between China and 
its trade partners. A high score on this factor indicates low similarity in the trade 
partner’s stage of development. We expect the Similarity Factor 1 to be negatively 
related to HIIT, but positively to VIIT. 
Distance (Factor 2). This second factor has a high negative loading on geographical 
distance and a high positive loading on the dummy border variable. The opposite 
sign of these two loadings is in line with the expectation that the two variables have 
conflicting influences on trade, as the geographical distance between a pair of 
countries sharing a common border is lower than the geographical distance between 
their capitals. Therefore, this factor is a sensible measure of physical distance. 
Distance Factor 2 is expected to have a positive impact on TIIT, especially on HIIT.  
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Table 5.3: Results of factor analysis I – pattern matrix with Hong Kong 
 Component 
   Factor 1 
Similarity 
Factor 2 
Distance 
Factor 3 
Size 
Factor 4  
Stage 
Factor 5 
FDI 
CULTURE  0.826*  -0.138 -0.019  -0.052  -0.109 
GDPPC  0.748*  -0.029 0.097  -0.280  0.134 
GINI  0.960*  0.072 0.077  0.118  0.124 
POWER  0.935*  0.031 0.066  0.071  0.134 
EDU  0.665*  -0.082 -0.189  0.077  -0.321 
SCHOOLs  0.815*  0.155 -0.115  -0.032  -0.204 
SCHOOLt  0.808*  -0.063 0.136  -0.050  0.106 
GDPppp  0.166 -0.236  0.866*  -0.166 0.075 
POPU  -0.082 0.296  0.796*  0.071 -0.212 
FDI  -0.023 0.181  -0.086 0.005 0.854* 
TARIFF  -0.339 0.238  0.177 0.496*  -0.312 
HIGHTECH  -0.009 -0.056  0.041 -0.781*  0.025 
MANUEX  -0.053 0.193  0.081  -0.827*  -0.070 
DIST  -0.074  -0.834*  0.079 0.417 -0.035 
BORD  -0.044  0.800*  0.124 0.213 0.251 
% of variance  37.19  15.91 9.80  8.47  5.81 
Cumulative %  77.18 
Notes: * indicates that a factor loading is significant at the 0.05 level; the extraction method is 
Principal Component Analysis; the rotation method is Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization; 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is. 731; Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
gives a Chi-square of 1599.60; and the sample size is 150. 
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Table 5.4:  Results of factor analysis II – pattern matrix without Hong Kong 
 Component 
   Factor 1 
Similarity 
Factor 2 
Distance
Factor 3 
Size  
Factor 4 
Stage 
Factor 5 
FDI 
CULTURE  0.818*  -0.133 -0.050 0.015  0.189 
GDPPC  0.745*  -0.064 0.100 -0.266 0.109 
GINI  0.971*  0.095 0.092 0.034 -0.124 
POWER  0.942*  0.050 0.081 -0.004  -0.086 
EDU  0.693*  -0.133 -0.130 0.053 -0.305 
SCHOOLs  0.792*  0.121 -0.148 0.090 0.227 
SCHOOLt  0.806*  -0.016 0.105 -0.072 0.054 
GDPppp  0.160 -0.236  0.847*  -0.155 0.178 
POPU  -0.064 0.253  0.812*  0.070 -0.110 
FDI  -0.013 0.069  0.042  0.006  0.920* 
TARIFF  -0.326 0.187  0.217  0.509*  -0.189 
HIGHTECH  -0.010 -0.024  0.017  -0.804*  -0.003 
MANUEX  -0.053 0.124  0.098  -0.802*  -0.017 
DIST  -0.077  -0.846*  0.096 0.420 -0.011 
BORD  -0.039  0.835*  0.124 0.235 0.102 
% of variance  37.93  15.26 8.12  9.46  6.26 
Cumulative %  77.03 
Notes: * indicates that a factor loading is significant at the 0.05 level; the extraction 
method is Principal Component Analysis; the rotation method is Oblimin with 
Kaiser Normalization; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 
0.744; Bartlett’s test of sphericity gives a Chi-square of 1571.45; and the sample size 
is 147. 
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Size (Factor 3). The third factor has a high positive loading on two variables: GDP 
per capita and population size. This factor can undoubtedly be interpreted as a 
measure of the (economic) size of a country. We therefore expect Size Factor 3 to 
positively relate to HIIT. 
Stage (Factor 4). This fourth factor has a high positive loading on trade barriers, and 
has two high negative loadings on the high-technology and manufacturing export 
proportions. This factor is therefore interpreted as a measure of the country’s stage 
of international trade development. A low trade barrier score and high export 
proportions of high-tech and manufacturing products will result in a low factor score, 
which indicates a high international trade development stage. Consequently, Stage 
Factor 3 is expected to negatively influence intra-industry trade. 
FDI (Factor 5). This fifth factor has a high loading on one variable only: FDI.   
Hence, this factor can be straightforwardly interpreted as FDI inflows. We expect 
that this FDI Factor 5 will be positively related to intra-industry trade, particularly to 
HIIT. 
The above interpretations and expected effects of these five factors, as predicted in 
our set of six hypotheses, are summarized in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5.5: An overview of the factors 
Expected signs and hypotheses  Factors Variables Interpretations 
   TIIT  VIIT  HIIT 
Factor 1 
(Similarity) 
 
CULTURE 
GDPPC 
GINI 
POWER 
EDU 
SCHOOLs 
SCHOOLt 
A low factor score 
indicates a high 
similarity between 
the two countries 
with respect to 
consumer pattern 
and factor 
endowment 
? 
Positive 
(H5.3) 
Negative 
(H5.1) 
Factor 2  
(Distance)  DIST 
BORD 
A high factor score 
indicates a large 
functioning 
distance  
Positive 
(H5.6a 
H5.6b) 
Positive 
(H5.6a) 
Positive 
(H5.6a) 
Factor 3 
(Size) 
GDPppp 
POPU 
A high factor score 
indicator a large 
economic size 
Positive 
(H5.2) 
? 
Positive 
(H5.2) 
Factor 4  
(stage)  
TARIFF 
HIGHTEC
H 
MANUEX 
A high factor score 
indicator a low 
trade level 
Negative
(H5.5) 
Negative 
(H5.5) 
Negative 
(H5.5) 
Factor 5 
(FDI)  FDI 
A high factor score 
indicates a high 
FDI inflow 
Positive 
(H5.4) 
Positive 
(H5.4) 
? 
 
The next step is to estimate models that link the five factors to the TIIT, HIIT and 
VIIT indices by using the two sets of rotated factor scores, with or without Hong  
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Kong, as the independent variables. The first set of estimations is done for the 
complete sample of 50 countries. The results are shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6: Empirical results for Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade in 1992 to 2001 
with Hong Kong included 
  TIIT VIIT HIIT 
Variable  Coefficient      t Coefficient      t Coefficient       t 
Constant   0.1251   36.78  0.0996  35.15  0.0370  15.33 
Similarity -0.0001  -0.06   0.0051***  3.64 -0.0066***  -3.05 
Distance   0.0297***   9.15  0.0134***  5.38  0.0148***  5.58 
Size   0.0076   1.54  0.0057  1.59  0.0018  1.24 
Stage -0.0769***  -23.42 -0.0635***  -19.88 -0.0061**  -2.44 
FDI   0.0582***   14.91  0.0384***  11.83  0.0068  1.62 
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.780  0.312 
N 150  150  150 
F 153.92  106.66  14.49 
P-value 0.00000  0.00000  0.0000 
Notes: method is GLS (cross-section weights), * p≤0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
The three F-statistics are significant at the 0.01 level, producing an adjusted R-
squared of 0.837, 0.780 and 0.311, respectively, in the three regressions. The first 
factor, Similarity, is positive and significant at the 0.01 level in the VIIT model, and 
negative and significant at the 0.01 level in the HIIT regression. This result strongly 
supports Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.3. The Distance factor is positively significant at the 
0.01 level in all three models, which is in line with H6. However, there is little 
evidence to support that HIIT is more sensitive to geographical distance than is 
VIIT. The third factor, Size, is not significant in any of the three models, which  
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implies a failure to support Hypothesis 5.2. The fourth factor, Stage, is negatively 
significant at the 0.01, 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively, which offers evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis 5.5. The last factor, FDI, is positively significant in the VIIT 
estimation at the 0.01 level, but not significant in the HIIT model. This result offers 
support for Hypothesis 5.4.  
The results of the second set of estimations for the sub-sample without Hong Kong 
are reported in Table 5.7. 
Most of the results are quite similar to the ones of the first set of estimations. Three 
factors, Distance, Size and Stage, are significant with the expected signs, which again 
provides support for Hypotheses 5.1, 5.3, 5.6, 5.5 and part of 5.4. However, there are 
two differences. First, Size is now significant at the 0.01, 0.01 and 0.05 level, which is 
in line with Hypothesis 5.2. Second, FDI is not only significant in the VIIT model, 
but also in the HIIT regression, which leaves a puzzle for further research. 
Table 5.7: Empirical results for Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade in 1992 to 2001 
without Hong Kong included 
  TIIT  VIIT HIIT
Variable  Coefficient            t Coefficient         t Coefficient          t 
Constant   0.1108   32.41 0.0929 32.59 0.0159  15.84 
Similarity   0.0032  1.36 0.0064*** 3.37 -0.0017*** -2.90 
Distance   0.0144***  5.54 0.0070*** 4.23 0.0057***  4.57 
Size   0.0122***  4.11 0.0080*** 3.30 0.0031**  2.55 
Stage -0.0728***  -19.57 -0.0616*** -19.94 -0.0086*** -8.07 
FDI   0.0108***  2.68 0.0073** 2.45 0.0026***  3.09 
Adjusted R2 0.897 0.770 0.392
N 147  147 147
F 255.72  98.99 19.83
P-value 0.00000  0.00000 0.0000
Notes: method is GLS (cross-section weights), * p≤0.1., ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.  
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5.5   Discussion 
Overall, the findings give rise to at least four observations. First, intra-industry trade 
has taken place not only between China and trade partners with similar consumer 
patterns and factor endowments, but also between China and trade partners with 
different consumer patterns and factor endowments. However, this observation does 
not imply that similarity does not affect intra-industry trade – it does. The results of 
our two sets of estimations suggest that China’s HIIT is more likely to emerge with 
countries that are similar than with those that are different. Conversely, China’s VIIT 
happens more with different rather than with similar countries. 
Second, three factors affect HIIT and VIIT in the same way. One is geographical 
distance, which has a significant and positive impact on both HIIT and VIIT. This 
result offers support for the argument that geographical distance does deter intra-
industry trade (including VIIT and HIIT) more than inter-industry trade. Another 
common factor is the influence of international openness and trade structure. Both 
HIIT and VIIT are positively affected by an open trade system and advanced trade 
structures. The last common factor is the economic size of trade partners. Both 
Chinese HIIT and VIIT are more likely to take place with large economies than with 
small ones. These observations are in line with most theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings in the intra-industry trade literature, although HIIT and VIIT tend 
not to be disentangled in the literature (e.g., Stone and Lee 1995; Matthews 1998). 
Third, evidence of a positive impact of FDI on VIIT is found in two estimations. 
This result indicates that increasing Chinese VIIT has been driven by FDI. This 
finding is in line with the theoretical framework explored above. In China’s practice, 
this observation can probably be largely attributed to the launch of export-oriented 
FDI and trade-processing policies. Since 1984, the State Council approved two  
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schemes allowing duty-free import of components and raw materials for use in 
export industries. Since then, China has been very successful in attracting export-
oriented FDI, particularly from Hong Kong. One scheme is called “Process and 
Assembling” (Lai Liao Jia Gong Zhuang Pei), which is similar to what is conventionally 
known as contractual processing. The other scheme is named “Processing with 
Imported Materials” (Jin Liao Jia Gong), which is similar to ordinary processing by 
subsidiaries. Encouraged by both policies, processed trade has gained a prominent 
position in Chinese international trade, accounting for 50-66 per cent of total trade. 
As the figures in Table 5.8 show, the performance of different business forms is 
different, though. 
About 30 per cent of trade by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is processed trade, 
which is about 80-90 per cent for foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). Obviously, 
FIEs are the main contributor to Chinese processed trade. They undertake about 80-
90 per cent of Chinese total processed trade. In the SITC aggregation procedure, 
processed imports and exports are often grouped together. Therefore, FDI is very 
important in facilitating VIIT.  
Fourth, comparing the two sets of the estimations, we observe that Hong Kong has 
played an important role in determining China’s trade structure. There are two 
differences in the two sets of estimations. The first difference indicates that 
economic size is not significant in the first set of estimations, but positively 
significant in the second set of regressions. This result can be attributed to the fact 
that although Hong Kong is a small economy in terms of GDP and population, it 
has enjoyed the highest TIIT, HIIT and VIIT with China. Therefore, when we 
include Hong Kong in the estimation, economic size is not a significant determinant 
of intra-industry trade. However, when Hong Kong is excluded from the sample,  
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economic size is positively significant, as is anticipated in the literature. The second 
difference relates to the variation of the significance level of HIIT. This can be 
explained by trade processing undertaken by Hong Kong’s FIEs. Processed trade has 
been dominant in bilateral trade between China and Hong Kong. According to the 
trade statistics, about 70 per cent of imports from Hong Kong was used in export 
processing in 2001 (MOFTEC). This state of affairs is largely due to the resource-
seeking motives adopted by Hong Kong firms. Many Hong Kong investors 
emphasize activities in the area of the labor-intensive and simple processing of light 
industrial and textile goods, aimed at the international market. However, FDI flows 
from Western MNEs into China are not mainly driven by such resource-seeking 
motives. Rather, although resource acquisition is a motivation, their major motives 
for entering into China are the growing market and the market potential (Lou 2001; 
Zhang 2001b). Therefore, Western investors put less emphasis on processing trade 
than do their Hong Kong counterparts. As a result, FDI is highly significant in VIIT 
model when Hong Kong is included in the analyses, but the significant level declines 
when Hong Kong is excluded. 
Table 5.8: Chinese processing trade in different business forms 
 1996  2001 
  Total SOEs FIEs COEs Total SOEs FIEs COEs 
Total Trade  151,066 86,058 61,506 3,073 266,155 113,234 133,235 14,223 
24,240 19,010 4,487 740 42,233 25,961 1,434 1,827  Contractual 
processing  16.0% 22.1% 7.3% 24.1% 15.9% 22.9% 10.8% 12.8% 
60,094 10,904 48,596 591 105,221 9,941 92,252 2,601  Ordinary processing  
39.8% 12.7% 79.0% 19.2% 39.5% 8.8% 69.2% 18.3% 
Notes: SOEs are State-Owned Enterprises; FIEs are Foreign-Invested Enterprises; 
COEs are Collectively-Owned Enterprises; and the data source is the Customs 
General Administration of the People’s Republic of China.  
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5.6    Appraisal 
In this chapter, we investigated the nature of three forms of intra-industry trade 
between China and 50 trade partners during the 1992-2001 period, when China has 
accelerated the implementation of policies to liberalize international trade and 
investment. The development of the Grubel – Lloyd index indicates that intra-
industry trade has indeed increased significantly during this period. VIIT has been 
the dominant type in China’s intra-industry trade, increasing faster than HIIT has. 
With these measures of intra-industry trade, we explored the determinants of TIIT, 
VIIT and HIIT separately. The results confirmed that disentangling TIIT into its 
HIIT and VIIT components provides the opportunity to improve the estimation of 
the underlying determinants. While there are a few common drivers of HIIT and 
VIIT, such as geographical distance, economic size, trade development stage and 
FDI, differences exist in the determinants of both two types of intra-industry trade 
as well. Specifically, the similarity between China and its trade partners can explain 
HIIT, whereas the difference between China and its trade partners can explain VIIT. 
The fact that VIIT has been dominant in Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade 
suggests that comparative advantage can explain not only inter-industry trade, but 
also most of China’s intra-industry trade. The considerable increase of VIIT indicates 
that China’s areas of specialization based on comparative advantage have been 
expanded from inter-industry to intra-industry trade domains. This conclusion is in 
line with the progression of China into the next trade development stage. 
This study confirms that most of intra-industry trade determinants discussed in the 
literature have done their job in the case of China in 1992-2001. This overall finding 
suggests that the market mechanism has started to work properly in the area of 
Chinese foreign trade in the post-1992 period. However, China’s recent trade history  
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reveals a number of specific features that can be attributed to the particulars of the 
process of transition and liberalization. First, trade and FDI policies have influenced 
the nature and cause of Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade. Specifically, the policies 
on processed trade and export-oriented FDI have significantly encouraged related 
FDI and VIIT. Second, due to historical and institutional reasons, Hong Kong has 
played an important role in China’s trade development.  
A number of important business and political implications can be drawn from the 
findings of this study. First, the increasing intra-industry trade index suggests that 
China is not only moving into the center stage of the world market as a result of its 
high-growth rates of trade per se, but also by upgrading its trade structure. China does 
no longer confirm with the image of a developing country that exports primary 
products and imports industrial goods, as it did twenty years ago. It now integrates 
into the world economy in depth, which offers multinational enterprises more 
opportunities to operate profitably in China. For multinational enterprises, this 
implies that the Chinese market is even more of an opportunity than it was before 
the epoch of liberalization, suggesting that management must carefully scan both 
VIIT and HIIT-related opportunities for FDI in China. With the increasing 
importance of HIIT, China does not only offer the “usual” efficiency-seeking (VIIT) 
opportunities of low-cost countries in the developing world, but also the market-
seeking (VIIT) ones as “normally” located in developed nation-states. Second, 
China’s trade and investment liberalization program has played a very important – if 
not crucial – role as the key driver of the improvement of the Chinese trade structure. 
Directly, tailor-made liberalization policies facilitate the development of VIIT, such 
as those related to relaxing the regulatory environment for multinational companies. 
Indirectly, liberalization measures have done the groundwork upon which the market  
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mechanism started to take over the China’s economy: as a result, economic rather 
than political determinants become the driver of intra-industry trade (cf. Zhang and 
van Witteloostuijn 2004). Third, further development of China’s intra-industry trade 
may rely more on HIIT than on VIIT. According to intra-industry theory, a major 
determinant of intra-industry trade is product differentiation, which is the major 
source of HIIT. Therefore, the future of China’s intra-industry trade depends not 
only on progress made in the liberalization program, but also – and probably even 
more so – on economic development. This may require a facilitating shift in China’s 
policy, emphasizing HIIT rather than VIIT-promoting measures. 
Although this study has made an effort to deepen our understanding of intra-
industry trade, it is characterized by a number of limitations that point the way to 
future work. First, further research might include industry characteristics into the 
cross-country analysis in order to investigate the impact of country-specific factors 
on intra-industry trade in different industries over time. By using a pair of countries’ 
cross-industry data, previous studies have maintained that the pattern of intra-
industry trade changed greatly across industries, due the different features of 
individual industries (e.g., Greenaway, Hine and Milner 1995). Employing a 
combined cross-country and cross-industry design in a longitudinal context offers 
ample opportunities to better detect the underlying causes of the development of 
intra-industry trade. Second, one result of our analyses is the significant influence of 
FDI on Chinese HIIT, which is not as expected. Further study is needed to explain 
this result.  
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Chapter 6 
The Relationships between FDI and 
Trade: A Cointegration Approach 
The literature is unanimous on the important link between trade and FDI. However, the exact 
nature of the relationship between FDI and trade is a controversial issue in international economics 
and business. In this chapter, by applying a cointegration approach, we unravel the causality and 
direction of FDI – trade linkages for the Chinese economy in the 1980 – 2003 period. The results 
indicate that, in the long run, FDI positively relates to exports and imports; in the short run, 
estimating our framework reveals bi-directional causal links between FDI and exports, and one-way 
causal links from imports to FDI and from imports to exports. 
6.1   Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we found that, in the last half-century, China’s bilateral 
trade linkages were determined by three important factors: political relations, 
geographical distance and economic characteristics. In Chapter 3, the findings 
indicate that political relations have been an important determinant of bilateral trade 
intensities ever since 1949. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, however, we report that, 
after two decades of economic reform, the economic elements started to play their 
roles as drivers of bilateral trade linkages much more prominently in the 1990s and 
early 21th century, pushing the role of political affinities to the background. Among 
the economic elements, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a central variable that 
gained prominence in recent decades as a key determinant of bilateral trade 
intensities and trade structures. Given these findings, a natural follow-up question 
can be raised: what are the causal relationships between China’s trade pattern and  
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FDI inflow? Given the extant literature, the answer to this question is not so 
straightforward. The current chapter aims to answer this question by applying a 
sophisticated cointegration and Granger-causality approach. 
Indeed, the official statistics suggest that FDI by multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
has played an increasingly dominant role in the domain of China’s trade with the 
outside world. An important and often-used piece of evidence as to the impact of 
FDI on China’s trade is the share of MNEs in total Chinese export and import. As 
Figure 2-5 in Chapter 2 demonstrates, the shares of Foreign Invested Enterprises 
(FIEs) in total national export and import flows have increased considerably since 
China’s liberalization program became effective, increasing from 1.9 and 5.6 per cent 
in 1986 to 54.8 and 56.2 per cent in 2003. These figures seem to imply that FDI has 
underpinned China’s trade expansion. However, the share of FIEs in total national 
exports and imports is a very crude indication of the impact of FDI on trade. One 
reason for this is that the category of FIEs does not only include wholly-owned 
foreign enterprises, but also joint ventures with shared ownership by both Chinese 
and foreign investors in which the foreign investors’ capital contribution should not 
be less than 25 per cent of the total registered capital. 1 Therefore, domestic 
investments also contribute to the FIEs’ exports and imports. Furthermore, an 
important part of FDI’s influence on their host countries’ trade may follow an 
indirect path. For example, through spillover effects, FDI can affect the export and 
import performance of local firms, and hence the total export and import flows in 
 
1 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
(EJV Law, Article 4), Law of the People’s Republic of China on Contractual Joint 
Ventures (CJV Law, Article 2), and Regulations for the Implementation of the Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Contractual Joint Ventures (CJV 
Implementation, Article 18). 
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host countries. For these reasons, simply taking the official statistics at face value 
provides far from sufficient evidence – if any – as to the explanation of the FDI – 
trade linkages. A more sophisticated and appropriate technique is needed to uncover 
the effects that underlie the official figures. 
In Chapter 4, by introducing lagged FDI as an explanatory variable, we found 
evidence for a one-way causal relationship from FDI to trade. The present chapter 
will go further by seeking to detect whether or not two-way causal FDI – trade 
linkages can be uncovered by analyzing time series data. We investigate both long-
run and short-run relationships between FDI on the one hand and exports and 
imports on the other hand by using the Granger-causality cointegration approach. 
Before doing that, though, we will first briefly review the relevant literature on FDI 
and trade. 
6.2   Literature Review 
From decades of research it is clear that FDI and trade are closely interrelated. MNE 
activity has a distinctive effect on the trade pattern of both home and host countries 
because of their ability and willingness to internalize cross-border transactions, 
thereby affecting the value-added activities both within a country and between 
countries (Dunning 1992). By and large, the international business and international 
economics literatures are unanimous on the importance of this link. However, the 
exact nature of the relationships between FDI and trade is a controversial issue, 
because (a) causalities can run both ways, from FDI to trade and from trade to FDI 
and (b) the sign of any FDI – trade linkages is dependent upon the underlying MNE 
strategies. 
The mainstream in the classic theory of international trade views the mobility of 
goods and factors as opposing forces. As part of international integration processes,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Chapter 6 The Relationships between FDI and Trade: A Cointegration Approach 
 
180 
trade in goods leads to the convergence of product prices, and thus of factor rewards; 
alternatively, migration or FDI triggers a convergence of factor rewards, and hence 
of product prices. This is the so-called Mundell principle. The Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson-Mundell framework suggests that international trade of goods can 
substitute for international movement of factors of production, which includes FDI. 
Similarly, the other way around, international factor mobility, including FDI, may 
substitute for trade in goods. In Mundell’s words,  “[c]ommodity movements are at 
least to some extent a substitute for factor movements … an increase in trade 
impediments stimulates factor movements and … an increase in restrictions to factor 
movements stimulates trade” (Mundell 1957: 320). 
Vernon (1966) developed the product lifecycle model of internationalization to 
explain the sequence from domestic production of a new product to its export and 
then foreign production by investigating the US multinational companies in the 
1950s and early 1960s. According to this model, in the first stage, new products 
initially are developed in the US, and sales occur first in the domestic market. 
Subsequently, in the second stage, export will start developing to those foreign 
markets where the consumers have the same preferences and incomes as at home. 
As the foreign markets grow, in the third stage, US firms might establish a subsidiary 
abroad to produce their products closer to their destination markets. When the 
production in foreign countries rises, US export to those markets will fall, as well as 
that to third-country markets. Finally, in the fourth stage, as foreign firms master the 
production processes and as their costs fall with the increased scale of production, 
they might begin to export their products to the US. This developmental sequence 
indicates that foreign production may substitute for export from the home country, 
even creating import of the same product in a later stage. From the perspective of a  
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host country, conversely, FDI is replacing its imports first and increasing its exports 
later. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, Kojima (1975 & 1982) points out that the 
comparative advantage of industries in home and host countries is crucial in 
determining whether FDI is trade-oriented or not. Kojima’s macroeconomic 
approach predicts that export-oriented FDI occurs when the source country invests 
in those industries in which the host country has a comparative advantage. It is 
beneficial for an investing country if an FDI flow goes abroad from its comparatively 
disadvantaged marginal industry for the purpose of producing goods in the host 
country at costs lower than at home through the transfer of efficient technology and 
effective management. Subsequently, in the next stage, importing the associated 
goods back into the home country (or exporting them to third markets) may gain 
prominence. Additionally, this kind of FDI benefits the host country, since it 
stimulates the export of new products from the host country. Therefore, on the one 
hand, if an MNE invests in a host country with comparative advantages that 
compensate for disadvantages in the home country, then FDI will increase the host 
country’s trade. However, on the other hand, if an FDI flow comes from an industry 
with a comparative advantage in the home country but a disadvantage in the host 
country, then this FDI tends to be a trade substitute because this investment does 
not fit with the host country’s comparative advantage, which eventually reduces the 
total output and trade volume of both countries involved. In developing host 
countries, FDI flowing into labor-intensive industries is likely to be trade-creating, 
whereas FDI flowing into capital-intensive industries is likely to be trade-replacing or 
trade-destroying. 
A related literature investigates the relation of trade and FDI in the context of 
development issues. Based on the conceptual framework developed by Porter (1990),  
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Ozawa (1992) formulated a comprehensive theory describing linkages between 
economic development and competitiveness that create international trade and FDI. 
Ozawa argues that an increase in trade flows occurs as a result of improved 
comparative advantage, which is, in turn, influenced by FDI leading to changes in 
the pattern of this advantage. He offers an explanation of the causal relationships 
between an outward-oriented economic policy and the impact of FDI on trade by 
emphasizing the effects of FDI on comparative advantage and structural upgrading 
in manufacturing. In this line of argument, FDI and international trade are not only 
increasingly complementary and mutually supportive, but also increasingly 
inseparable as two sides of the process of economic globalization (Ruggiero 1996). 
Furthermore, inward FDI may stimulate exports from domestic sectors through 
industrial linkage or spillover effects, especially through backward linkages, buying 
local-made intermediate inputs to produce exports (O hUallachain 1984). This effect 
creates a strong demand stimulus for domestic enterprises, and promotes exports. 
The international business literature emphasizes the role of the motives of 
multinational enterprises. With a different motivation, FDI has a different effect on 
trade. Motivations can be classified into two general categories: market-seeking and 
factor-seeking (Root 1977 & 1994). Market-seeking FDI follows demand, 
penetrating foreign markets with a promising sale potential. Market-seeking FDI may 
have a negative impact on the host country’s trade balance, since “the affiliates of 
foreign firms (in the US) do show an apparent tendency to export somewhat less and 
import significantly more than US firms – indeed over two and a quarter times as 
much” (Graham and Krugman 1989: 67). Factor-seeking FDI includes MNE 
behavior aimed at gaining access to raw materials and low-cost locations. FDI 
motivated by the quest for raw materials is used to produce goods with natural 
sources that are lacking or under-supplied in the home country. In general, this type  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
of FDI increases exports from the host nation to the home country, as well as to 
other third countries (Root 1994). FDI motivated by low-cost production objectives 
takes advantage of low-cost factors, such as cheap labor, as part of an overall global 
sourcing strategy, leading to an ability to export products from the emerging host 
nation to other countries in the world, including the home country. In this case, the 
host country is able to increase exports and improve its trade balance (Phongpaichit 
1990). 
So, in the business and economic approaches to FDI, trade is considered to be one 
of the factors that determine the MNE’s choice of location for FDI initiatives. On 
the one hand, a high level of imports in host countries suggests a high level of 
penetration by foreign companies, which may start off by exporting to the host 
country, to subsequently switch to FDI once they have established a foothold in 
those countries. Following this logic, a long-run positive relationship is hypothesized 
between host-country import and inward FDI (Culem 1988). On the other hand, in 
the short run, multinational companies may regard export and FDI as alternative 
modes of foreign market penetration, which implies a negative relationship. 
Therefore, there is uncertainty as to the net effect of the level of the host-country 
imports on FDI (Billington 1999). Of course, an MNE’s motivation may be complex, 
implying that FDI is undertaken for more than one reason. Furthermore, regional 
economic integration and growth of intra-firm trade complicates the prediction of 
the trade effect of FDI (Narula 1996). All this together explains why unconditional 
hypotheses about the causality and sign of FDI – trade linkages make no sense. 
To summarize, the “quick” literature review above indicates that the relationship 
between the trade and FDI is complicated, implying that the sign and direction of 
the causal relationship depend on the range and type of trade and FDI being 
considered, the MNEs’ dominant strategies, and the characteristics of industries and  
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countries involved. Figure 6.1 summarizes the possible relationships that different 
pieces of literature predict, depending upon the set of conditions under investigation. 
Obviously, the causal relations between trade and FDI are not clear-cut. 
 
Import  FDI Export 
+ – ? + - ?
Figure 6.1  A literature review: relationships between import, export and FDI 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, then, the empirical evidence is mixed.  The majority of the 
empirical studies have confirmed that outward FDI and exports are complementary, 
especially in the case of developed countries (e.g. Swedenborg 1979; Lipsey and 
Weiss 1981; Blomstrom, Lipsey and Kulckyck 1988; Pearce 1990; Pfaffermayr 1996; 
and Wei, Liu, Parker and Vaidya 1999). An early exception to this rule is Horst 
(1972), who found that trade and FDI reveal a substitutive linkage, and hence are 
negatively related. Yet other studies have reported that the effects of FDI on exports 
are different from that on imports. For example, Bayoumi and Lipworth (1997) 
showed that outward FDI from Japan had only a temporary impact on exports, but a 
permanent effect on imports. 
In terms of Figure 6.1’s FDI – trade relations, China is an interesting case that 
attracts much attention from economists and politicians. Using provincial data of 
China over the 1985-1995 period, Wei, Liu, Parker and Vaidya (1999) revealed that 
provinces with a higher level of international trade attract more FDI. Using 
provincial data for 1984-1997, Sun (2001) found evidence for a one-way causality 
from FDI to export in the coastal and central regions. Using bilateral data for China 
and 19 trade partners for 1984 to 1998, Liu, Parker, Vaidya and Wei (2001) applied  
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unit-root and Granger-causality tests, indicating that import causes FDI and FDI 
causes export. Using quarterly data from 1981 to 1997, Liu, Burridge and Sinclair 
(2002) investigated the causal links between economic growth, FDI and trade, 
showing that two-way causal connections exist between economic growth, FDI and 
export. Using case study, Zhang and Ebbers (2002) argued that the characteristics of 
an investing country affect the FDI-trade relationship between China and the 
investing country. Together, these studies reveal important features of the 
relationships between Chinese FDI and trade. However, these previous studies either 
use provincial or bilateral data, and only a few studies have investigated the causal 
linkages between FDI, export and import at the aggregate level. Moreover, earlier 
work has not incorporated the influence of policy changes into their models, and 
information for the period after the Asian crisis has not yet been included. The 
present study’s aim is to extend the extant literature by filling these gaps. 
6.3    Methodology and Data 
6.3.1   Granger-causality test 
One often applied method to investigate causal relationships between variables 
empirically is Granger-causality analysis. The basic principle of Granger-causality 
analysis (Granger 1969) is to test whether or not lagged values of one variable help to 
improve the explanation of another variable from its own past. Simple Granger-
causality tests are operated on a single equation in which variable A is explained by 
lagged values of variables A and B. It is then tested whether the coefficients of the 
lagged B variables are equal to zero. If the hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
lagged values of B are equal to zero is rejected, it is said that variable B Granger-
causes variable A.  
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The present study will test for two-way Granger-causality relationships between 
exports, imports and FDI. Since a single-equation specification cannot fulfil the aim 
of this study, we set up a Vector AutoRegression (VAR) system, which treats all 
variables symmetrically. In terms of the variables central to the present study, the 
VAR system has the following form:  
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where EX, IM and FDI are exports, imports and FDI, respectively; a, b, c, and d are 
parameters; the e’s  are error terms; and n is the order of the VAR, i.e., the maximum 
number of lags in the system. For the {FDIt} sequence to be unaffected by exports, 
all the b3i must be equal to zero; and for the {FDIt} sequence to be unaffected by 
imports, all the c3i must be equal to zero. Similar logic applies to {EXt} and {IMt}. 
The conventional Granger-causality test based on a standard VAR-model is defined 
conditional on the assumption of stationarity. If the time series are non-stationary, 
the stability condition for VAR is not met, implying that the Wald test statistics for 
Granger-causality are invalid. In this case, the cointegration approach and Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) are recommended to investigate the relationships 
between non-stationary variables (e.g., Toda and Philips 1993). Engle and Granger 
(1987) pointed out that when a linear combination of two or more non-stationary 
time series is stationary, then the stationary linear combination, the so-called 
cointegrating equation, can be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the variables.   
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6.3.2   Cointegration approach 
This long-run equilibrium relationship cannot determine the direction of causality, 
though. The direction can be obtained by estimating a VECM that explicitly includes 
the cointegrating relations. In a VECM, long and short-run parameters are separated, 
which gives an appropriate framework for assessing the validity of the long-run 
implications of a theory, as well as for estimating the dynamic processes involved. 
The short-run dynamics of the model are studied by analyzing how changes in each 
variable in a cointegrated system respond to the lagged residuals or errors from the 
cointegrating vectors and the lags of the changes of all variables. Therefore, by 
adopting the cointegration approach and corresponding VECMs, we can detect both 
long-run and short-run relationships between non-stationary variables. 
In the current study, we found two cointegrating relationships between exports, 
imports and FDI (see below). Hence, we estimate the following three-equation 
VECM to analyze causality: 
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where ∆EX, ∆IM and ∆FDI are first differences of EX, IM and FDI, respectively; 
the error-correction term ect is a vector of residuals from the long-run equilibrium 
relationships; D92 is a step dummy variable, with zeros before and ones in and after 
1992, to be discussed below; α, β, γ , δ, and  θ are parameters; and the ε’s denote error 
terms.    
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Two aspects of the VECM system (6.2) deserve special attention.  Firstly, the error-
correction term consists of the linear combinations of our three variables, which are 
stationary. The number of combinations, also labeled as rank or the number of 
cointegration vectors (r), is two in our case. Below, we will apply the Johansen 
cointegration test to determine the rank. The error-correction terms reveal the 
deviations from the long-run relationships between the three variables. The 
coefficients of ect, αF, αE, and αI reflect the speed of adjustment of exports, imports 
and FDI toward the long-run equilibrium. For example, the larger the first (second) 
element of αF , the greater the response of FDI to the previous period’s deviation 
from the first (second) long-run equilibrium relations. Conversely, if the two 
elements of αF are equal to zero, FDI does not respond to lagged deviations from 
the long-run equilibrium relationships. In this case, FDI is called weakly exogenous 
for the system. So, Granger-noncausality in the case of cointegrated variables 
requires the additional condition that the speed-of-adjustment coefficients are equal 
to zero.  For example, for the {FDIt} sequence to be unaffected by exports, not only 
all the β3i must be equal to zero, but also the elements of vector αF. 
Secondly, three deterministic components – a constant, a trend and step dummy D92 
– may enter the VECM system. The form in which the constant and the trend enter 
the VECM is found as part of the cointegration estimation strategy. The step dummy 
variable controls for the important role that the Chinese government policies have 
played in the process of China’s integration into the world economy. China’s 
liberalization policies followed a gradual step-by-step approach before 1992 (as was 
explained in Chapter 3). In that period, international trade and FDI increased steadily. 
Since 1992, however, China has speeded up the pace of liberalization impressively. 
The Chinese trade system has been adapted to better reflect international norms, and  
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incentive measures have been launched to attract inward FDI. Consequently, China’s 
FDI inflow has increased tremendously due to these changes in policies.  
6.3.3   Estimation procedure 
Figure 6.2 (see below) indeed reveals a structural break in the FDI time series as of 
1992. The Chow breakpoint test confirms that the influence of this break on the 
relationship between our time series is significant, with an F-statistic of 41.2 (p < 
0.001).2 We considered three alternatives for the structural break: the break may 
change (1) the constant, (2) the trend, or (3) both the constant and the trend. We 
started from the most complicated case (3), including a step dummy (D92), the 
product term of D92 and EX, and the product term of D92 and IM. The result 
indicates that the coefficient of D92 is significant, while the two product terms are 
not, which implies that case (1) is empirically validated. Therefore, we only include 
the step dummy D92 into our VECM and cointegration test. 
The estimation comes of three steps. First, we test whether the three variables 
involved are stationary with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. 
Additionally, due to the fact that there could be structural breaks in the time series 
concerned, we apply the Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test, which allows for one 
structural break in the time series. When the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is 
not rejected by these two tests, we move to the second step: the cointegration test in 
Johansen’s (1991 & 1995) framework. If the first two steps indicate that the three 
variables are non-stationary and cointegrated, we take the third step: estimating the 
VECM of system (6.2), and testing for weak exogeneity and Granger-causality 
relationships between the three variables.  
 
2 We also applied the Chow breakpoint test for other years, such as 1989, 1996 and 1994, as suggested 
in Table 6.2 below. However, these other step dummies are not associated with significant breaks.  
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6.3.4   Data 
The current study examines the relationships between FDI inflows, exports and 
imports for China using annual data from 1980 to 2003. The three time series are 
deflated by using a GDP deflator, and are converted to constant US dollars (2000 = 
100). All variables are transformed to natural logs before estimation. GDP deflators 
are obtained from the OECD (SourceOECD). Annual realized FDI values are 
collected from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOC) 
and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). 
Exports and imports information is from the Customs of General Administration of 
the People’s Republic of China. Figure 6.2 shows exports, imports and FDI in 
logarithms from 1980 to 2003. 
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Figure 6.2: China’s FDI, exports and imports 1980-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: FDI, EX and IM stand for logarithms of FDI, exports and 
imports, respectively.  
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Clearly, our three variables reveal an upward trend during the sample period. FDI 
increased faster than exports and imports did, however, especially in the 1992 – 1994 
period. 
6.4   Evidence 
6.4.1   Unit root tests 
Table 6.1 reports the results of the unit root tests for exports, imports and FDI using 
the ADF test. Two models with different deterministic components are considered: 
the model with a constant only, and a model with a constant and a trend. It is clear 
that all the log-variables have a unit root in their levels. However, the null hypothesis 
of a unit root in first difference of the three variables is rejected at the 10 and 5%-
level in the model with a constant and a trend. Additionally, the hypothesis is 
rejected at the 5%-level for all variables in the model with a constant only. Therefore, 
according the ADF test we can treat exports, imports and FDI as integrated of order 
one in our sample, denoted I(1). 
The ADF test is biased toward accepting the null of non-stationarity if the time 
series has a structural break. Therefore, we apply the Zivot-Andrews unit root test. 
Table 6.2 shows the results. Again, the findings suggest that the three time series are 
I(1). These results permit us to proceed with the next step, cointegration tests, in 
order to investigate the long-run relationships between exports, imports and FDI.  
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Table 6.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test  
Variables Level  First  difference 
 
With constant 
and trend 
With constant 
only 
With constant and
Trend  With constant only 
EX -2.723(2) 0.912(4)  -3.937**(0) -3.303**(0) 
IM -3.120(3) 1.081(7)  -3.462*(5) -3.398**(5) 
FDI -1.701(3)  -1.793  (3)  -3.722**(1) -3.442**(1) 
Notes:  
(1)   EX, IM and FDI denote the logs of exports, imports and FDI, respectively. 
(2)   **, and * are significant at the 5% and 10%-level, respectively. 
(3) Figures in parentheses are the number of lags that were selected by the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
Table 6.2: Zivot-Andrews unit root test: minimum t-statistic 
 Level  First  difference 
 With  constant 
and 
trend 
With constant
only 
With constant 
and 
Trend 
With constant 
only 
EX  -2.093 (1994)  -2.093 (1994)  5.126 (1996)**  5.126 (1996)** 
IM  -4.019 (1990)  -4.019 (1990)  4.800 (1989)  4.800 (1989)** 
FDI  -4.567 (1992)  -4.567 (1992) 5.893(1992)***  5.893  (1992)*** 
Notes:  
(1) EX, IM and FDI denote the logs of exports, imports and FDI, respectively. 
(2) **, and * are significant at the 5% and 10%-levels, respectively. 
(3) Figures in parentheses are break points. 
 
6.4.2   Cointegration test and long-run relationships 
The purpose of the cointegration test is to determine whether our three non-
stationary time series are cointegrated – that is, to detect whether there are long-run 
equilibrium relationships among the three variables. As mentioned above, we include 
the step dummy D92  as an exogenous variable. We test for cointegration using the  
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methodology developed by Johansen (1991 & 1995). We first need to find the 
optimal lag order for the VECM model. Lag-exclusion Wald tests indicate that three 
lags is the optimal lag structure in our VECM. With this optimum number of lags, 
we move on to choose the appropriate cointegration model for the constant and the 
trend. We estimated the five models considered by Johansen (1995: 80-84). The 
results indicate that a model with a linear trend and cointegrating equations with 
intercepts is supported. Therefore, we use this model to perform the cointegration 
test. 
Table 6.3 reports the results of the cointegration test. Trace statistics and L-max 
statistics indicate that the null hypotheses of no cointegration, r=0, and one 
cointegration vector, r = 1, are rejected at the 1%-level. However, the null hypothesis 
of two cointegrating vectors, r = 2, is not rejected.  Consequently, we conclude that 
there are two cointegrating relationships among the three selected variables in the 
model. Based on the normalization used in Table 6.3, the two cointegration vectors 
are: 
 EX-1.97FDI+7.01, and                         (6.3) 
 IM-1.36FDI+1.28,                          (6.4) 
which are included in the ect term in the VECM system of Equation (6.2). The results 
indicate (a) a long-run positive relation between FDI and exports, and (b) a long-run 
positive relation between FDI and imports. These relationships imply that China’s 
FDI inflow is positively associated with China’s exports and imports in the long run. 
Combining Equations (6.3) and (6.4) yields the following positive relationship 
between EX and IM: 
EX-1.45IM+5.16.                                                    (6.5)      
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Table 6.3: Johansen’s cointegration tests (with three lags) 
H0=r Eigenvalue λmax     5% critical value λtrace 5% critical value
0 0.970  70.41***  21.13  102.53*** 29.80 
1 0.778  30.14***  14.26  32.12*** 15.49 
2 0.094  1.97 3.84  1.98  3.84 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
One cointegrating equation: log-likelihood = 109.31. 
EX   IM  FDI   c   
1.00 -1.06  -0.571  6.08   
β 
 (0.192)  (0.073)     
Two cointegrating equations: log likelihood = 119.37. 
β  EX   IM  FDI   c   
1.00 0.00  -1.97  7.01   
   (0.14)    
0.00 1.00  -1.36  1.28   
 
   (0.10)    
Notes: 
(1) ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively.  
(2) D92 is included as an exogenous variable. 
 
We must exercise caution, however, when interpreting this result. The reason is that, 
although the cointegration implies positive relations between the three variables, 
cointegration tests cannot determine the direction in which causality flows. The 
causality relationships can be ascertained from performing Granger-causality tests 
that incorporate the cointegrating relation. This is what we do next. 
6.4.3   VECM and short-run relationships 
Given the existence of two cointegrating relationships between exports, imports and 
FDI, we test for weak exogeneity and Granger-causality by using the VECM of  
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Equation (6.2).3 In line with the outcomes of the cointegration test, the order of the 
VECM is three, and a linear trend and cointegrating relations with constants are 
included in the model. Again, D92 is taken on board as an exogenous variable. The 
vector error correction estimates are shown in Table 6.4. The results indicate that 
D92 is positively significant in export and FDI equation, which confirms the effect of 
policy on exports and FDI. 
Table 6.5 reports the results of the weak exogeneity test. Weak exogeneity is rejected 
for EX and FDI at the 1%-level. However, weak exogeneity is not rejected for IM. 
This result implies that two of the three variables, EX and FDI, are weakly caused by 
all variables in the system. This conclusion is complemented by the result of the 
VECM Granger-causality test, as displayed in Table 6.6. The first column defines the 
equations of system (6.2). The other columns display χ2 (Wald) statistics for the joint 
significance of each of the other lagged endogenous variables and the error-
correction term in the associated equation. In the exports Equation (6.2a), the 
hypothesis that imports does not Granger-cause exports is rejected at the 1%-level, 
and the hypothesis that FDI does not Granger-cause exports is rejected at the 5%-
level. In the imports Equation (6.2b), the hypothesis that exports does not Granger-
cause imports cannot be rejected, and the hypothesis that FDI does not Granger-
cause imports is not rejected either. In the FDI Equation (6.2c), the hypothesis that 
exports does not Granger-cause exports is rejected at the 5%-level, and the 
hypothesis that FDI does not Granger-causes imports is rejected at the 1%-level. In 
summary, the Wald test statistics indicate that bi-directional causal links in the short-
 
3 When variables are non-stationary at their levels but stationary at their first differences, some studies 
employ a vector autoregression (VAR) in first differences to detect the causality relation (e.g., Liu, Wang 
and Wei 2001). However, when non-stationary variables are cointegrated, then a VAR in first 
differences is misspecified (Engle and Granger 1987). In the current study, two cointegration vectors 
are found. Therefore, a VECM is used.  
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run dynamics exist between ∆EX and ∆FDI, and that one-way causal links run from 
∆IM to ∆FDI and from ∆IM to ∆EX. 
Table 6.4: Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  CointEq2     
EX(-1) 1  0  
IM(-1) 0  1  
FDI(-1) -1.968  -13.1 (t) -1.358 -13.088 (t)  
C 7.010    1.280       
Error Correction:  D(EX)  t D(IM) t D(FDI) t 
CointEq1 -0.966  -2.290 -0.643 -0.477 2.194 3.983 
CointEq2 1.539 2.386 1.020 0.494  -2.959 -3.511 
D(EX(-1)) -0.340 -1.820 0.177 0.297 0.411 1.685 
D(EX(-2)) -0.481 -2.064 -0.754 -1.012 0.878 2.884 
D(EX(-3)) 0.021 0.087 -0.875 -1.108 0.984 3.050 
D(IM(-1)) -0.991  -1.743 -0.996 -0.548 2.318 3.121 
D(IM(-2)) -0.645  -1.797 -0.864 -0.752 1.637 3.488 
D(IM(-3)) -0.147  -0.519 -0.245 -0.271 1.171 3.171 
D(FDI(-1)) 0.055 0.496 0.128 0.359 0.004 0.028 
D(FDI(-2)) 0.225 2.768 0.177 0.680 -0.192 -1.802 
D(FDI(-3)) 0.056 0.475 -0.044 -0.116 -0.364 -2.347 
C 0.209  1.894 0.317 0.900 -0.940 -6.536 
D92 0.196  2.686 0.186 0.797 0.812 8.524 
R-squared 0.882  0.472 0.977  
Adj. R-squared 0.680  -0.432 0.936  
F-statistic 4.360  0.522 24.293  
Log likelihood  40.790  17.536 35.443  
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 5.22E-08  
Determinant resid covariance  2.24E-09  
Log likelihood  114.038  
Akaike information criterion  -6.904  
Schwarz criterion  -4.663  
Note: t-statistics are reported in the column at the right-hand side of the parameter 
estimates. 
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Table 6.5: Weak exogeneity test 
  χ2 p-value 
∆EX weakly exogenous to the system  21.00 0.0018 
∆IM weakly exogenous to the system  3.32 0.7678 
∆FDI weakly exogenous to the system  22.08 0.0012 
 
Table 6.6. VECM Granger-causality test 
Wald test statistics (χ2) 
Dependent variable 
∆EX  ∆IM  ∆FDI 
∆EX   12.44***  9.95** 
∆IM  1.52   1.20 
∆FDI  15.37** 12.53***  
Note: *** and ** are significant at the 1% and 5%-level, respectively. 
6.5   Conclusion and Discussion 
In this chapter, we focused on analyzing two relationships, FDI and exports, and 
FDI and imports. Our empirical study confirms the interactive causality relationships 
between China’s exports, imports and FDI, as summarized in Figure 6.3. Moving 
beyond previous studies, the present study finds evidence in support of more 
relationships between the three variables, although the findings are in line with that  
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in the extant literature.
4 In the long run, FDI positively relates to exports and 
imports, and exports is positively associated with imports. This result implies that 
multinational enterprises’ investments in China do not substitute for China’s exports 
and imports. In the short run, the VECM framework reveals bi-directional causal 
links between FDI and exports, and one-way causal links from imports to FDI and 
from imports to exports. In addition, this confirms the significant impact of 
liberalization policy on China’s exports and FDI inflows. 
  Figure 6.3: Relations between FDI, exports and imports 
 
                    
+ 
+
+
+
Import  FDI  Export 
 
 
First, the two-way causal link between exports and FDI suggests that growth of 
exports has made China more attractive to foreign investors, and foreign investment, 
in turn, has promoted China’s exports.  According to Kojima’s (1975 & 1982) 
macroeconomic approach, export growth reveals a country’s competitiveness in the 
world market. This competitiveness derives from the country’s comparative 
advantages. The comparative advantages encourage multinational companies to 
i n v e s t  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  s o  m a k i n g  u s e of these advantages to enhance their 
competitiveness in the world market. In the case of China, the growth of exports 
since 1978 has been four and a half times that of world exports, which demonstrates 
 
4 Most studies concern to relationships between China’s exports, imports and FDI. Wei (1999), Sun 
(2001), and Liu, Wang and Wei (2001) found only one-way relations between the three variables. Liu, 
Burridge and Sinclair (2002) traced a two-way relationship between FDI and export, and one-way 
linkages from FDI to imports, and from imports to exports.  
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that China can benefit from noticeable comparative advantages. These advantages 
attract FDI into China that seeks low-cost production and raw-material access. 
Given the nature of these types of FDI inflows, they, in turn, promote China’s 
exports. This finding is consistent with the arguments of Vernon (1966), Ozawa 
(1992) and Root (1977 & 1994). The causal link from FDI to export also reflects 
China’s FDI policies, with an overall bias toward stimulating export-oriented FDI. 
That is, export-oriented foreign investments were (and still are) highly encouraged by 
the Chinese government through special tax rebates, low land-usage fees, and 
offering water, electricity and other infrastructure services. Furthermore, there were 
restrictions and regulations imposed on foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in the 
area of export obligation. For example, under the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprises (1986, Article 3), FIEs have to export all or the 
majority of their products.
5 This is one of the reasons why FDI had a positive impact 
on exports in both the long run and the short run.  
Second, the causal link from import to FDI found in our VECM cointegration test is 
in line with the internationalization argument advocated in the extant international 
business and international economics literatures. That is, multinational enterprises 
are likely to first penetrate a new market by export, to subsequently switch to FDI 
once they have established presence in that market.  
Third, the lack of significance of causation from FDI to import can be explained by 
the contradictive impact of FDI on imports. On the one hand, FDI may replace 
import when the motivation for the investment is market-seeking. One the other 
hand, FDI might promote import when the motivation for foreign investment is 
factor-seeking. China is not only potentially the largest market in the world, but also 
 
5 This restriction was relaxed in 2000, but the Chinese government still encourages FIEs to market their 
products outside of China.  
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features very low labor costs. Therefore, multinational companies may be driven by 
both motives, which causes opposing effects on import. As a result, empirical studies 
do not find clear-cut evidence for either a negative or a positive relationship. In 
Chapter 4, we found that the impact of FDI on imports is less significant than the 
impact on exports, which is likely to be caused by the same reason.  
In summary, the findings of this chapter indicate a virtuous process of the 
development of China’s outward-oriented economy. As shown in Figure 6.3, more 
imports lead to more FDI, more FDI leads to more exports, and more exports lead 
to more FDI. This virtuous process reflects China’s open-door policy. The trade 
liberalization program that started in 1978 initially facilitated China’s imports, and 
hence, directly and indirectly, FDI and exports. In order to fulfill its promise to the 
WTO, China is currently further opening up its markets to the outside world. This 
virtuous circle is therefore likely to continue, or even accelerate, which will eventually 
underpin a high economic growth rate in China for many years to come. In the 
process, the role of MNEs through FDI is crucial. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary, Conclusions and 
Discussion 
The basic aim of this thesis was to explain the changes in China’s bilateral trade relations. For this 
purpose, five empirical studies were carried out, each from a different angle. The findings of these 
studies are summarized below. 
7.1   Conclusions from the Empirical Analyses 
Evolution of China’s foreign trade and related policies 
Chapter 2 has thrown more light on the evolution of foreign trade and FDI in China 
since the foundation of socialism in 1949. China’s economic development is 
characterized by two different periods. The first or pre-reform period from 1949 to 
1978 is characterized by the following features: (1) China’s implementation of an 
import-substitution strategy in its industrialization; (2) a foreign trade system 
dominated by complete state monopoly; (3) the elimination of market forces; and (4) 
the use of political arrangements as a weapon against enemies in international 
political struggles. Under this trade regime, foreign trade accounted for only a small 
part of the Chinese economy. China was basically a closed economy with a limited 
role in world trade. In line with this role, China’s foreign trade was concentrated in 
terms of the number of trade goods and trade partners.  
The second period or reform era started in 1978. In this period, China became a 
prime example of a developing country that integrated into the world economy,  
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particularly in the areas of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). It 
also shifted from import-substitution regimes to export-promotion regimes. Trade 
decentralization and liberalization increased the impact of the market mechanism on 
China’s foreign trade. During the past two decades, China became one of the most 
dynamic trading countries in the world. China’s foreign trade growth not only made 
China an important player in the world economy, but also exerts an important 
influence on its domestic economy. In terms of trade goods and trade partners, 
China’s trade has been diversified more than at any other period in China’s history. 
Associated with China’s growth of foreign trade, FDI has expanded extraordinarily.  
Impact of political factors on bilateral trade linkages 
China’s position in the international world during the past half-century provides vital 
information for investigating the relation between politics and trade. Although there 
is a substantial number of studies in this area, Chapter 3 extends the literature in at 
least three ways: (1) it tests the impact of five political arrangements simultaneously, 
which is, as far as we know, more comprehensive than any former study; (2) it uses 
trade intensity instead of trade flows as the measurement of trade relations, which 
better reflects the mutual relationship between politics and trade; and (3) it accounts 
for zero observations, temporal dynamics and heterogeneity within one framework, 
and therefore better fits with the characteristics of the data than other models used 
in previous studies.  
Our empirical analysis in Chapter 3 showed that political arrangements played a 
crucial role in shaping China’s international trade. By covering a long time window 
with much variation and more appropriate methods for analyzing the data, and by 
using a trade intensity index rather than trade value to measure bilateral trade 
relations, this study was able to provide strong empirical evidence in favor of the 
hypotheses that the establishment of diplomatic relations, cooperation, high-level  
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visits and similarity of political systems are associated with higher intensities of trade 
linkages. Weaker empirical evidence was found in favor of Linder’s effect. The 
hypothesis that member countries of a Preferential Trading Agreements (PTA) have 
had lower trade intensities with China was rejected. These findings suggest that 
political factors were more important than economic factors over the last half 
century. By contrast, due to China’s trade liberalization program in the 1990s, the 
importance of economic factors has increased over the last decade.  
Impact of cultural, economic and geographical factors on bilateral inter-industry trade linkages 
Chapter 4 focused on the explanation of the intensity of China’s bilateral trade 
linkages in the 1990s. Six models were estimated in order to seek explanation for the 
shifts in the export and import intensities of trade with different trade partners over 
the 1993-1999 period. The estimation results revealed striking differences for 1993 
vis-à-vis 1999, as well as for export vis-à-vis import trade intensities. By analyzing these 
differences, the following conclusions could be drawn. First, after seven years of 
further reform, the economic drivers of trade intensities have gained momentum. 
This confirms the common sense belief that China is integrating rapidly into the 
world market, and that the market mechanism is starting to work properly in the area 
of Chinese foreign trade. Political determinants of trade intensities that were still very 
important in 1993, were pushed to the background by a number of key economic 
factors in 1999. Second, by comparing the estimation results obtained for the export 
and import trade intensity indices, we found that economic factors appear to be 
more influential in the export than in the import domain. The reason for this 
difference is that, while China has largely liberalized its trade regime and has taken a 
number of important steps to reduce protection, import countries still face tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, as well as complicated formalities associated with import activities. 
Third, the estimation results over the 1993-1999 period suggest that Linder’s effect  
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does exist in a transitional country like China, especially in the export domain. This 
finding supports the idea that a developing and transitional country, such as China, 
needs to import technology-intensive products from developed countries. In the 
import domain, Linder’s effect appeared to be very weak. Fourth, in Chapter 4, we 
found empirical evidence in favor of the argument that the greater the geographical 
distance between China and its trade partner, the lower will be their mutual trade 
intensity indices. This is in line with standard trade theory logic. Finally, in this 
chapter, we found that FDI and ethnic ties positively influenced the bilateral trade. 
In Chapter 3, it was found that Linder’s effect did not exist in the export domain and 
only weakly in the import domain. This difference with respect to export and this 
similarity with respect to import require further explanation. In Chapter 3, we 
examined data from 1950 to 2002. In the first three decades of this period, China 
was a planned economy. The purpose of import during this period was to meet the 
needs of domestic industrialization. In other words, China’s import plan was largely 
based on its planned economic situation, and economic factors were at least to some 
extent responsible for China’s import behavior. This situation did not really change 
when China started to reform its economy, and market forces became responsible 
for China’s import behavior. Consequently, the impact of Linder’s effect on China’s 
import intensity indices remained more or less the same. In the case of export, 
though, the situation in both periods was quite different. In the first three decades, 
the objective of China’s export behavior was to finance its imports. Consequently, 
politics exerted more influence on export than on import, pushing Linder’s effect to 
the background. Only after China thoroughly integrated into the world economy, 
and market forces became responsible for China’s export behavior, did Linder’s 
effect start to work. In sum, although Linder’s effect became significant in the 1990s,  
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this period was too short to find any empirical evidence in favor of Linder’s effect 
with respect to export over the whole sample period.  
Impact of cultural, economic and geographical factors on bilateral intra-industry trade structures 
In Chapter 5, we investigated the nature of intra-industry trade between China and 
50 trade partners during the 1992-2001 period, when China has accelerated the 
implementation of policies to liberalize international trade and investment. In order 
to explore the determinants of total intra-industry trade (TIIT), we disentangled this 
measure into vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT) vis-à-vis horizontal intra-industry 
trade (HIIT). This distinction led to a significant improvement of the estimation 
results. The following conclusions could be drawn from this analysis. First, TIIT has 
increased significantly during this period, which implies that China’s trade structure 
has been upgraded. By breaking down TIIT into VIIT and HIIT, we found that 
VIIT has been the dominant type in China’s intra-industry trade, increasing faster 
than HIIT did. Second, while the variables geographical distance, economic size, 
trade development stage and FDI are common determinants that affect both VIIT 
and HIIT in the same direction, the variable reflecting similarity does not. The 
results of our two sets of estimations showed that China’s HIIT is more likely to 
emerge with countries that are similar than those that are different. Conversely, 
China’s VIIT happens more with different rather than with similar countries. The 
considerable increase of VIIT in Chinese bilateral trade suggests that China’s areas of 
specialization based on comparative advantages have expanded from inter-industry 
to intra-industry trade domains. This conclusion is in line with the progression of 
China in its latest trade development stage. 
Third, this study corroborates that most of intra-industry trade determinants 
discussed in the literature have done their job in the case of China in 1992-2001.  
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These determinants are cultural, economic and geographical factors. This overall 
finding again confirms that the market mechanism has started to work properly in 
the area of Chinese foreign trade in the post-1992 period. In addition to this, China’s 
recent trade history revealed two specific features that can be attributed to the 
particulars of the process of transition and liberalization. One is that trade and FDI 
policies have influenced the nature and cause of Chinese bilateral intra-industry trade. 
Specifically, the policies on processing trade and export-oriented FDI have 
significantly encouraged related FDI and VIIT. The other is that, due to historical 
and institutional reasons, Hong Kong has played an important role in China’s trade 
development. 
The interaction between trade and FDI 
In Chapter 6, we investigated the causality and direction of linkages between FDI, 
exports and imports of China’s economy during the 1980 – 2003 period by applying 
cointegration and Granger-causality methods. In the long run, FDI appeared to be 
positively related to exports and imports, while exports appeared to be positively 
related to imports. These results imply that multinational enterprises’ investments in 
China do not substitute for China’s exports and imports. In the short run, the 
Granger-causality method revealed bi-directional causal links between FDI and 
exports, and one-way causal links from imports to FDI and from imports to exports. 
These results confirm the significant impact of the liberalization policy on China’s 
exports and FDI inflows. The lack of significance of causation from FDI to import 
also explains our findings in Chapters 4 that the impact of FDI on imports is less 
significant than the one on exports. 
The results of this causality analysis point to a virtuous process of the development 
of China’s outward-oriented economy: more imports lead to more FDI, more FDI 
leads to more exports, and more exports lead to more FDI. This virtuous process  
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reflects China’s open-door policy. The trade liberalization program that started in 
1978 initially facilitated China’s imports, and hence, directly and indirectly, FDI and 
exports. Currently, China is further opening up its markets to the outside world in 
order to fulfill its promise to the WTO. The implication of this policy is that the 
described virtuous circle is likely to continue, or even to accelerate, which will 
eventually underpin a high economic growth rate in China for many years to come. 
In the process, the role of MNEs through FDI is crucial. 
7.2   General Conclusion 
This thesis revealed the great changes of China’s trade relations during the last half 
century. During the pre-reform period, institutional and political factors were the 
most important determinants of China’s bilateral trade linkages. After China started 
to open the door to the world market in 1978, the market mechanism began to exert 
its function in China’s trade linkages. Consequently, especially economic factors 
became more important. Particularly, MNCs play very important roles in China’s 
foreign trade relations. Figure 7.1 gives an overview of all the results (cf. Figure 1.1). 
The contribution of this thesis to the international trade literature in general and the 
study of China in particular is, at least, twofold. For one, it is the first study that 
systematically investigated the impact of four groups of factors: cultural, economic, 
geographical and political factors. This is, as far as we know, more comprehensive 
than any former study. Moreover, it has been shown that trade theories commonly 
applied to trade data of developed economies also apply to a large transition 
economy such as China. 
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Figure 7.1: Summary of the empirical studies 
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7.3   Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
Although this thesis has deepened our understanding of China’s bilateral trade 
relations in a period characterized by globalization and transition, it is also due to a 
number of limitations that point the way to future studies.  
First, this thesis has studied bilateral trade linkages and trade structures at the 
aggregate country level. Future research might focus on lower levels of aggregation. 
Especially a breakdown of trade flows by industry offers additional research 
opportunities. The reason is that the response to both positive and negative factors  
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of international trade may vary substantially across industries. Furthermore, the 
elasticities of supply and of demand might differ widely across industries. A study at 
the level of single industries may offer not only additional information about China’s 
trade relations, but also may throw more light on the kind of policies needed for 
industry development. 
Second, given the important role of FDI found at the macro level, future studies 
should also pay attention to FDI at the industry level or even at the firm level. The 
combination of micro-level studies in international business and macro-level studies 
in international economics may contribute to the development of an international 
business and economics literature (Brakman et al., 2005). The motivation and entry 
mode choice of MNEs not only affect their intra-firm trade, but also the general 
trade pattern of a state. Since the motivation and entry mode choice of MNEs tend 
to vary considerably across industries, industry-level or firm-level analysis within a 
macro-economic framework may help to better understand international trade 
relations.  
Third, given the important impact of political factors on China’s bilateral trade 
relations and the limitations of our political data variables used in this thesis, further 
research in this area is welcome. Another potential research issue, next to replicating 
our study on the relationship between trade and politics in different settings, is to 
extend the analysis with the reversal relationship between politics and trade. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to explore why political arrangements are so influential 
in China.  
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Tot 1978 was China ondanks zijn grootte een geïsoleerd land. Daar kwam 
verandering in toen partijleider Mao Zedong werd opgevolgd door Deng Xiaoping 
en China haar economie begon te liberaliseren, de deur openzette naar het 
buitenland en handelsrelaties zich konden ontwikkelen. Centraal in dit proefschrift 
staat de vraag of China’s handelsrelaties kunnen worden verklaard met behulp van 
handelstheorieën die in beginsel zijn ontwikkeld voor westerse economieën. Het 
doel van deze studie is meer zicht te krijgen op de invloed van economische, 
politieke, geografische en culturele factoren op bilaterale handelsrelaties, alsook in 
veranderingen hierin. Deze vragen zijn actueel gezien China’s immense omvang en 
zijn huidige impact op de wereldeconomie. 
Hoe hebben handelsrelaties zich ontwikkeld? Hoe kunnen handelsrelaties worden 
gemeten in ruimte en tijd? In hoeverre is het politieke systeem en het uitgezette 
beleid in China’s vijfjarenplannen van invloed geweest op haar handelsrelaties? 
Welke factoren kunnen de ontwikkeling van China’s handelsrelaties verklaren? Is er 
net als bij andere onderontwikkelde economieën sprake van het effect van Linder? 
In hoeverre hebben buitenlandse investeringen invloed gehad? Is er wellicht sprake 
van een wederzijdse relatie tussen handel en buitenlandse investeringen? Door een 
antwoord te geven op deze vragen kunnen de veranderingen die in de tweede helft 
van de vorige eeuw in China’s handelsrelaties zijn opgetreden in perspectief worden 
geplaatst. Hieronder volgt een beknopte samenvatting van alle gevonden resultaten. 
Het proefschrift geeft eerst een overzicht van de ontwikkeling van de buitenlandse 
handel en buitenlandse investeringen sinds de oprichting van een socialistische staat 
in 1949. China’s economische ontwikkeling wordt gekenmerkt door twee perioden. 
In de eerste periode die loopt van 1949 tot 1978 was de economie van China 
gesloten. De buitenlandse handel werd gestuurd door een staatsmonopolie en het 
marktmechanisme had nauwelijks enige invloed. Ten opzichte van de internationale  
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markt was de omvang van de buitenlandse handel beperkt en betrof deze handel 
voornamelijk handel naar naaste buren. 
De tweede periode die loopt van 1978 is China’s hervormingsperiode. Ondanks dat 
het eenpartijstelsel bleef bestaan, voltrok zich vanaf 1978 een geleidelijk 
integratieproces waarin buitenlandse handel en buitenlandse investeringen een 
steeds grotere plaats innamen. In plaats van import werd de nadruk gelegd op 
export en het marktmechanisme deed zijn intrede. In de tachtiger en negentiger 
jaren kan China zelfs worden gekenmerkt als een van de meest dynamische 
economieën in de wereld met indrukwekkende groeicijfers. Door de groei van de 
buitenlandse handel is China ook tot een van de meest belangrijke handelsnaties 
verworden. Het aantal handelspartners is sterk gestegen, waaronder ook landen op 
grotere geografische afstand. De samenstelling van de handelsstromen is bovendien 
sterk gediversifieerd. Tenslotte zijn ook de buitenlandse investeringen in China 
sterk gestegen.  
De empirische analyse uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat politieke factoren 
een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld in de ontwikkeling van de buitenlandse handel. 
Door de ontwikkeling van China’s bilaterale handelsrelaties met 78 landen te 
analyseren over een periode van vijftig jaar, op basis van handelsintensiteiten in 
plaats van handelsstromen, en door gebruik te maken van betere econometrische 
schattingsmethoden dan voorheen, heeft deze studie sterk empirisch 
bewijsmateriaal aangedragen voor de volgende hypothesen. De handelsintensiteit 
tussen China en haar handelspartner zijn sterker gebleken indien bilaterale 
diplomatieke relaties werden aangegaan, indien werd samengewerkt, indien 
staatshoofden een bezoek aflegden en indien China’s politieke systeem 
overeenkwam met dat van haar handelspartner. Zwakker empirisch bewijsmateriaal 
is aangedragen voor het bestaan van het effect van Linder. De hypothese tenslotte 
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dat de handelsintensiteit tussen China en een handelspartner minder sterk was als 
dit land lid was van een handelsblok is verworpen.  
Bovenstaande bevindingen lijken erop te wijzen dat politieke factoren belangrijker 
zijn gebleken dan economische factoren. Dat is echter voorbarig, omdat het een 
analyse betreft over een periode van vijftig jaar. Het is mogelijk dat in China’s 
hervormingsperiode economische factoren steeds belangrijker zijn geworden en dat 
dit in een analyse over vijftig jaar niet of onvoldoende tot uitdrukking komt. 
Daarom is dezelfde analyse in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 opnieuw uitgevoerd maar dan 
alleen over de jaren negentig. 
Deze empirische analyse uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat de invloed van 
economische, culturele en geografische factoren op China’s bilaterale 
handelsrelaties na twee decennia van hervormingen aan significantie heeft 
gewonnen. Met name de hervormingen in laatste zeven jaar tot aan 1992 zijn van 
doorslaggevend belang gebleken. Dit bevestigt het algemene beeld dat de integratie 
van China in de wereldeconomie zich in snel tempo heeft voltrokken en dat de 
invloed van het marktmechanisme op China’s buitenlandse handel vruchten heeft 
afgeworpen. Politieke factoren die in 1993 nog belangrijk bleken, zijn in 1999 
definitief door economische factoren op de achtergrond geplaatst. Wel is duidelijk 
geworden dat, door de resultaten met betrekking tot export en import met elkaar te 
vergelijken, economische factoren van meer invloed zijn geweest op de intensiteit 
van de export dan van de import. Ofschoon China haar handelsbeleid heeft 
geliberaliseerd en stappen heeft ondernomen om protectionisme te beteugelen, is 
de reden hiervan dat importeurs nog steeds worden geconfronteerd met 
handelsbarrières zowel in de vorm van tarieven als in allerlei ingewikkelde 
douaneformaliteiten. 
De empirische analyse in dit hoofdstuk bevestigt eveneens dat de handelsintensiteit 
afneemt met de geografische afstand, hetgeen in overeenstemming is met de 
traditionele handelstheorie. Niet onbelangrijk zijn ook de buitenlandse Chinese  
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gemeenschappen gebleken; chinezen die zich soms al ver in het verleden buiten 
China hebben gevestigd. Deze Chinese gemeenschappen blijken als een soort 
springplank te hebben gefungeerd bij het aanknopen of versterken van buitenlandse 
handelsrelaties. 
De empirische analyse uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 5 toont de invloed aan van 
economische, culturele en geografische factoren op China’s bilaterale 
handelsrelaties binnen sectoren. Hiertoe is de totale intrasectorale handelsindex 
(TIIT) bepaald en opgedeeld in de verticale intrasectorale handelsindex (VIIT) en 
de horizontale intrasectorale handelsindex (HIIT). De bevindingen van deze analyse 
kunnen in drie punten worden samengevat. 
Ten eerste is gebleken dat de totale intrasectorale handelsindex over de periode 
1992-2001 aanzienlijk is gestegen, hetgeen impliceert dat de kwaliteit van de 
verhandelde producten is gestegen. Uit de opsplitsing is gebleken dat dit met name 
kan worden toegeschreven aan een toename van de verticale intrasectorale handel. 
Ten tweede is gebleken dat de meerderheid van de onderzochte variabelen de twee 
indices VIIT en HIIT in dezelfde richting beïnvloeden, zoals geografische afstand, 
economische omvang, het ontwikkelingsstadium van de handelsrelatie en 
buitenlandse investeringen. Alleen de variabele die de mate van similariteit meet 
vormt hierop een uitzondering. Waar similariteit tussen China en haar 
handelspartner bijdraagt aan de verklaring van de horizontale intrasectorale 
handelsindex, is het juist het ontbreken van similariteit dat bijdraagt aan de 
verklaring van de verticale intrasectorale handelsindex. Uit het feit dat de verticale 
intrasectorale handelsindex de totale index domineert, kan dan ook worden afgeleid 
dat comparatieve voordelen niet alleen China’s intersectorale handel maar ook haar 
intrasectorale handel verklaren. Anders gezegd, de producten waarin China zich 
heeft gespecialiseerd afgeleid van haar comparatieve voordelen hebben zich 
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uitgebreid van intersectorale naar intrasectorale handelsdomeinen. Deze conclusie 
onderstreept dat China in staat is gebleken een nieuw stadium te betreden in de 
ontwikkeling van haar handelsrelaties. Ten derde bevestigt de empirische analyse 
dat de determinanten van bilaterale handel, zijnde economische, culturele en 
geografische factoren, ook intrasectoraal van toepassing zijn. Dit geeft wederom 
aan dat het marktmechanisme sinds 1992 zijn vruchten heeft afgeworpen op 
China’s buitenlandse handel. 
De analyse uitgevoerd in hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de relatie tussen handel en 
buitenlandse investeringen en vindt empirisch bewijs voor het bestaan van causale 
relaties tussen export, import en buitenlandse investeringen. Deze laatste blijken op 
lange termijn positief beïnvloed te worden door export en import, terwijl export op 
zijn beurt positief beïnvloed wordt door import. Deze bevinding wijzen erop dat 
investeringen van multinationale ondernemingen in China niet in de plaats zijn 
gekomen van export en import. 
Tevens is er empirisch bewijs gevonden dat wijst op een wederzijdse relatie tussen 
export en buitenlandse investeringen op korte termijn, alsook een eenzijdige relatie 
van import naar buitenlandse investeringen en een eenzijdige relatie van import 
naar export. Het geeft aan dat China’s liberalisatiepolitiek een significante bijdrage 
heeft geleverd aan haar export en aan de instroom van buitenlandse investeringen.  
Al deze resultaten tezamen duiden op een zichzelf vesterkend ontwikkelingsproces 
van China’s opendeur politiek: meer import leidt tot meer buitenlandse 
investeringen, meer buitenlandse investeringen veroorzaken meer export, hetgeen 
op zijn beurt weer meer buitenlandse investeringen oproept. China’s 
liberalisatiepolitiek, dat in 1978 gestalte kreeg, leidde aanvankelijk alleen tot meer 
import. Niet lang daarna namen export en buitenlandse investeringen als gevolg 
hiervan toe, zowel direct als indirect, hetgeen uiteindelijk heeft geleid tot een 
positieve ontwikkelingsspiraal. Ook vandaag de dag staat het openen van haar 
markten nog hoog op China’s politieke agenda, mede met het oog op haar belofte  
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aan de wereldhandelsorganisatie (WTO). Deze positieve ontwikkelingsspiraal zal 
daarom naar verwachting nog voortduren en zichzelf wellicht nog verder versterken, 
zodat ook in de komende jaren nog hoge groeicijfers verwacht mogen worden. 
Multinationale ondernemingen die zich in China zullen vestigen zullen hierbij een 
doorslaggevende rol spelen. 
Dit proefschrift heeft de veranderingen die zich in de laatste halve eeuw in China’s 
handelsrelaties hebben voorgedaan aan een diepgaande empirische analyse 
onderworpen. Alles overziende, blijken politieke factoren hierbij de belangrijkste rol 
te hebben gespeeld. Nadat China in 1978 haar deuren opende naar de internationale 
wereld, heeft het marktmechanisme echter vat kunnen krijgen op deze 
handelsrelaties. Aanvankelijk weinig, maar later steeds meer. Dit heeft ertoe geleid 
dat de invloed van de politieke factoren in de jaren negentig naar de achtergrond 
zijn gedrukt en zijn overgenomen door factoren die traditioneel thuishoren in 
handelsmodellen, namelijk economische, culturele en geografische factoren.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 